Senior Executives and the Emergence of Local Responsibilities in Large Organisations: A Complexity Approach to Potentially Better Results by Groot, Nol
  
 
Senior Executives and the Emergence of Local Responsibilities in 
Large Organisations: A Complexity Approach to Potentially 
Better Results 
 
Nol Groot 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements of the University of Hertfordshire 
for the degree of Doctor of Management 
 
 
 
The program of research was carried out in the  
Department of Human Resources and Strategy 
University of Hertfordshire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2007 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
            
              
   In memory to my father’s spirit, my mother’s kindness 
     and my sister Hannie’s courage 
 3 
ABSTRACT 
 
All executives strive for better results in their organisations. They are always 
dependent on others to achieve these results and this dependency is particularly 
evident in large organisations. This thesis is concerned with the ways in which 
these better results might be achieved and the role senior executives might play in 
this process. The traditional view is that senior executives design and control the 
way their organisations function and better results therefore depend upon getting 
the design and the controls ‘right’. My personal experience, supported by many 
authors, is that this view is often far from reality. In this thesis I therefore draw on 
an alternative view of how organisations function, namely, the theory of complex 
responsive processes, in order to explore how senior executives can be more 
effective given their very limited ability to design and control their organisations.  
 
From a complex responsive processes perspective (Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 
2000; Stacey, 2003a), an organisation is understood, by analogy with the 
complexity sciences, to be processes of self-organising interaction between 
agents. The abstract analogy from the complexity sciences is interpreted in the 
case of human interaction according to the thinking of the American pragmatist G. 
H. Mead (1934). Mead explains the simultaneous emergence of mind and society 
in terms of the social act in which one person gestures to another and in doing so 
calls forth a response from that other in ongoing conversational processes in 
which patterns of communication (meaning) emerge across the organisational 
population. Work in organisations is accomplished in these conversational 
processes. In their conscious, self-conscious and responsive interaction, human 
agents depend on each other; according to the process sociologist N. Elias (1978), 
this means that all human relating is simultaneously constraining and enabling. 
Elias defines power as these enabling constraints between people, so that power is 
an aspect of all human relating. According to Elias, values, norms and ideology 
are the basis of power. Human choice and intention influence the shifting of 
power balances in which conflict, as a normal aspect of human interaction, plays 
an important role. Power, ideology and identity are then seen as central aspects of 
organisations. 
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People only interact locally with a small proportion of the total population they 
are part of, and do so on the basis of their own local organising principles 
(communication, power and choice) rather than simply obeying centrally set rules. 
This can be understood as self-organisation. The global patterns of communicative 
interaction and power relations across the organisation emerge in these local 
interactions rather than following a specific plan, programme or blueprint. The 
global patterns are unpredictable and are not under the control of any member of 
the organisation. Global – that is, company-wide – results are thus not directly 
determined by global design or control, but emerge in this local interaction. This 
approach means re-thinking what is involved in leadership and the roles of senior 
executives. From this perspective, senior executives are paradoxically in control 
and not in control at the same time (Streatfield, 2001). 
 
In this thesis I draw on my own personal experience over the past three years as a 
senior executive in a large services and transport company to identify the role a 
senior executive can actively play in potentially achieving better results despite 
not being fully in control. I emphasise the active contribution of senior executives 
in many local interactions in which global company-wide results emerge. Through 
the manner in which they participate in, and inspire, the development of local 
conversational interaction, senior executives can actively encourage front-line 
staff to take local responsibility for contributing to global, company-wide 
improvement of results. During these local interactions a chain reaction of local 
responsibilities can emerge that can contribute to the improvement of global 
company-wide performance. It is the responsibility of senior executives to 
communicate clearly in the organisation about demands on performance and 
results by customers and stakeholders in the market, and to encourage the taking 
of local responsibility for them. From a complexity view, the impact of leaders on 
the organisation is not less but different, with potentially better results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
A project like this cannot be accomplished without the help and involvement of 
many others. There are many people who I need to thank for their support and 
cooperation:  
 My first supervisor, Ralph Stacey, who by answering one e-mail opened up a 
whole new world of recognition, understanding, search and reflexivity. His vital 
inspiration, sharing of knowledge and personal help is something I will cherish 
and always admire. Donald MacLean, as my second supervisor, not only 
commented on all my work but also introduced me into the world of search and 
the use of academic literature. The members of my learning set, Stephen Billing, 
Shona Brown, and Chris Townley, with whom I was able to share periods of ups 
and downs and whose ideas and comments were of great help in constructing the 
ideas. All other learning set and faculty members, and members of ‘The Institute 
of Group Analysis’, supporting this research to reach its current state.  
 A great number of colleagues have to be thanked. Aubert and Jacques, in 
different periods, took the initiative to start or renew our collaboration. I am 
grateful to both men for the opportunities they offered in work and research. 
Margret immediately supported my idea to start working on the DMan 
programme despite the very short decision period. Bert not only supported my 
application but also took the time and effort to read all my written material and 
gave very helpful comments producing the different projects. I will not forget the 
help of the team I collaborated with during the first years, Corné, Huib, Klaas, 
Lies and Rein, who by reading the drafts felt himself reintroduced in the field of 
sociology. At a later stage Anja and Rine started to present their comments and 
opinions along with plenty of new literature. This was both confusing and helpful, 
forcing me to make some adjustments in the final stage of the work. And all other 
colleagues and friends who have read drafts and contributed in the final result. 
  A special thank you goes to my brothers, Dr. Kees Groot, who introduced me 
to the world of complexity thinking a long time ago and used his academic 
experience to explain the necessity of detail and being precise in going through 
the projects; and Rens Groot, for transferring his unlimited creativity. My special 
colleague Maud, who I want to thank for not only (morally) supporting me in my 
 6 
day-to-day work but especially in all the organising around meetings, travel, 
learning sets, literature search and putting material together in a presentable form, 
without ever losing her cheerfulness. My two daughters, Annerose and Asceline, 
kept telling me that it all looked quite simple; and, last but not least, my wife 
Annelies, who has meticulously read and re-read, again and again, all my drafts 
and somehow never lost her patience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Abstract               3 
 
Acknowledgements             5 
 
Introduction            10 
 
Methodology            19 
 
Project One: 
 About Project One               38 
Strategy, Self and Research        39 
Introduction                 39 
Thinking about today             39 
The importance of strategic thinking in my personal development       41 
An historical example of strategy:  
     Prince Maurits and the battle on the Tielenheide (1597)         42 
Working in the service industry           44 
Strategic choices, expanding markets and acquisitions         45 
The entrepreneurial phase            48 
Reinventing myself             49 
Taking on a Board role again           50 
 
Project Two: 
 About Project Two             52 
Working at the edge of polarised conflict in organisations     54 
 Negotiating a labour agreement           54 
Reflection on the overriding intention of avoiding polarised conflict    56 
Preparing for the negotiation of a new unified labour agreement        61 
The issue of job security and job flexibility          64 
Conflict: individuals and groups            67 
 8 
Preparations for the negotiations continue          71 
Theme groups              72 
The conference            73 
Negotiations, agreement and some surprises      76 
Local interaction and global patterns                  78 
 
 
Project Three:  
 About Project Three             83 
Strategic development of a merger: formulating and  
implementing at the same time       84 
Introduction              84 
Organisational background, established–outsider relations        85 
Round one: cost reduction through cooperation as strategic choice      86 
The plan stops: strategic decision-making in isolation        87  
Back to business as usual            88 
Renewal of personal acquaintance and restart of cooperation        89 
Reflections on strategy             90 
Round two: interplay of intentions in strategic development       94 
Round three: exchanging new ideas with the Staff Councils       97 
Presentation(s) in the country: shifting established–outsider positions    99 
Round four:  
     involving people on operational levels in strategy development 100  
The big meeting:  
     formulation and implementation of strategy at the same time  103 
Micro strategy in retrospect       105 
 
Project Four:  
 About Project Four        109 
Resisting ‘technological myopia’: focusing on performance  
improvement at the interface of humans and technology   111 
Introduction         111 
Problems with the performance of train conductors    115 
Improving performance through technical systems    116 
 9 
From technology and humans to humans and technology   119 
Improving performance through interaction between social and technical      
systems         121 
Taking an actor–network perspective     126 
Technology and complex responsive processes    128 
Complex responsive processes of performance improvement  132 
Generalised other and ‘social object’     134 
What can we do to improve customer satisfaction in train services? 137 
Conclusion         142 
 
Synopsis and Critical Appraisal       143 
Growing awareness of problems in my thinking about the senior  
     executive role        144 
Taking a complex responsive processes perspective on the senior  
     executive role: developing local responsibility    147 
1) A complex responsive process view on leadership as a key           
aspect of the senior executive role    152 
2) Senior executive roles and the part conflict plays   155 
3) Local and global patterns of identity and image   158 
4) Technology and local social interactions    163 
5) Another aspect of local interaction: anxiety   168 
6) What senior executives can do      169 
Critical appraisal        174 
- Complex responsive process thinking versus systems thinking 175  
- Possible future research       177 
 
Bibliography         180 
 
Appendix 1 Strategy overview 
 
Appendix 2 Recent publications      194 
 
 10 
Introduction  
 
For the past seven years I have worked as a senior executive in different 
management positions for a large service and public transport company with 
25,000 employees. I have been director of a food and retail division, managing 
director of onshore operations, and at present I am responsible for transport and 
general service operations. Part of my current responsibility is the merging of 
several other parts of the company to provide integrated services, information and 
security to travellers. The total group participating in this process numbers 
approximately 10,000 people. The merger involves changing the tasks for drivers 
and conductors and introducing new technology.  
 
I joined this company after it had experienced a period of great upheaval. The 
source of the upheaval was a conflict in 1999 between the directors, the unions, 
the works councils and the majority of the staff running operations, about a plan 
for organisational change regarding timetables and employee work patterns. 
Although there was an official agreement with the unions, their members slowly 
but surely started to form informal subgroups who were opposed to what the 
unions had agreed. Short strikes were initiated by these groups, which seriously 
affected the traveller. It took only a few people to break up an existing structure 
and, as in this case, to cause travelling chaos across the country. These events led 
to an identity crisis for members of the organisation. The travelling public 
responded negatively to the disruption, which affected the company’s corporate 
image and identity. As these are also aspects of the identity of individuals in the 
company, the negative public response led to a sense of vulnerability. As a result 
of the emerging conflict and the consequent breakdown, some new directors were 
appointed and in 2002 a remarkable recovery started. However, improvements 
have now reached a plateau; at the same time, our organisation faces new 
challenges, like the introduction of a new electronic distribution system (EDS) 
that will change the tasks and requirements of many working in the service 
domain.  
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My purpose in the DMan research programme was to investigate more successful 
ways of cooperation with the unions, works councils and the total working 
population during the introduction of new technical systems, mergers and the 
realisation of substantial improvements in performance. The research is presented 
in four projects, using a reflexive narrative methodology, which I discuss in the 
next section. Project One is a discussion about personal leadership styles and a 
review of how I had been thinking about organisations before coming on the 
programme. Project Two is a story about leading a negotiation team during labour 
agreement negotiations. Project Three explores a strategic merger of sales 
departments from two divisions; and Project Four focuses on performance 
improvement at the interface of humans and technology.  
 
In making sense of the narratives in these projects, I have relied heavily on the 
theory of complex responsive processes, which is strongly influenced by Mead’s 
(1934) thinking, because it offered me a chance to engage in another way of 
thinking about people, technology and organisations. This approach differs from 
the views of systems thinking on organisational change. Complex responsive 
process theory focuses on human behaviour and interaction, meaning that the only 
agents in a process are people and they are not thought of as constituting a system. 
Instead they form, and are at the same time formed by, patterns of interaction 
between them (Stacey, 2003a). The interaction referred to here is understood as 
local interaction (self-organisation), and it is held that this local interaction leads 
to slowly evolving emergent global patterns. In understanding such patterns, the 
work of Elias is important (Elias, 1939). These global patterns structure the very 
personalities, identities, of locally interacting people through communication and 
interaction (Stacey, 2005a). In this process, according to Streatfield (2001) and 
Stacey (2003a), leaders are paradoxically in control and not in control at the same 
time. A third key element in the theory of complex responsive processes is the 
analogies drawn from the complexity sciences in which particular computer 
simulations model the dynamics of iterated, non-linear interaction between 
entities. The simulations demonstrate that a widespread coherent pattern will 
emerge from the local interaction in the complete absence of an overall blueprint, 
plan or programme; a process that is called self-organisation, which can be 
understood as interaction patterning itself from within (Prigogine, 1996; Allen, 
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1998; Stacey, 2003a; Schlick et al., 2006; Zuijderhoudt, 2007). The inclusion of 
the term ‘complexity approach’ in the title of my thesis emphasises this self-
organising property as an important aspect of a complex responsive processes 
view that forms the basis of my thinking in the four research projects.  
 
The theory of complex responsive processes offered unexpected possibilities for 
insight in relation to the projects referred to above:  
 
1. Developing other ways of thinking about leadership. 
2. Understanding the positive role of conflict, which led me to develop a notion 
of working with explorative conflict at the edge of polarised conflict during 
labour agreement negotiations. This helped to bring about a successful 
agreement.  
3. Taking a micro strategy approach during a merger process, in which strategy 
is seen as a pattern of interaction referring to organisational identity. The 
merger process was strongly influenced by patterns of power felt by people in 
terms of being part of the established group or as outsiders. Bringing the 
groups together led to strategy formulation with concurrent implementation, 
resulting in a successful merger.  
4. Understanding improvement processes as the development of ‘social objects’ 
within communities of professional practice operating in a technological 
environment. A ‘social object’ is a historically evolved tendency to act in 
similar ways in similar situations by groups of people in a common (working) 
environment (Mead, 1925, 1934). This is a concept that came to have 
considerable importance to my thesis, and I will be explaining it in much 
greater detail in Project Four. 
 
Being a long-time manager and having been responsible as a senior executive for 
many organisations, I have always wondered what it is that makes results in 
organisations improve or not. Management in our company has been struggling 
for more than ten years to initiate performance improvement processes without 
sustainable success. Why can organisations working in the same market present 
completely different outcomes in terms of performance and results? Most of the 
time, the credit for this is given to the CEO or the executive team. The question is 
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whether this is fair. Looking back at my own experience, I have noticed that 
increasing pressure on the people around me to perform better in their respective 
responsibility areas did not lead to the required improved outcome. Also, 
executing substantial organisational change programmes did not provide the 
expected improved outcome. This statement is supported by a whole group of 
authors: Pettigrew (1997), Boonstra (2000), Kaplan and Norton (2004) and 
Mulder, Robroek and Stil (2006). The important question then becomes: does the 
behaviour of executives have any influence at all on improvements, or are these 
merely the result of coincidence?  
 
At a certain point I started to become interested in complexity theory approaches. 
Although related to the natural sciences, complexity theory helped me to begin 
thinking differently about adaptive processes and forms of self-organisation. On 
the other hand, it did not explain how this approach could be helpful in tackling 
the many human-related questions an executive faces when managing a company. 
The complex responsive processes approach in the DMan programme enabled me 
to explore other approaches to the work of an executive and to think differently 
about organisations and the work I am doing. In this work I am not only interested 
in the academic knowledge part of the programme, but also very much concerned 
with the practical implications. Writing about complex responsive processes has 
required me to understand and explain my primary concern about what it means 
for what people do and what they can do differently regarding their 
responsibilities and to improve their organisational outcome. An aspect of this 
work is leadership: without really changing my approach to collaboration with 
people, I have come to understand this relation quite differently. Working as a 
senior executive is not some idealised form of leadership following some kind of 
agreed design. It involves many ordinary everyday activities that are vital to what 
we achieve in our organisation. 
 
I started my career working from a systemic perspective, using management by 
objectives and other management techniques for organisational design. They have 
served me well, but not at all times. During my research I started to understand 
how results in organisations develop as local interaction potentially leading to 
global (improved) outcome, based on the development of a ‘social object’ (Mead, 
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1925, 1934), a tendency to act, between people belonging to a same group or 
social community. During developments of these ‘social objects’, general 
tendencies were taken up by managers and professionals dealing with customers 
and transformed into local responsibilities. The leadership literature on complex 
responsive processes so far reduces the impact of the role of the leader. My 
investigations try to show that, from a complexity view, the impact of leaders on 
the organisation is not less but different. I came to understand my role as actually 
fostering and sometimes shaping the development of ‘social objects’, leading to 
the emergence of local responsibilities, without losing sight of my own overall 
responsibilities as senior executive. To explain how these developments took 
place, I will go on to set out a brief description of the structure of my thesis. 
 
 
General overview of the sections that follow this introduction  
 
The next section concerns methodology. Then I come to Project One. The themes 
emerging in this project have to do with what strategy means, what managers can 
do with their power, and what determines organisational outcomes. Another key 
theme relates to the importance of taking account of those affected by strategic 
decisions and the importance of the strategic decision-makers participating with 
them with an emphasis on teams. What can powerful executives accomplish, and 
how? In all these themes there is a strong leitmotif of (personal) strategy/plans 
that encounter the unexpected. In Projects Two to Four I have been able to expand 
on the research question that emerged after writing Project One:  
 
‘In a context of technical change in a public transport system, my research has 
to do with the following questions: How are we, as leaders, to work with the 
conflicts that emerge between those affected by the strategic change described 
above? In what way are strategic decisions affected by such emerging 
conflict? How does the recognition of inevitable emerging conflict affect the 
meaning of strategy in relation to change processes?’  
 
What amazes me in retrospect is that in the latest three projects the basis of the 
original research questions remained the focus of my most intense curiosity: the 
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social and organisational implications of conflict, strategy and technology, my 
ideas on which developed in an unexpected way due to the emerging events in my 
practice. 
 
The way I have been able to approach these points from a complex responsive 
processes view opened up, in addition to the original questions, new related 
research areas and areas of knowledge, supporting the development of new insight 
into organisational change processes from a leadership perspective. Elias (1939) 
explains how local interactions lead to slowly evolving global social patterns. 
Managers do not often have time to let things evolve slowly, so I have been trying 
to understand and experiment with other forms of leadership in which working 
according to insights coming from complex responsive processes theory can make 
leaders more effective. In doing so, I have been able to develop new knowledge 
both from a theoretical point of view and from the perspective of day-to-day 
practice. Although the term ‘leadership’ is not used very often in the four projects 
that follow, it is a clear thread running through all four of them and in fact through 
my life as a manager. The DMan programme offered me a chance to analyse and 
explain my own experience, which was often intuitively driven, using 
interpretative tools that enabled me to communicate more effectively to 
colleagues at all levels in the organisation. Projects Two and Three have been read 
and commented upon by colleagues who played a part in the narratives and with 
whom I work closely. Project Four has been circulating around the company and 
was even (without my knowledge!) translated into Dutch to reach a wider 
audience. Many of the recommendations I made regarding process approaches on 
specific strategic subjects developed in the four projects have been taken up by 
others in our organisation; and, as the proof of the pudding is in the eating, 
improving results are very encouraging. 
 
However, this process has not been as clear-cut and straightforward as it might 
sound. A complex responsive processes approach focuses on patterns of relating 
and power between people as the essence of organisational development and 
change. In this process leadership is paradoxically an activity of being in control 
and not in control of the organisation at the same time. This is still not what many 
leaders want. Most leaders want to be in control; when they are not, they try to 
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dictate what has to be done, or at least want to approve what is done. In this 
traditional model, the leader designs the system and expects employees to act 
accordingly. Indeed, this is also what many professional workers expect. Workers 
demand clarity, security and straightforward sound decisions; they put emphasis 
on their own position. I am often asked, ‘Can’t you make a straightforward 
decision, so we know what we’re in for?’ This attitude is also strongly supported 
by the unions, because it gives them control over how the workers position 
themselves.  
 
So, why change an approach that everyone seems happy with? A recent Human 
Resources Management (HRM) survey in our organisation, covering the total 
working population, found that being able to participate in developments around 
one’s own workplace scored as the most important item. Why do we find 
ourselves stuck in so many process developments as simple as providing better 
services to our customers? Why have we introduced so many parameters and Key 
Performance Indicators telling each other again and again we have to do better, 
without actual results?  
 
The general feeling is that leadership wants results and will design ways to 
achieve their goals. Professional workers want things to stay as they are and have 
no urgent feeling that performance outcome has to improve. Feelings of people 
working in our company are strongly influenced by the interplay between our 
corporate identity and the company’s corporate image, the image we have with the 
general public, part of our global patterns. The public, government and members 
of parliament often use journals, parliamentary sessions, correspondence, and 
other media to express the opinion that we are not improving enough, conveying 
the impression that we are losers. Our global external image reflects back upon 
the identity of many individuals in the company, structuring the personalities of 
locally interacting people (Stacey, 2005a). One could argue that the image of an 
organisation lacking improvement would stimulate everybody involved to try to 
do better; reality shows that it leads to acceptance of the situation, lethargy, shame 
and hiding; it is like knowing that smoking is bad for you (Maister, 2006). 
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My approach in this thesis is based on complex responsive processes thinking. In 
this thinking, it is social processes of local interaction between people, referred to 
as self-organisation, that create continuity, change and novelty, shaping the 
organisation while simultaneously being shaped by the organisation. Self-
organisation is not a free-for-all party that simply happens. It is about social 
processes, and this perspective encourages leaders to pay particular attention to 
conversation, habit, spontaneity, cooperation, conflict and power as enabling 
constraints in relationships. It also means enabling people to become responsible 
for local organisational processes leading to global company-wide outcomes 
(improvements), taking our individual day-to-day experiences seriously, rather 
than trying to organise from a central HQ. People are organising their own 
activities based on local principles, not acting according to a central program, plan 
or blueprint. In this process they might be taking into account a generalised or 
idealised statement, but in an ongoing activity of gesture and response they are 
interpreting that generalisation in the particular circumstances at the particular 
time, in which it is not under the control of one member in the community 
(Stacey, 2003a).  
 
Starting to introduce complex responsive thinking into the ongoing discourse in 
an organisation places one in the middle of a battlefield, because it requires 
knocking on all doors at the same time. Behind these doors are people who, either 
alone or in groups, have their own identities, ideas and ways of reacting. Although 
the projects describe a negotiation process, a merger process and a process of 
performance improvement in which conflict, strategy, the social and human-
technology interfaces are the main subjects, the main theme is about leading and 
leadership, in which identity, anxiety and power are binding factors. I will try to 
explain in what way these connected factors have played a crucial role in the 
organisational developments I describe, and how my own thinking has developed 
during the period of writing, researching and reflecting. Because of its 
importance, I will also connect these developments to groups outside the 
organisation, introducing relational aspects of organisational and corporate 
identity and corporate image. When groups of customers and other stakeholders 
and their demands play an important part in our development, ultimately we must 
face the inescapable requirement for our organisation to perform better. So what 
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are the roles, apart from simply generating and transferring energy, that leaders 
can play in this process if one takes a complexity view? In this field the 
development of complex responsive processes thinking (Stacey, Griffin and 
Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2003b) has offered challenging insights on how people 
working in local situations in organisations can and will take up responsibilities 
and contribute to potentially better results. I will also explain how managers, 
especially senior executives, can not only work differently but can also make a 
difference in terms of outcome and results. In the next section of the thesis I will 
describe the methodology used during the research programme; and then in the 
sections that follow, I will present in four projects the processes leading to the 
final arguments in the synopsis.   
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Methodology  
 
The initial information material on the professional doctorate called the Doctor of 
Management (DMan) stated that ‘Participants’ work will be the focus of their 
research. … Everyone is acting with intention to shape the organisation while, at the 
same time, they are being shaped by the organisation. Paradoxically this shaping 
process emerges as one action in the present. This is the basis for speaking of self-
organisation in the social sciences. The sentence in italics opens up a new world for 
the practitioner in search of academic knowledge. Being a long-time practitioner, I 
wondered why so many degree programmes and advanced management programmes 
have great difficulty in really closing the gap between study and practice, a concern 
expressed by other authors in the field (Hoddell, 2000; Morris et al., 2004; Wormell, 
2004; Boud and Tennant, 2006; Grogan et al., 2007) and in Europe, especially taken 
up by universities in the UK (Powel and Long, 2005; ERSC, 2005; Ivory et al., 2006) 
and in Germany (Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2004; Gorzka and 
Lanzendorf, 2006). It seems that traditional PhD programmes, then, have great 
difficulty in closing this gap; and this is where a professional doctorate could be 
useful. Many colleagues have asked me what a professional doctorate is. In the 
Netherlands, as far as I know, there are only two professional doctorates: one in 
Engineering, delivered by Eindhoven University of Technology, and the other in 
Business Administration, delivered by the University of Maastricht. Several authors 
have explained the differences and similarities between the two doctorate paths; 
others have even identified a third path, a professional research path within a 
traditional PhD (Boud and Tennant, 2006).  
 
The difference strongly resonates with the theory–practice gap mentioned in much 
of the literature. Universities try to reach out to companies to combine their 
research initiatives to establish an area of learning that is of mutual interest; many 
traditional PhD programmes evolved in this way. Executives often sponsor these 
initiatives, collecting the results, but very seldom actively participate in the 
research. Many senior consultants have roots in their consultancy firms and 
lecture at universities, some even as professors. But what about managers and 
executives? How often do they themselves participate in academic research; and if 
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they do not, can this be seen as a missed opportunity? I want to explore the 
differences between traditional PhDs and professional doctorates as a way of 
highlighting the methodology I have used in my research for the DMan. I 
emphasise the importance of companies embracing the professional doctorate 
initiatives to enable managers and specialists to develop academic knowledge in 
their own fields of expertise. This can contribute to closing the practice–theory 
gap. Especially within the social sciences area, the DMan programme offered a 
remarkable opportunity for conducting academic research into my own field of 
executive work, strongly enhancing my personal and professional abilities.  
 
Morris et al. (2004) analysed the publication history of two of the most influential 
and integrative journals in their field of clinical psychology according to the 
authors’ degree qualifications over the last thirty years, and discovered that PhDs 
produced more published scholarship than PsyDs and held the majority of the 
faculty positions in integrative programmes. Faculty who graduated from 
integrative programmes were three times more likely to have a PhD than a PsyD. 
Morris et al. explain the difference in terms of the academic psychologists who 
value research above their own clinical practice, while those in the professional 
school tend to value practice above research. Another important reason for the 
difference between doctorates might be the relatively short histories of many 
professional doctorate programmes. There is a movement for clinical training that 
has developed during the past decade according to a scholar-professional model 
that emphasises the mutuality of science and practice. This movement produces a 
whole range of contributions to integration in addition to life in the academy, in 
which PsyDs excel; and current developments suggest that the future comparative 
contributions of PhD authors and PsyD authors might present another picture.  
 
Hoddell (2000) compares the traditional PhDs with professional doctorates and 
wonders whether developments indicate convergence or divergence between the 
two approaches. Although it is possible to find exceptions, the key characteristics 
generally are as set out in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Professional Doctorates and PhDs 
 
Professional Doctorate PhD 
Usually modular and often, but not 
necessarily, credit-based. The taught 
modules are often shared with related 
Masters-level programmes. 
Never credit-based, and almost  
invariably seen as a single integral  
programme. 
Usually part-time, but there are some  
subject areas where this is not the case.  
Traditionally full-time, but with an 
increasing number of part-time  
candidates. This trend is likely to  
increase as a consequence of student 
debt. 
 
There are normally explicit criteria for  
assessment of the Professional 
Doctorate; usually these are related to 
explicit learning outcomes.  
While most universities specify that  
the PhD should be based on a significant  
original contribution to knowledge,  
there is not usually any interpretation  
of this into explicit assessment.  
Most Professional Doctorates are 
cohort-based – partly because of the 
need to offer taught elements efficiently, 
and partly because of elements of 
teamworking. 
Most PhDs are individual, although in  
the sciences the individual project may 
be carried out in the context of a  
research group team. 
While there is a requirement that the 
candidate demonstrates a high level of 
knowledge and understanding within the 
field, this must also be related to  
professional practice. 
A PhD may or may not be related to 
practice – and can be purely academic  
in focus. 
(Hoddell, 2000, slide 7) 
 
Hoddel (2000) also points to a number of factors that would normally be 
identified as common to both professional doctorates and PhDs. These are factors 
that universities have chosen to define as a doctoral level of award, and they are 
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derived in the main from the traditional view of the PhD. These common factors 
are:  
 
- A requirement for a significant original contribution to knowledge; 
- Assessment based on a substantial written dissertation or thesis; 
- Assessment that includes a viva voce examination; 
- Demonstration by the candidates of a high level of expertise in their 
subject area, which may not be limited solely by the boundaries of their 
research area. 
 
The DMan programme is one that enables participants to combine executive work 
with academic research, but in a way that is different from many other 
programmes in that the thesis is not about analysing and researching an abstract 
hypothesis, but focuses specifically on the candidate’s own working life. This 
emphasises the nature of the programme regarding self-organisation, in which the 
emergence of research ideas arises in the complete absence of a programme, plan 
or blueprint. This not only focuses attention in a very special way on how one 
acquires knowledge about one’s own work, but it also reduces problems to do 
with the availability of time, since ‘working is research and research is working’. 
Any other approach would make the combination of research and work impossible 
for me, given the responsibilities involved in my line of work. I had some 
organisational questions in mind when I started the programme, which I shared 
during the first introduction and in writing Project One. Although these questions 
did not altogether disappear, my focus has shifted to research questions that were 
not clear at the beginning or that emerged as a consequence of substantial changes 
in my working environment. Looking back, my final research questions resulted 
in a much more interesting and important contribution to my day-to-day working 
responsibilities, and hopefully to the learning community. From the start of 
writing Project One, the ‘current project’ window on my computer in the office is 
always open. In this way I try to integrate thoughts from my daily work and the 
DMan programme as regularly as I can.  
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Personal experiences and development during residential sessions on the 
programme 
 
A key aspect of the programme is experiencing emergence through conversation 
during the five residential sessions, each lasting one week. The content of the 
residentials is tailored to the knowledge development requirements of the 
participants, and introduces ways of experiencing self-organisation directly. Self-
organisation can be explained as (organisational) developments without having a 
pre-arranged plan, programme or blueprint. Consistent with this, every morning 
started with a large group session with no prepared agenda. Thirty people sat 
down for one and a half hours, sometimes one by one carefully bringing up points 
for discussion and waiting to see whether anybody else might pick the point  up.  
 
Another major element in the methodology was the development of learning sets 
formed by four or five members of the large group. Membership of each of these 
learning sets was based on self-selection, which is another experience of emerging 
patterns in the programme. When a learning set is formed, its members become 
each others’ mentors, helpers, critics and tutors. Each set is supervised by one of 
the faculty members and people exchange information on each others’ progress by 
e-mail, or sometimes live. They also meet nine times for two-day sessions at 
different locations around the world, due to wide international participation on the 
programme, to discuss the development of each of their four projects. During the 
later residentials, subgroups were formed that comprised participants who were 
not confined to membership of the same learning set; these were supervised by the 
participants themselves, who would exchange topics of mutual interest related to 
each of the individuals’ research projects.  
 
The large group meetings and the self-selection of the learning sets create many 
common real-life situations such as anxiety, shame, power, interdependency and 
rejection (Elias, 1970; Griffin, 2002; Dalal, 2002). Anxiety is an inevitable 
companion of shifts in themes that organise the experience of relating, because 
such shifts create uncertainty, particularly uncertainty around individual and 
collective identities (Elias, 1939, pp. 441–442). I have experienced these moments 
of conversation with myself: Shall I speak? Will it make sense, and what will they 
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think of it? Is it a risk? Will I make a fool of myself? Many more questions and 
feelings arise when engaging in conversation in a large group. It is from this point 
on that the paradox of the programme became manifest to me; the split 
disappeared between experiencing and making sense of experience within the 
programme, within the work situation and between the programme and the work 
situation. Together with these experiences the research path developed as an 
ongoing enquiry with shifting questions and occasional answers and insights, 
making use of or reflecting on several types of methodology. This methodology 
was sometimes part of the programme, or sometimes crossed my path during 
further investigation. Another important aspect is meeting the academic 
requirements, which is an essential part of doing the research and has to be 
interwoven into my work situation. In the following paragraphs I will go through 
some of the theoretical and methodological questions I have encountered. I will 
also explain the search path I have followed, examining different views on 
methodology and how they could contribute to my research in combination with 
the views of the DMan programme.  
 
 
Some remarks about management research in relation to the DMan 
programme 
 
The Advanced Institute of Management Research (Ivory et al., 2006) reported the 
views of critics who claim that in their pursuit of intellectual respectability, 
business academics have failed to generate knowledge that can usefully be applied 
by organisations themselves. The report refers among others to Mintzberg (2004), 
who makes the same point about the way business schools teach their graduates. 
Business school researchers address two central issues of our time: one concerns 
business in its various manifestations, and the other is organisation rather than just 
management (ibid., p. 394). Mintzberg is positive about the potential outcome of 
management research from the academic world, but considers this outcome to be 
one of the best-kept secrets. Academic research on organisations and management 
suffers from two major problems: first, it is not very efficient; second, it is not 
very accessible (ibid., p. 395). Serious scholars should respond to practitioner 
needs. This does not mean to weaken scholarship, but to strengthen it. Working 
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with the real problems of the world means to dig deeper and understand better, 
also emphasised in the section where I have highlighted the practice–theory 
differences between a traditional PhD and a professional doctorate. Intellectual 
rigour – namely clear thinking – does not get in the way of relevance (ibid., p. 
399). There is much information on management research of dedicated subjects, 
accounting, economics, finance, information, legal, technology, healthcare, etc, 
but not so much on the general issues of management research. Weick (1996) 
talks about how executives embodying the scholarship of integration give 
meaning to facts. Executives talk about connections in the world in complete 
disregard of the disciplinary boundaries they might be violating. Those 
connections bridge the arbitrary line that academics draw around their own 
disciplines. A complex responsive processes view disregards these boundaries as 
well, understanding organisations as population-wide patterns of relating that 
emerge in daily local interaction between people. This statement will be 
extensively explored, with many examples, in the four projects that follow this 
section.  
 
Johnson and Duberley (2000, pp. 2–3) criticise researchers in management studies 
for being uncritical and ill-informed in their adoption of particular research 
methods. Today students need to demonstrate a reflexive understanding of their 
own epistemological commitments as they engage with management and 
organisations, in which epistemology is understood as the study of criteria by 
which we can know what does and does not constitute warranted, or scientific, 
knowledge. Epistemology confronts a fundamental problem of circularity, from 
which it cannot escape, in that any theory of knowledge (i.e. any epistemology) 
presupposes knowledge of the conditions in which knowledge takes place. In 
effect, this prevents any groundings of epistemology in what purports to be 
scientific knowledge – psychological or otherwise – because one cannot use 
science in order to ground the legitimacy of science (ibid., p. 4). For Johnson and 
Duberley (2000), circularity means that there are no secure or incontestable 
foundations from which we can begin any consideration of our knowledge of 
knowledge – rather that what we have are competing philosophical assumptions 
about knowledge that lead us to engage with management and organisations in 
particular ways. The question then becomes: Where does knowledge start?  
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Hegel (1812) held that one cannot begin, as Kant (1790) had done, with an 
isolated individual subject experiencing the world and then ask how a world of 
experience gets built up out of the inner world of purely subjective experience. 
Rather, one must begin with an already shared world of subjects making 
judgements in the light of possible judgements by others… Person and subject 
are given content only by the social institutions in which each individual 
achieves social identity through interdependence and mutual recognition.  
(Stacey, 2003b, p. 328)  
 
A complex responsive processes approach takes a stand in which knowledge 
develops without presupposed knowledge of the final conditions, other than 
taking one’s day-to-day experiences seriously. Another question is about the 
position from where the research takes place. The DMan programme approaches 
the research position of the student as one where the student is an involved 
participant within the area of research while also, paradoxically, being both 
subject and object of the research at the same time.  
 
Management research according to the quoted authors means acknowledgement of 
the importance that this research has in terms of practical implications. Questions 
of an organisational or managerial nature develop in a reflexive, unpredictable, 
non-linear way, in which there is no presupposed knowledge about the conditions 
in which research takes place. These starting-points show much similarity with the 
approaches within the DMan programme. One theme in which the DMan 
programme takes a different stand is that the research is about one’s own work, 
meaning that the researcher is also the researched at the same time. The matter of 
connecting theory and practice and emphasising practicality is well addressed in 
this approach. There is no separation between work and study, an important aspect 
that will be addressed in all projects written as part of this thesis. The projects all 
started with a narrative about a work situation; and I think it is important to 
explain my view on the academic rigour of this approach. Another strong point is 
the fact that research and work are combined efforts, solving the problem of 
effectiveness. In the following paragraphs I will describe how I have experienced 
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this combined effort and the methodology used during the development of the 
four projects.  
 
 
Narrative methodology 
 
All projects started with a narrative about an event or development in my 
organisation. These narratives were subjects for discussion with my learning set 
about the issue arising in the narratives which could be the focus of my research. 
For example, during the first discussions of Project Four, the subject that emerged 
had to do with the relation between humans and technology, which had never 
before crossed my mind. In the end the research around this project contributed 
significantly to performance improvement in my company.  
 
According to Mitchell and Egudo (2003), narrative approaches, involving story-
telling methodologies, can be used as an alternative method for the study of 
human action and can be seen as an interpretative approach in the social sciences. 
They position story-telling largely in the postmodernist paradigm. Postmodernists 
question the modernists’ philosophical assumptions of rationality and universal 
truth, and the application of scientific empirical methods to problem-solving. 
Postmodernists emphasise that knowledge is value-laden, and reality is based on 
multiple perspectives, with truth grounded in everyday life involving social 
interactions amongst individuals. This is one of the reasons why narrative 
methodology is so accessible for research in the field of complex responsive 
processes, where a key element is taking one’s day-to-day experience seriously. 
Meaning arises through conversation between individuals and groups develop 
identity, which is strongly influenced by power relations. It is through these 
narratives that actual research areas can develop. As I have explained earlier, this 
is one of the extraordinary aspects of the DMan programme. The thesis is not an 
argument around a hypothesis, but a research topic that has emerged from one of 
my real work situations as part of the research process itself. Let me explain some 
of the methodological aspects of and around the use of narratives. 
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Postmodernism and social constructionism share the common ground of 
uncovering the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of 
their perceived reality. It involves looking at the ways social phenomena are 
created, institutionalised, and made into tradition by humans. Socially constructed 
reality is seen as an ongoing, dynamic process; reality is re-produced by people 
acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966). Gergen (1998) goes one step further and states that postmodernist thinking 
and social constructionism not only account for criticism of modernist thinking, 
but also form the basis for the application and understanding of narrative. Ricks 
(2002) does not see difference in the use of narratives between researchers and 
practitioners. Both are drawing conclusions about the meaning of ‘what is’ after 
determining these stories to prepare action. Both are studying a particular 
phenomenon and could be said to be using a phenomenological approach to study 
these stories, although the formats and the way the stories are used are quite 
different. Hardy (2002), in a theological study, draws on Llewellyn (1999) to 
provide a link between narrative, qualitative methods and methodology, claiming 
that narrative can make stronger research claims than calculative research, by 
revealing humans as strategic beings at both an individual and an organisational 
level. According to Hardy, to achieve a successful narrative the reader has to be 
taken inside the hermeneutic circle (Polkinghorne, 1988; Alvesson and Sköldberg, 
2000, p. 93), because narrative is pervaded with an awareness of the centrality of 
time, allowing it to move beyond the individual experience of history to create a 
communal history. He links theology to a mixture of reason and faith, in which 
acceptance of its tenets is always a matter of faith. It is both the reliance on and 
the role of faith that allow the hermeneutic and narrative traditions to come to the 
fore when dealing with Christian organisations (Hardy, 2002). It is clear that 
narrative plays an important role in the religious traditions. This is also 
emphasised in a review by Jordaan (2004) of “Narrative dynamics in Paul: A 
Critical Assessment” by Longenecker (2002).  
 
An important point has to do with the ‘truth claim’ made by the narrative itself 
and the analysis of it according to criteria of validity stipulated by the researcher 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). To ensure that my project narratives were as 
close as possible to reality, I have asked several colleagues who worked with me 
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on these projects to read the narratives, and correct me when they thought this was 
necessary. In one case, one of the colleagues mentioned that he thought the 
sequence of events was not strictly chronological; but he did not insist on 
changing the narrative, as according to him it would have little impact on the 
essence of the story (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000, pp. 103, 272). I am certain 
that the story told in Project One is as I saw it during my writing; but it will 
certainly change, indeed it already has, every time the story is retold. Reflecting 
on the reflections of the narratives offers the opportunity to perform academic 
research on one’s own practice. Staying as close as possible to the original events 
is important as this makes the difference between analysing a story and analysing 
your own practice, which in the end will contribute to the experiences of others. 
All finalised projects have also been read by several of my colleagues, especially 
those who played a role in the narratives, and have been ground for discussion 
about my views. Project Four was also read by colleagues not playing a part in the 
narrative during the making of the final draft. At a certain point I discovered that 
colleagues had translated this project into the Dutch language, in order to make it 
possible for some of the findings to be discussed with a larger group of our 
working population. These findings have played an important role in many 
decision-making processes, becoming a kind of joint inquiry with others. Another 
important aspect is the combination of being a practitioner and a scholar at the 
same time, which I have seen as an enormous advantage. 
 
 
Scholar-practitioner 
The participants in the DMan programme use a reflexive methodology through 
narrative. The basic question here is again the ability to link practice and theory at 
an academic level. Tenkasi and Hay (2004) focus on the need to bridge 
knowledge and action from a management point of view and find theory-practice 
linkages delivering business results and further academic knowledge, considered 
successful by scholar practitioners based on activity theory. Jarzablowsky (2003) 
presented a study on micro practices using activity theory, where activity theory 
can be described as the conceptualisation of psychological development of a 
process of interaction within particular or historical context. Tenkasi and Hay 
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(2004) see scholar-practitioners as semiotic brokers and boundary spanners, 
having a foot in both worlds and being interested in advancing the causes of both 
theory and practice. They argue that not only do we need a fuller comprehension 
of bridging theory and practice, but we also need a conceptual clarification of 
these dual domains and how the scholar-practitioner goes about linking them in 
organisational endeavours to create actionable scientific knowledge that meets 
scientific criteria. They approach this question through activity theory, based on 
the mediated action concept of Vygotsky (1934, 1978, 1979), the principle of 
unity and inseparability of consciousness (i.e., theory) and activity (i.e., practice). 
The meaning of this principle is that the human mind comes to exist, develops and 
can only be understood within the context of meaningful, goal-oriented and 
socially determined interaction between human beings and their material 
environment (Tenkasi and Hay, 2004, pp. 180, 188). They found four 
predominant functions served by creating theory-practice linkages:  
1) Use of theory to frame and give direction as a possible solution to an 
organisational crisis/need or future-state opportunity/vision. 
2) Influencing key decision-makers through theory-informed practice and, 
alternately, practice-informed theory. 
3) Including principles of Valid and Reliable Research using Action 
Research/Experimental Enactment. This involves implementing an idea and 
testing it out to see if it works, followed by Reflection on the experience to 
gain insights from thinking about the experiences and sometimes using the 
process of writing to communicate thoughts to others while also developing 
insights and conclusions.  
4) Demonstrating impact as a form of legitimising the process and outcome.  
This approach can lead to useful and practical outcomes; while it partly focuses on 
control and direction, it also connects to the methodology of complex responsive 
processes. During many of the local interactions we promoted in our company 
over the last few years, we stimulated ideas for pilot programmes and 
responsibility exchange in which people could experiment with other forms of 
collaboration. After thorough evaluation by the participants, implementation steps 
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could be worked out and shared with other colleagues. In Project Three, I have 
described how this can work out in practice.  
Tenkasi and Hay (2004) extensively explained their findings to validate the 
analysis of their results looking for theory–practice linkage. They found enough 
evidence to ground and shape the development of a process model of theory–
practice linkages that was common across all their interviewed scholar-
practioners, employing principles of valid and reliable research that focused on 
aspects of validity, reliability, and controlling for extraneous variance. Designs 
here ranged from employing experimental and control groups, and in the case of 
qualitative research focusing on the constant comparison method (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1999; Hay, 2003). The field experiments show many similarities with our 
approach, validating the outcome with future organisational developments and 
keeping track of whether developments led to the desired improvements or 
increased efficiency.  
 Complexity aside, what is most interesting about the scholar-practitioner 
 journey is the active and agential involvement of the scholar-practitioner in the 
 often covert creation and use of theory–practice linkages. 
(Tenkasi and Hay, 2004, p. 201) 
Choosing a methodology in management research is a risk in itself. What is the 
generalisability in this methodology? The work I have done in the four projects 
does not lead to a set of rules. I have chosen to describe specific parts of my 
responsibilities and reflect on these according to a complex responsive processes 
approach, with a view to formulating possible other ways of working. But is it 
valid? It is valid according to its own results in the projects, but will not provide 
guaranteed success when copied. Management research will enhance knowledge 
about methods of research and management behaviour, as this research is more 
about management behaviour and organisations as social phenomena (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2000). On the other hand, readers, including colleagues, should 
find new impulses and stimulating ideas to help them reflect on their own work, to 
improve general performance.  
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But to make epistemological assumptions and remain unaware of their origins 
has to be poor practice, particularly when even a cursory examination of the 
philosophy of science would suggest not only that an epistemological 
commitment is unavoidable, but also that any epistemological commitment is 
highly contentious. 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000, p. 9)  
 
 
Reflexivity in general 
 
Another important discovery I made in the programme is the need and ability to 
be reflexive in my own work and behaviour. The combination of research and 
work based on this methodology is essential. The structure of the projects calls for 
narrative, reflection and reflexivity together with the support of the members of 
the learning sets; this is the way we chose to do things. Is this academic enough? 
Can this type of research deliver the original insights that academic research is 
supposed to provide? According to Ricks (2002, p. 18), research and practice 
coexist, are interactive and inform each other through a shared process of inquiry. 
She denies the stereotypes of researchers having intellectual intelligence and 
practitioners having emotional intelligence. Psychologists in the 1940s and 1950s 
suggested and eventually mandated that in their profession they needed to be 
researchers and practitioners. Qualitative research in sociology and anthropology 
was “born out of concern to understand each other” (Vidich and Lyman, 2000). 
Researchers struggled with how to locate themselves and their subjects in 
reflexive texts. A generic definition is offered by Denzin and Lincoln (2000): 
qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. My 
question, then, is: what can happen when the observer is at the same time the 
observed? 
 
A way of framing the approach of “reflective practice” conducted by the reflective 
practitioner is found in Schön (1987).This approach involves a process of thinking 
about professional practices to challenge one’s own basic assumptions and 
rational choices. Information grounded in practice, according to Ricks (2002), is 
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as valid and reliable for decision-making and planning as information gleaned 
from research that is separated from practice. She argues that through advances in 
practice new knowledge is generated in the process of inquiring into this practice, 
which is guided by the question of how to improve. When practitioners strive to 
change practice through inquiry, they question their own beliefs, assumptions and 
ways of doing things. She also links this to participatory inquiry, showing the 
additional advantage of learning from each other. This enables, through 
collaboration, new understanding of complex issues in order to address these 
issues.  
 
This way of thinking connects to our work in the large group on the DMan and 
partly to our learning sets in the programme, where I also experienced the 
difficulties of acting in this large group as it presents many psychological hurdles 
that must be traversed in the process of participation. Over the course of my 
involvement in the programme, I have organized many meetings and conferences 
in our organisation to stimulate discussions about important matters concerning 
developments in our company. Looking back, it is important to realise that the 
people participating in these meetings experienced the same feelings and anxieties 
that I and others have experienced in our big group meetings during residentials in 
the programme. It is this combination of interweaving the results of both work and 
research that makes life very challenging: being a scholar and a practitioner, and 
using each aspect to inform the other. If one starts looking for other 
complementary or supporting methodologies, action research and action learning 
are also methods in which practice and theory are integrated aspects of the 
research method. 
 
 
Action research and action learning 
 
Friedlander (2001) sees participatory action research as a means of integrating 
theory and practice. He misses the possibility to make room for research in 
practice, or, as Schön (1987) says, for reflection in action. Friedlander (2001, p. 8) 
sees working as a scholar-practitioner as the continuous integration of concurrent 
scholarly and practice work. Explaining on how to teach a group of Chinese 
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people and experiencing all the differences in approach, he describes his action 
research question as ‘teaching them to teach me how to teach them’. This can at 
least be seen as participatory action research. This model of cooperation is largely 
supported in the literature on action research and action learning, and also focuses 
on cooperative inquiry, which takes place ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ people (Heron 
and Reason, 2001). Balogun, Huff and Johnson (2003) focus in particular on the 
importance of working with organisational members as research partners, rather 
than seeing them as passive informants.  
Dick (1997) sees action research as a process by which change and understanding 
can be pursued at the same time. It is usually described as cyclic, with action and 
critical reflection taking place in turn. The reflection is used to review the 
previous action and plan the next one. He defines action learning as a process in 
which a group of people come together more or less regularly to help each other to 
learn from their experience. The use of a team with a common project or problem 
leads to an action learning programme that looks remarkably like action research. 
When we act, we often do not have the time to deliberate on what we are doing, so 
the fundamental principles we draw on are intuitive theories, which can be made 
explicit in review and planning as material for critical reflection on the last action. 
He compares action research and action learning with experiential learning, in the 
sense that experiential learning functions by alternation between action and 
reflection and between conscious and unconscious theories. Most action 
researchers are system thinkers, believing that almost everything affects almost 
everything else (Dick, 2004). 
I have experienced various approaches in the DMan programme, including using 
theatre as a group learning tool, as a process of action learning. Our large and 
small group sessions and learning sets have a lot in common with action learning 
and action research, and I have used many of these experiences in my practice. All 
quoted authors promote reflexivity as an indispensable part of the chain of events. 
Still, this alone does not support research on complex responsive processes, where 
one of the main research subjects is how and why we interact in groups of people 
and how these patterns of interaction lead to organisational development or 
change processes essential for organisational continuity or results. What is my 
role as a person/manager in these interactions? How can I focus on results? The 
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‘why’ question, in particular, requires reflexivity on the researcher’s part in 
observing and interpreting their own actions. The systemic approach of action 
researchers will come up with mutual understanding of a problem or situation and 
describe the chosen solution to be executed. According to Dick (1997) it is usually 
described as cyclic, with action and critical reflection taking place in turn. The 
reflection is used to review the previous action and plan the next one. This became 
manifest in describing communities-of-practice (Wenger, 1998) in Project Four, 
which in itself is a strong method of developing knowledge. From a complex 
responsive processes view, research during action becomes part of the 
development of knowledge during local social interaction on many levels at the 
same time. Action knowledge will not be developed in bounded situations but 
become part of day-to-day practice. 
     
 
Reflexivity as methodology 
 
Reflexivity is a dominant element of the DMan programme, taking one’s day-to-
day experience seriously and being able to reflect on this. On the other hand, it is 
presented as part of a reflexive understanding by students of epistemological 
commitments of engagement with management and organisations (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000). Interpreting reflexivity, I found two general meanings in the 
literature. Positional reflexivity leads the analyst to examine place, biography, self 
and other to understand how they shape the analytic exercise. Textual reflexivity 
leads the analyst to examine and then disrupt the very exercise of textual 
representation (Macbeth, 2001). Macbeth also emphasises the problematics of 
‘certainty’ that have followed from the dissolution of modernist programmes and 
confidences. Reflexivity begins with scepticism on how we have been speaking, 
describing, reading and writing, and how we have been doing this all along. 
Reflexivity recommends an inquiry into the very possibilities of our unreflected 
knowledge and practices, and brings an unsettled field into view.  
 
Is there a difference in interpreting one’s own narrative and an interview that is 
reproduced by the interviewers (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000, pp. 259–260)? 
During the primary interpretations, the narrative writer knows what s/he sees, 
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where the interviewers might sometimes wonder what somebody else’s reflection 
looks like and what they are looking at, even when they are in a position to ask 
clarification and even when the interview is taped. The interviewer/researcher is 
never able to readjust the original material, even where this might improve the 
knowledge level of the performed research. It may also be difficult to separate 
preliminary interpretations from better reasoned secondary interpretations in 
which the researcher does not construct but (further) interprets and explores ‘data’ 
in depth (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000, p. 261).  
 
The researcher/scholar-practitioner, reflecting on their own narrative through self-
reflection and participative exploration of experience (participative inquiry), as in 
the DMan Programme, has a double advantage: the interpretation of information 
remains first-hand, which will improve accuracy; and one’s own practice can be 
linked to theory. Intersubjectivity is a determinant of the action research process, 
just as it is in the interactions between participants in which certain versions of 
knowledge are produced. The research context is to construct and reconstruct a 
programme of analysis and reflection around the narratives describing the 
problems met in (work) practice with the aim of sustaining sense-making 
processes. In the DMan programme, the projects are written and rewritten many 
times, a high frequency of iterations leading to a final submission, as part of the 
reflexive process. Reflexivity is intended here as being inherently connected to 
action and as a part of the sense-making process in which both participants and 
the researcher are engaged (Colombo, 2003). During discussion around my 
writing of Project Four, many colleagues started to participate in a process of joint 
inquiry. The events presented in this project also describe a process of joint 
inquiry – or, better formulated, joint learning – in groups or communities. My 
research method and work mode show many similarities as a parallel reflexive 
process. In Project Four I have described the many confrontations, conferences 
and smaller meetings that were all part of a process of joint inquiry, without any 
pre-planned process or predetermined outcome. Most of the time we had a clear 
reason why we would initiate one of these meetings; but oddly enough, in many 
cases the reason, goal and continuum changed during the day in a reflexive 
process of inquiry with others. In order to make progress on many of the quality 
problems we were faced with, we created learning groups or (virtual) 
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communities where as many participants as possible could contribute to 
discussions, which in turn opened up many new possibilities for other people to 
get involved in conversations about the subjects.  
 
Authenticity is seen as another aspect. When the researcher is an interviewer, the 
information is always second-hand. In the case of narrative methodology by a 
scholar-practitioner, the researcher chooses their own evaluative storyline. The 
narrative is written from the perspective of the researcher and will change every 
time the story is retold (Stacey, 2003a, p. 351). The story may be authentic but 
need not necessary be ‘true’. Co-reading by colleagues who participated in the 
events reduces the risk that the story will not have enough general bases in the 
community present in the narrative. During the secondary interpretation the 
interviewer has to guess about motives and has to alternate between distance and 
familiarity in relation to it (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000); the scholar-
practitioner writing their own narrative knows the (sometimes hidden) motives. 
Academic rigour is an important question to be solved, when working with 
narratives. Reflecting on my own experience closes the practice–theory gap. 
Reflecting on my own reflections, based on literature study and exchange of 
information with my learning set, the faculty and colleagues at work, can 
contribute to formulating academic views on the written subjects, making it 
possible for others to modify or expand their personal knowledge. As a scholar-
practitioner I personally feel that it is also vital that new academic insights should 
lead to improved organisational actions and improvement of performance. 
Viewing myself as a manager, I consider my participation in the DMan 
programme to have been a great motivator; this will become clearer in the four 
projects and synopsis that follow.  
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Project One 
 
 
About Project One 
 
This paper was written at the start of the DMan programme. It is a presentation of 
my first steps in a new academic world of acquiring knowledge and connecting 
this knowledge to my practice. Reading it now, I see it is a review of the 
development of my experiences both as an individual as as a manager, and serves 
the understanding of the direction of further research based on these experiences. 
It feels more like touching theory from a practice base rather than starting to build 
a bridge between the two. Writing down what I have been doing in my life and 
work was also a period of great struggle. It was difficult to explain why I did what 
I did and under what influences, when many of my actions were habitual and had 
not been fundamentally questioned for many years. I tried to be reflexive in this 
project but the truth is that it has more been descriptive, searching for answers in 
my own personal history as well as in traditional and more recent literature. 
Although I have excised large pieces of the original text, what is left has become 
the basis for development of the other projects and the synopsis, and enables the 
reader to connect these developments to my personal experiences and see how my 
thinking has evolved. It is remarkable to note that, as a young man, I could not 
choose between becoming a musician, a sports instructor or a jet fighter pilot.   
 
In the introduction to the previous section, I gave a short explanation of the actual 
situation in the company I have worked for since 2001 and the developments there 
during the last few years. The events were very much influenced by people 
working in the transport division of the company, whereas I was responsible for 
the onshore activities. I was connected on the basis of being a colleague and 
through my future responsibilities of leading the team negotiating with the unions 
on a new labour agreement for all company divisions. At that time, no one 
anticipated that at the end of the DMan programme I would become one of the 
responsible managers of the train and general services division, becoming directly 
involved in organisational developments in the light of our recent history.  
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Strategy, Self and Research 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this first paper three worlds come together: strategy and my personal life; 
strategy and my work in the past, including the people, writers and tutors who 
influenced it; and strategy and the future, the way I interact in my daily work and 
my intended research work on the DMan programme. The aim of this project is to 
explore the influences that have shaped how I work and how I have come to think 
about what I do as a background to thinking about the steps we have to take in our 
company to change and improve our performance. I will try to clarify, using 
historical examples, how I feel and think and how the relationships I have 
developed with other people affect how we work together. The key words are: 
creativity, novelty, emergence, leadership, adaptive, responsive, detail, strong 
human relations and knowledge.  
 
This project takes a critical first look at the ways in which we, as managers, 
interact and make decisions – or do not make decisions – in certain 
circumstances. These descriptions are to be considered part of an enquiry into the 
way we work. I am glad that my colleagues have enabled me to participate in the 
DMan programme. They are prudently curious about the outcome. Even now in 
this early stage my family, friends and colleagues are already involved, sharing 
their knowledge and asking critical questions.  
 
 
Thinking about today 
 
In the company where I now work, why did everything happen in the way it did? 
Is it possible to look back at events with the knowledge of today? When I do so, 
what I still see is a lack of trust between many parties involved. Although the 
performance of the company has improved dramatically, even this month some 
strategic disputes have been brought to court by the Staff Council. The previous 
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period was marked by power plays between management and the unions. Power is 
not something possessed by one group or person, nor by another group of persons: 
it is a structural characteristic of human relationships (Elias, 1970). The people 
who were the subjects of this power play developed their own power by initiating 
strikes, organising travellers to become a huge pressure group to end this conflict 
in their favour. In the end the status quo predominated, with all new plans 
reverting to the old situation; this created an atmosphere of distrust that prevails to 
this day. I do not believe that a company can be managed on a basis of mutual 
misunderstanding. The workers fear that they will be cheated by the management, 
and so they go into formal protest against every decision made. The management, 
in turn, is reluctant to propose any decision for fear that it will further ruin their 
relation with the Staff Council and that they will go into formal protest. In effect, 
each side is a prisoner of the other. As the appointed lead negotiator for the 
unions, with a team representing all divisions involved, these circumstances 
become very real for my own experience. Mead (1934, p. 121) states: 
 
 Under the circumstances the person who stumbles on the footprints of the bear 
 is not afraid of the footprints – he is afraid of the bear. The footprint means a 
 bear. 
 
There might be a fear of change, not for the actual development itself but for the 
system that underlies it. So every proposal becomes a footprint. 
 
What do we have to change in our ways of organisational thinking to live through 
these extremely difficult situations? Can we do it in such a way that most of the 
solutions are provided in intensive cooperation and emerge in moving forward, 
not through making automatic assumptions that may be unfounded? Is it possible 
to have everybody participating in the way things change over time, and can the 
very movement of joint sense-making change ourselves and our situation (Shaw, 
2002)? Solutions are formed between people, individuals and groups (Elias, 1970) 
in mutual interaction. Is it possible to start the search for common vision and 
intent?  
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In the following sections, I will review my personal experience of strategic 
management and how this could influence current choices, both within my 
personal area of responsibility and within the company as a whole.  
 
 
The importance of strategic thinking in my personal development 
 
To bring the aspect of organisational change and strategic management in my 
career into perspective, I have to go back to the point where strategy, as such, 
started to gain a role in my professional life. Needless to say, that strategy has also 
been apparent in my personal life. Within the army, where I was Cavalry Officer 
and Platoon Leader, strategy was held to be an important aspect of the proper 
execution of one’s job, just as teamwork was considered vital. Later on, as the 
officer responsible for field intelligence, strategic thinking at battalion and 
division level was required, but on a much broader level. Especially important 
was the ability to discuss and reflect on the possible strategy of our opponents (in 
those days, the Eastern Bloc); this required a higher level of strategic thinking. 
Strategy was distinguished from tactics. In talking about the strategic positioning 
school, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998, pp. 88, 89) point to the views of 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) on the differences between strategy and tactics. 
Strategic decisions require more strength of will, as everything has to be guessed 
and presumed, while in tactics at least part of the problem can be seen. Quite 
literally: strategy means an elaborate and systematic plan of action. Tactic is an 
expedient way of achieving a goal; a manoeuvre.  
 
Working in and with teams has been a leitmotif running through my life. In the 
late 1970s, in the company I worked for, we were trying to identify the 
complementarities of mental models in the teams in which we worked. We used 
questionnaires to try to ascertain our personal style (for example, common vision, 
assertiveness etc) within the group. Having identified the ‘blind spots’ in the team, 
we helped each other in overcoming our weaker points (Zaanse Stichting, 1979). 
Team learning, as described by Senge (1990), based on the views of Bohm (1965, 
1983), derives from dialogue, which means the free flow of meaning through a 
group of people, allowing them to discover insights not attainable individually. 
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Meaning arises in the relation between the gesture of a given human and the 
response evoked in another human organism by that gesture (Mead, 1934).     
 
There are several other writers or institutions that influenced my thinking on the 
aspect of working with teams. Adezis (1981) explained the concepts of 
complementarities in teams based on the assumption that every lifecycle of a 
company was in need of its own management style. He developed his Pioneer, 
Control, Entrepreneur and Integrator model of thinking. In bigger companies all 
lifecycle aspects were present all the time in one way or another, so it was simply 
necessary to make sure that all talents were on board. I now see that this is also a 
somewhat mechanistic way of thinking. Even widespread participation, however, 
is no guarantee of more effective learning or better decision-making when people 
have not learned to operate on the basis of continuing complex learning, which is 
very difficult to achieve (Stacey, 2003a, p. 117) but might be very rewarding to 
investigate. 
 
 
An historical example of strategy: Prince Maurits and the battle on 
Tielenheide (1597) 
 
During the Eighty Year War between the Netherlands and Spain, Turnhout 
(Belgium today) was situated in the front line between the northern and southern 
Netherlands. Turnhout, despite not being protected by city walls, was in those 
days an important strategic city. On 24 January 1597, there was a battle on 
Tielenheide between the Dutch army led by Prince Maurits and the Spanish troops 
led by Varax (van ’t Hoff and Ogilvie, 1992). The Spanish troops were defeated 
and fled, despite greatly outnumbering the Dutch troops. Why was Prince Maurits 
successful? According to the authors, Maurits was eager to learn, intelligent, 
practical and had stamina.  
 
On the morning of the battle, he sent out reconnaissance units to make and 
maintain contact with the enemy. To support the reconnaissance units, he created 
an infantry cavalry unit. An Italian source from 1674 states: ‘trois cent 
Mousquetaires montés en croupe derrière autant de cuirassiers’ (‘three hundred 
 43 
horsemen with heavy armoured musketeers behind them’) gave firepower and 
movement. The Spaniards were not prepared for these tactics and the Spanish 
reserve troops also had to defend themselves against violent break-outs. Before 
the Spaniards were able to take their battle orders, the Dutch cavalry attack on the 
Spanish troops had already dealt the finishing blow. The transformation from 
marching order into battle order was a smooth one. The attacks were carried out 
on the front troops as well as the reserve troops in the rear of the colonnade. After 
a number of skirmishes and a light counter-attack, the battle was over. 
 
Maurits was not able to transfer this tactical masterpiece into strategic success and 
withdrew. The war lasted another fifty years, until 1648. There have been many 
other examples of warlords and rulers not capable of creating a lasting result. I 
was, however, impressed by the way Maurits created new ways of tactical 
thinking, but was surprised that there was no bigger plan behind it. One will never 
know how the Dutch-Spanish Eighty Year War would have ended if Maurits had 
not fought this battle and won it. His creative flexibility is something that attracted 
me and I have used the story as an example on many management occasions and 
presentations. The strategic outcome of the story, however, cannot be due to his 
original planning. Tactically he won the battle, but strategically not the war. 
Another historical example could be the life of Alexander the Great (Kets de Vries 
and Engellau, 2003) who, probably not knowingly, was copied by Maurits in 
many aspects. 
 
In the Positioning School, where strategy is looked at as an analytical process, it is 
argued that only a few key strategies, as positions in the marketplace, are desirable 
in any given industry: Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998, p. 89) refer to the 
view of von Clausewitz: 
 
 To make strategy happen, it is necessary to put together an organisation with a 
 formal  chain of command, in which orders are executed without question. Yet 
 this organisation must tap the initiative of its members.  
 
In this last part of the statement can be read a point relating to what Elias (1970, p. 
12) says, that even the powerful remain part of the interdependencies between 
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people in an organisation. It is shown in history that military leaders in good 
relation with their troops perform better on the battlefield, but amazingly not from 
the perspective of long-term strategic outcome.  
 
 
Working in the service industry 
 
In 1973, I started as management trainee for a large services company. The Board 
of Directors (BOD) in those days had a standard rule that all management trainees 
had to become acquainted with all the different businesses of the company. One of 
my first positions was as an apprentice cleaner. Working as a cleaner, one is 
confronted with many complex issues. I was appointed to clean one of the 
departments, but was faced with the problem that the circumstances were different 
every day. To start off with, there was not enough time to clean the whole 
department thoroughly, every day. After a few days I started to divide the task 
into three segments: toilets, every day half an hour; one hour to clean one part of 
the department thoroughly; the remaining last hour to whisk through the rest, a 
way of working adapted by my present colleagues a long time ago. My ‘deep 
cleansing’ section started where I had finished off the day before. In this way I 
achieved an average cleaning result for the whole department. Great was the 
frustration, therefore, when a professor dropped a box full of blackboard chalks 
and turned my complete scheme upside down. I had been able to draw up my own 
working scheme, but now found that I had to adapt to sudden changes when the 
people working in the department changed their habits. Looking back, I think it is 
fair to observe that the service industry is fertile ground for the development of 
emerging, adaptive, and responsive ways of working. On a basic operational 
performance level, people are able to create their own working patterns. This 
understanding had a strong influence on my career and on my understanding of 
the needs of people and the potential of each individual. Cleaning was not a high-
ranking profession, and I expected a more or less chaotic way of working, with 
people around me not speaking the language or with a low educational standard. 
The truth is that I met people of all kinds in this business and worked with 
immigrants, students, housewives and workmen, in fact a higher than average 
representation of the Dutch population; and they were very good to work with. 
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From that time on, I developed an internal support mechanism for groups who 
might be socially squeezed in the companies I worked for. As an overall strategy I 
feel free to delegate responsibilities and important decisions to people working in 
the service jobs in my company. This approach has always worked out well, 
except for one time in my working life. I will come back to this later.  
 
 
Strategic choices, expanding markets and acquisitions  
 
It was the time of ‘Management by Objectives’ (MbO), models, checklists 
(Humble, 1970) and job functions (responsibilities) equal key result areas, 
combined with action plans (Reif and Bassford, 1973). Hospital directors saw 
possibilities for the use of MbO, because it could be focused on aspects other than 
financial and medical results alone (Jones, 1977), a very interesting market at that 
time. Within this model they would still be able to delegate responsibilities, 
introduce individual thinking, locate motivation and work with responsibilities on 
other management levels. The objective orientation within the job function 
thinking created the possibility, more than before, of talking about the role and 
tasks of managers, as well as the opportunities and hurdles encountered. MbO was 
not used in a mechanistic fashion but in an interactive way. Drucker (1957) sees 
MbO as a management philosophy, describing it as based on the concept of 
organisations as human behaviour and human motivation and suggesting that it is 
suitable for all managers in all businesses on every level and all sizes.  
 
The success factor of MbO is that it offers an opportunity to align the functional 
goals of the organisation with the personal goals of the manager. Work is a natural 
way of living for almost everyone. Well-motivated employees can develop a high 
level of self-control, take responsibility, be creative and help the organisation to 
reach its goals (Groot, 1977). MbO normally relies on negative feedback as 
defined in cybernetic systems theory; our model was not seeking equilibrium and 
when necessary we were able to rethink the whole process, which is a key 
assumption in system dynamics theory. The most significant difference between 
cybernetics and system dynamics theory relates to the introduction of non-
linearity and positive feedback (Stacey, 2003a). Concurrently with the system side 
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of MbO, result orientation and output of the organisation as a system, we 
introduced new views on traditional humanistic behaviour such as the hierarchy of 
needs, attitude towards workers, satisfiers–dissatisfiers, and real work motivation 
(Blokland and Fischer, 1977). Alongside the aforementioned MbO, we 
participated in management games with teams of younger managers, had fun, and 
fought but never won. MbO did, however, have a positive influence on our 
analytical decision-making processes (Kepner and Tregoe, 1965) and team spirit. 
We held many discussions about how we should proceed as a business and about 
our leadership roles combining the balance between business and human interests 
(Blake and Mouton, 1970).  
 
Our company was acquired by a large retail group that wanted to expand in the 
service industry; it was not long after this acquisition that I was appointed as a 
member of our company’s BOD. The chairman of the retail group was convinced 
that expanding into services was his next step to success. They asked us to 
develop a strategic plan on how we could build up strong market positions in 
several European countries. This is a clear case of strategic choice (Stacey, 
2003a): deciding on a goal and writing it down. Writing an international strategic 
business plan is not much different from writing a military combat plan. Together 
with a research group from Harvard University in Boston, we developed a PIMS 
(Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies) model for our industry to investigate the 
return-on-investment (ROI) effects of the PIMS database items such as market 
share, quality and investments. The results were presented during a large 
conference of the WFBSC1  in Miami in 1980. There were, however, minimal 
differences in ROI outcome, even when the input figures showed a wide variety. 
This was a disappointment; we stopped our collaboration with the programme. 
The PIMS models were database-oriented and part of the strategic positioning 
school. The message of the positioning school, related to process, is not to get out 
there and learn, but to stay home and calculate. In this way the positioning school 
has reduced its role from the formulation of strategy to the conducting of strategic 
analysis in support of that process (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998). But 
what does the real world show?  
                                               
1 World Federation of Building Service Contractors  
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Our first new acquisition in Belgium came as no surprise. We had long-term 
relations with the owner and he sold the company because he had no successor. 
The next acquisition process in France was remarkable. We discovered a small 
article in a French newspaper reporting that one of the bigger services companies 
was for sale. A conglomerate listed on the French stock exchange was planning to 
sell their service activities. After the normal due diligence period in which 
information was exchanged, two companies were selected to negotiate the 
possible final deal. One of these was ours. Like all services companies, the 
business was people-related, with approximately 7000 employees. We negotiated 
with the company’s management team, headed by a 60-year-old traditional French 
CEO, formal, honest and straightforward. Through him we were able to visit 
several branches and talk to other people on different levels. We became 
increasingly enthusiastic: a good sign for possible future cooperation, but not for 
negotiating a good price. After a few weeks, feelings were such that we decided to 
place a bid. Afterwards, we found out that we were competing with an American 
company, prepared to pay 15 million francs in excess of our bid. However, they 
had not built up a relationship with the responsible management, and did not 
speak French; nor had they sent people who were able to communicate in the 
French language. In the end, the French management asked their old shareholders 
to decide for us, since they were able to communicate and they felt secure enough 
that we would more or less respect the cultural differences. In short, our strategy 
was to acquire a large company in France; we ran into it by accident and were 
able to buy it, despite a negative price difference for the seller, through inventive 
tactical manoeuvring and luck. Together with them, we were able to acquire 
several other French companies and make the company one of the market leaders 
in France. The mutual feeling for relationships and communication, in the end, 
also had considerable economical benefits for everyone involved and created a 
business employing some 40,000 people. 
 
I left the services company after a strategic battle with the Chairman of the Board 
of the mother company. However, the feeling of losing something has never left 
me. Elias (1970) stated that losing a person means you lose a part of yourself. A 
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similar feeling arises when one leaves behind a group of people with whom one 
has worked with for more than fifteen years. At least, it felt that way to me.  
 
 
The entrepreneurial phase 
 
After I left the services group, I was able to buy the majority of the shares in a 
company working in the field of advertising. It was a small company, almost 100 
years old, with 100 employees, and a 75-year-old owner, the son of the founder. 
In spite of its good reputation, the company had been struggling to survive over 
the last ten years. After conducting a survey and a due diligence investigation, I 
decided to sell my assets and buy the company. I restored relations with the 
former CEO of the conglomerate I had worked for and left in agony; he stepped in 
as minority shareholder. We started to renovate the workshops and improve 
climate control systems. A quality circle concept was introduced and we tried to 
introduce new spirit in the workforce. Employees were given the opportunity to 
follow courses at education centres and in all possible ways we tried to make the 
company ready for the 1990s. There was one little problem: it did not work. For 
many different reasons, we were still losing customers and were not able to reduce 
the failure rate. Here I discovered the meaning of the phrase, ‘there is no time to 
do it right, but always time to do it again’, as well as learning the importance of a 
bank in business life (van Gunsteren and Kwik, 1984). I believed I was 
performing as before but, except for the convention branch of our business, results 
were poor. When anxious that one’s colleagues are not in control, it is tempting to 
take over responsibility oneself; and I did. This attitude provokes uncertainty 
within the organisation and, in the end, does not solve the problem. In fact this 
was the only time in my life when I was not able to perform and realise the results 
necessary for continuity. What happens at a personal level when an event like this 
takes place? In the beginning it is hard to believe that it is actually happening. I 
felt guilty for the people I worked with, although at a certain point I realised that I 
was not the only one who had influenced the situation; but as a conscientious 
manager, it was hard to rid myself of the sense of responsibility. I always said: 
“the mirror talks”.  
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When I started a new period in my career, I tried to put the previous episode 
behind me. This could be described as shame, or uncertainty as to how other 
people might view the situation. Guilt and shame are the same process; their 
difference lies in the shift of location from the external to the internal world – an 
enlightening statement, although it concurs with Freud’s remark that guilt 
(conscience) is nothing other than social anxiety internalised (Dalal, 2004). It was 
a couple of years before I learned to handle these feelings. In my work today I am 
less absolute in my opinions. At that time, I was convinced that what I was doing 
was right and tried to convince other people of this. When in the end this turned 
out to be a total failure, I brought more reflexivity into my daily actions in the 
next part of my life with the knowledge that the expected or predicted outcome 
might not happen at all. This understanding has become an essential part of my 
day-to-day thinking.  
 
 
Reinventing myself 
 
Very soon after the period I described above, I was approached by the managing 
director of a fast-food restaurant and retail company. The company had always 
worked with franchisees, but changed this approach in recent years into an in-
house operation. Instead of running a business with 100 franchisees, the company 
now had to manage a few thousand employees. For me it was like having to drive 
again after a car accident: you soon realise that you still can do it. My former 
HRM colleague once said: ‘management is a simple skill: you have to be able to 
generate energy, and transfer this energy to others. The rest you can learn’. I am 
not quite sure that matters are that simple, but his advice did help.  
 
After that year, I worked for an investment group that had acquired the majority of 
the shares of a general services company. The services provided were almost the 
same as in the company where I started my business career. The company had 
made a major loss in the first year after the take-over, whereas a profit of the same 
amount had been predicted. There was no common strategy or vision. The 
company consisted of independent companies that had been bundled together as 
the result of acquisitions, but managers acted as if they were alone in the world. 
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After evaluation, two out of six directors could stay and two were newly 
appointed. They were all given the freedom to organise their work, but within the 
scope of a common strategy. After two years the company was back on track and 
today is still one of the leaders in its market. When the old owner bought back a 
bigger part of the shares, it was time for me to leave.  
 
 
Taking on a Board role again 
  
I was asked to become Managing Director of the food and retail company I 
worked for in 1998, when this position became vacant. I was hesitant at first 
because the former director had played an important role in my professional life 
and had also become a good friend. There was, however, no connection between 
his leaving and my coming, as the position had been vacant for several months. 
Nonetheless, our relationship did come under pressure when I told him that I 
would take the job he had held. After a year the Chairman of the onshore division, 
also responsible for our activities, retired and the Board of Directors of the group 
asked me if I would be interested in taking up his position. I was interested. 
Together with my colleague, the CFO, we moved towards our new positions; at 
the same time, I became a member of the Executive Board (EXB). The division 
had 5000 employees and successfully ran the onshore business of the group. 
Change was in full process, and in joining I have been able to play a role heading 
the organisation in the direction I feel comfortable with: few organisational levels 
with high participation of management in day-to-day business as part of a team, 
creating a simple structure with straight lines of communication and a strong 
delegation of responsibilities. Every four weeks, I try to work a one-day shift in 
different operational jobs. It helps me relate to my co-workers and gives me 
insight into work and problems on the ‘shop floor’.  
 
In 2002, the decision was made to introduce a new electronic distribution system. 
The system required many technological changes that will affect the work of 
many in the control and service area. Developments are still ongoing and much is 
still unclear. The boundaries and limitations of the technological side of the 
system are fairly well defined.  
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The main goals are: 
  
1. Improvement of safety and security; 
2. Create a distribution system without boundaries, improving ease and 
comfort for customers.  
 
We must, however, take into account the lessons learned because we realise that 
there is a basic fear of change and we will have to gain enough confidence among 
the people involved to overcome that fear and launch the process, not letting the 
footprint stand in the way (Mead, 1934, p. 121). Managing has much to do with 
improvisation like in music. According to Weick (1977), rigid rule-bound 
organisations that spell out exactly how people should behave are incapable of 
generating new forms of behaviour to meet new situations. He advocates valuing 
improvisation more than forecasts, dwelling on opportunities rather than 
constraints. If we think of strategy as a pattern of interaction referring to 
organisational identity, how can this lead to a substantial improvement in the way 
we work, talk, interact and perform?  
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Project Two 
 
 
About Project Two 
 
If Project One was an introduction to what was to come, writing Project Two was 
a real entrance in a new world for me; a world of intensive literature search on 
new subjects that had to be related to narratives of daily events in my work life. 
What amazes me, looking back, is the enormous amount of paper I produced and 
how often the same subject arose over and over again. I told my learning set 
stories about preparation meetings for negotiations with trade unions and related 
these stories to the recent history of our company. All of these stories reflected 
some kind of conflict, so I decided that this should be the main area of research 
for this project. At the centre of the project there is a story of how a team worked 
together in negotiating the terms and conditions of a labour agreement for our 
company’s employees. These negotiations were different from previous ones 
because the lead from the company side of the negotiations was taken by an 
operational managing director, myself, instead of a professional negotiator from 
the Human Resources department; and also different because a single agreement 
had to be negotiated for all the divisions of the company, replacing separate 
agreements for different parts of the company.  
 
Two important contextual matters formed the background for the negotiations. 
First, the memory of the 1999 agreement to which the unions had agreed but 
which was then undermined by the emergence of dissenting sub-groupings of 
union members, leading to a damaging strike. The new negotiation team was 
strongly motivated to prevent a repeat of this. Second, the strategy we are 
developing of installing a new electronic distribution system. It was, therefore, 
important that whatever we agreed with the unions should not impede, but rather 
assist, the implementation of this strategic change which is going to affect the jobs 
and work patterns of very large numbers of employees. 
 
The story is about negotiations with the unions, but it is not only a story of labour 
relations. It is also a story of how conflict is implicated in all decision-making 
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processes, showing the centrality of conflict in management processes. I have 
tried to make clear how general points on the development of conflict are of 
relevance to management and leadership generally in all situations, and the roles 
of individuals and groups in conflict situations, and how an unprepared manager 
can be exposed to doubt and surprises. This project presents how I developed my 
views on the nature and development of conflict in organisations. Although, 
looking back, it is fair to say that many of the discussions around the negotiations 
were very coincidental. I think a positive approach of stimulating different 
patterns of interaction and an open mind towards coincidences during negotiations 
can be repeated as described in this thesis. It is however impossible to copy the 
negotiation process, as it was supported by extreme uncertainty resulting from the 
government at that time. This uncertainty drove parties more or less into each 
other’s arms. From the process I experienced that conflict in itself can be a strong 
motivator in finding different solutions, and is not something to walk away from. 
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Working at the edge of polarised conflict in organisations 
 
 
Negotiating a labour agreement 
 
This project describes an 18-month period in which I led the team negotiating a 
labour agreement for my company. I explore the formation of the negotiation 
team, internal relations within the team and relations with union leaders, 
managers, and board members, as well as the politics and other developments that 
led to the final agreement. The narrative explores the way in which global patterns 
of interaction continuously emerged in local interactions as I experimented with 
approaches to leadership with the intention of securing acceptable results. 
Conflict, or in some cases the avoidance of conflict, played an important role in 
organisational life, including the negotiation of a labour agreement. I consider 
how conflict might be thought about, how it is explained by different authors, how 
it connects to negotiation processes and how global patterns emerge in the local 
interactions of negotiation. I make a link to the unpredictability of strategic 
processes and the effect this has on the negotiations.  
 
As a member of the EXB, I was responsible as managing director for the onshore 
division. As explained in the introduction, I joined this organisation after it had 
experienced a period of upheaval. The source of the upheaval was a conflict in 
1999 between the directors, the unions, Staff Councils and the majority of the 
staff running operations, about a plan for organisational change regarding 
employee work patterns. A binding agreement had been entered into with the 
unions so that, even though they were unable to convince their members to accept 
these changes, they had no choice but to continue their support for the new 
patterns. Union and non-union members slowly but surely started to form 
subgroups. Short strikes were initiated by these groups that seriously affected 
production. It only takes a few people to break up an existing structure.  
 
As a result of this emerging conflict and its breakdown consequences, some new 
directors were appointed and in 2002 a recovery period started. Six new labour 
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agreements were finalised for divisions and departments covering the period from 
January 2003 to December 2004. Headquarter staff were included in the General 
Service and Transport (GST) Division agreement which meant that it covered 
12,000 of the company’s 25,000 people, making it by far the most important of 
the six separate labour agreements covering the whole company. After a 
remarkable improvement over the past few years, our company now faces new 
challenges. New electronic distribution systems (EDS) will be introduced. This 
will have a major impact on organisational and strategic developments, 
particularly changes in work practices for almost all of the 12,000 operational 
staff members working in this area. The Staff Councils participated in the 
decision-making process around the new distribution system, but it was clear that 
the new labour agreement to replace the one expiring at the end of 2004 would 
also have an impact. As one of the leaders I realised that there is always the 
potential for conflict during such strategic change, and I was anxious to avoid a 
repetition of the 2001 strike. 
  
The HRM director in the GST division, a former union leader, had led the most 
important negotiation team for the agreement that was to expire at the end of 
2004. He had introduced some new items during these negotiations, such as job 
security for a part of the operational staff in exchange for flexibility (JSF). In late 
2003, this director changed careers and the HRM manager of the group left, while 
a new HRM director was yet to be appointed. At the same time a new policy was 
adopted to bring all divisions closer together in the light of possible future 
developments, meaning going from six labour agreements to one for the whole 
company. The Board decided to ask one of the managing directors to lead the 
forthcoming negotiations on behalf of the whole group. In December 2003, the 
CEO of the group asked me whether I would be willing to lead the negotiations 
with the unions regarding a new labour agreement for the period starting on 1 
January 2005. I agreed. From the moment the request was made, I started to think 
about how this agreement could play a role in our future strategic change program 
on the introduction of EDS. Major changes lay ahead, and a good agreement could 
facilitate these changes. One thing I focused on was to secure this agreement in a 
responsible way, without the polarised labour conflict that had led to the 
breakdown in 2001, putting the country and our reputation in jeopardy. 
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What I have discovered in working for our company is that there is a gap between 
top management and people in operations, on the one hand, and planning and 
execution, on the other. This, in combination with a lack of trust and superficial 
relations between these groups, always creates a basis for polarised conflict. 
During the past few years, the unions have tended to refer to company 
management as ‘those stupid idiots up there who do not know what they are 
talking about,’ declaring, ‘We will stand up for the workers to see that no wrong is 
done’. Neither view, of course, is true; but they are presented as the truth. This 
way of thinking created an advantageous position from the union point of view. 
Many times, even small organisational changes led to conflict. So, trying to avoid 
polarised conflict means, among other things, building better relations, which 
requires an investment of time and energy in engaging people and taking them 
seriously in the work they do. This intention of doing what was required to avoid 
polarised conflict, without weakening our negotiation position, very much 
influenced the thinking during the whole negotiation process. Focusing on 
preventing polarised conflict by building good relationships is not generally the 
starting position in most negotiations, but it provides an opportunity to look at 
negotiations from another angle.   
 
 
Reflection on the overriding intention of avoiding polarised conflict 
 
From the start I had a clear overall intention of avoiding conflict by focusing, not 
on a negotiating position, but on building relationships in order to avoid this 
situation. Reflecting on this overriding intention, in writing this chapter, I am not 
only exploring the nature and role of conflict in terms of this particular labour 
agreement negotiation, but generally in organisational life. We, the company, 
discovered that we were not able to handle the previous conflict in a way that 
served the purpose of an acceptable outcome. Also based on the fact that we did 
not know how relations with the unions and the opinion leaders in our workforce 
developed during the last years, we were not sure how any conflict would present 
itself during these negotiations. In reflecting on what happened during the 
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negotiation period I have come to see the importance of distinguishing between 
different meanings and forms of conflict in literature and practice. 
 
A typical definition of conflict describes it as a social phenomenon involving a 
struggle aimed at neutralising, injuring or eliminating the values, status, power 
and resources of opponents (Coser, 1956; Rapoport, 1974; Glasl, 1999). Conflict, 
then, has the meaning of a relationship between foes characterised by hostility, 
fight and even breakdown in cooperation. One could speak in this case of 
‘polarised conflict’. Writers in this tradition tend to say little about how conflict 
emerges and focus instead on how to prevent or ‘solve’ conflict (Mastenbroek, 
1987; Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn, 1991), involving the ability to handle 
misunderstanding and tension in organisations. Some warn against suppressing 
conflictual feelings, because this could surface as other polarised forms of 
conflict, and advocate instead bringing differences into the open (Glasl, 1999). 
One could call this ‘preventive or repressive conflict’.  
 
Writers also typically classify conflict into different categories, proposing 
different interventions to deal with different types of conflict. Mastenbroek 
(1987), for example, identifies:  
 instrumental conflicts about priorities, resulting from insufficient 
communication and unclear division of responsibilities;  
 social, emotional conflicts relating to personal relationships, trust and 
self-image;  
 negotiation conflicts arising in the tension around sharing scarce goods; 
and  
 power/dependency questions reflected in rivalry about position.  
 
Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn (1991) distinguish between substantive conflicts, 
which are disagreements over ends and means, such as the allocation of resources, 
distribution of rewards, policies and procedures, and emotional conflicts, which 
involve feelings of anger, distrust, dislike, fear, resentment and personal clashes. 
Although it is difficult to separate them, Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn (1991) 
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argue that each form must be dealt with each on its own merits, and also 
recognise:  
 role conflict, which occurs when people are unable to respond to the 
standards of one or more members of the group they normally work 
with;  
 intrapersonal conflict;  
 interpersonal conflict;  
 inter-group conflict; and  
 inter-organisational conflict.  
 
Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn (1991) focus on the ability of the manager to 
encounter and deal with each level of conflict, specifically from the organisational 
standpoint. They hold that conflict resolution can only be achieved when the 
underlying reasons for conflicts are eliminated and propose several management 
techniques to help the manager to solve the problem.   
 
The question might be asked whether prevention of conflict in this way will lead 
to desired developments in organisations. When conflict occurs, solutions also 
provide the opportunities to implement necessary change in an organisation, 
implying that conflict is not always a bad thing. Taking another view, Mead 
(1934), Elias (1970) and Griffin (2002) see conflict as the normal result of people 
interacting to reach an acceptable next step in discussing goals. This can be called 
‘natural or normative conflict’. Normative, in this perspective, is used to describe 
the effect of those structures of culture that regulate the function of social activity. 
Conflict can be seen as an ongoing process of discussing and exploring difference, 
involving both cooperation and competition without necessarily breaking down as 
hostility of some kind. In this case conflict could be seen as a description of 
relationships. This is a relationship of exploration, as opposed to the relationship 
of confrontation stressed by the writers mentioned above, and can be called 
‘explorative conflict’.  
 
Griffin (2002) introduces conflict as an aspect of the emergence of leadership, in 
focusing on the difference between cult leadership and functional leadership. Cult 
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values such as cult leadership are the idealisation of standards of the world or the 
organisation in which one lives and works. For example, the cult value is that all 
services should be delivered on time, where the reality is that all kinds of 
influences on a services system result in an acceptably low percentage of punctual 
deliveries. This is the functionalisation of the standards, which makes them real in 
day-to-day practice. Cult leadership shows the same phenomenon. Every 
performance has to match maximum standards, where reality shows that this will 
not be the case. The discussion between managers, leaders and the people they 
work with will lead to the recognition of diverse opinions and this recognition will 
take place through conflict, in which case conflict is a very normal part of our 
day-to-day responsibilities. Good examples can be found in every election 
campaign where reality is not good enough to get elected. After the election the 
politician has to transfer (functionalise) his ideals into usable plans for the time to 
come, in interaction with his voters and parliament. Griffin also points out that 
‘conflict’ itself can be idealised by removing it from the present and making it 
hypothetical: just pretend that it does not exist, and it becomes a cult value. Not 
acknowledging and discussing the possibility that conflict can emerge when 
choices between two conflicting proposals are to be made is in itself seen by 
Griffin as cult leadership, a form of idealisation.   
 
In taking the above view, Griffin relates to Mead, who sees conflict as the very 
core of his theory of ethics and leadership and states that it is through conflict that 
we are continuously recreating our world and becoming ourselves, that is, 
realising our identity. 
 
Human individuals realise or become aware of themselves as such, almost more 
easily and readily in terms of the social attitudes connected or associated with 
these two ‘hostile’ impulses, self protection and self preservation (or in terms of 
these two impulses as expressed in these attitudes), than they do in terms of any 
other social attitudes or behavioural tendencies as expressed by those attitudes 
(Mead, 1934, p. 304). 
 
Griffin also refers to the importance of conflict as viewed by Norbert Elias: 
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 One of the most astonishing features of many sociological and economical 
 theories is that they scarcely acknowledge the central part played in every 
 social development by tension and conflicts  
(Elias, 1970, p. 172). 
 
Griffin does not see conflict as something threatening or as something to be 
avoided, but as a normal result of interaction between people and an integral part 
of leadership. Ordinary life is an ongoing exploration and negotiation of 
conflicting positions, which need not immediately be polarised. Such ordinary 
conflict cannot be managed away or resolved. 
 
By now it is clear that there is not something universal called conflict. It is 
important to try to prevent polarised conflict and to avoid the repressed conflict 
that could so easily become polarised, but explorative conflict, as part of the 
continuous process of relating, can create solutions and prevent people from 
getting stuck. The position Griffin, Mead and Elias each take is reflected in the 
theory of complex responsive processes (Griffin, 2002). With regard to the 
negotiation process I was about to engage in, the explorative conflict involved in 
building up relations with the union people was to become important. Establishing 
relations means that parties have to engage without moving into a polarised 
conflict situation. Working with explorative conflict always holds the risk of 
entering polarised conflict. My experience is that a thin line separates the two. 
When I started investigating conflict, I saw it as a general way of describing 
people disagreeing about opinions and views. In the course of reflecting and 
writing, I have come to see the question of conflict in a more complex way, 
although at the time of the negotiations my understanding and actions were much 
more intuitive. In the following sections, I will describe how the process of 
relating has evolved. I will also present an argument linking conflict to identity 
and ideology, and suggest ways of working in an explorative way at the edge of 
polarised conflict in negotiating a sensitive labour contract.  
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Preparing for the negotiation of a new unified labour agreement  
 
Returning to early 2004, I would now like to describe some of the preparations we 
made for the negotiations with the unions. Three main groups were involved: (1) 
the nine members of the company EXB; (2) the four union leaders, who act as a 
group when negotiating but are competing when representing their own members; 
and (3) the six members of the negotiating team. After several consultations with 
the chairman of the EXB, I presented the first steps of a possible future strategic 
change program to the EXB on 16 February. This included proposals for job 
security and staff reduction. I followed the business plan of the GST division and 
tried to combine this with the plans of the other specialised divisions. Shortly after 
this presentation, I was invited by the eleven HRM managers of all divisions and 
subsidiary companies to share my first impressions. I gave them the same EXB 
overview and sensed their strong fear of being excluded from the process as a 
group. Labour agreements have always been the domain of the HRM people; now 
someone else had taken over. I understood their feelings, but it was not yet time to 
include this large group in my work in progress, as I was concerned that they 
would push strongly to continue business as usual and I wanted to be free to make 
up my own mind on how to move things forward. I planned conversations with 
many other colleagues who, in one way or another, play an important part in how 
the company is managed and who would have to live with the outcome of our 
negotiations.  
 
During a financial information meeting at the end of February, I was introduced to 
the union leaders, Boris, Charles, Karl and Stef, as the negotiator for a new 
combined company labour agreement. These meetings have something of the 
nature of a cat-and-mouse game, in which the company is the cat and the union 
representatives are the mice. 
 
Next, I had to form the negotiating team. From the beginning I was looking for an 
emergent way to get the negotiating process underway rather than making clear, 
fixed decisions right at the start about what we needed to achieve and how we 
should go about achieving it. I was in no hurry because the government was 
proposing major changes in many social systems, including pensions, which 
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would feature in our negotiations. In early 2004 it was very unclear just what the 
changes would be, so I wanted to move as slowly as possible toward the actual 
negotiation with the unions. I was also very aware of the events of 1999, when the 
unions had not been able to carry their own members with them. It was important, 
therefore, to invite onto the negotiating team people with expert knowledge and/or 
enough support from the managers in the division they represented, to take up the 
responsibility for negotiating together with me and feel comfortable in working 
together in an emergent way. The internal political forces and pressures always 
increase during such a process, and I was reluctant to let these forces influence our 
work too early and in a way that would make it difficult for us to hold on to our 
own emergent thinking. One thing was certain – one day there would be a new 
labour agreement; but the rest was open for discussion. So, I had talks with each 
of the candidates for the negotiating team individually, sharing my views on the 
way I would like to work together. For some it was a little unusual not to sit 
down, think it over and present a point of view on how to move forward and what 
to get out of the process. Everybody was asked whether they were comfortable 
with working together in this emergent way. In March 2004 I presented the first 
draft on the team composition at the EXB meeting.  
 
29 March was a big day. We had our first meeting of the negotiating team and 
introduced ourselves to each other. We decided to meet every two weeks in the 
afternoon on the day of the EXB meeting to talk about whatever was going on. 
Our biggest friend was time, and we wanted to keep it that way. We started our 
first meeting just talking. Since our future as a team and what we might achieve 
together was uncertain, we wanted to give ourselves enough room to maneuver 
without putting all kinds of constraints on ourselves. Our own day-to-day 
experience gave us enough food for talk and thought to connect to the process at 
hand. In one of her examples, Shaw describes how one of her clients wants to 
encourage his people to open up and accept new turbulence. She describes her 
feelings as follows: 
 
At this point I talk about my interest in the concept of “edge of chaos” 
conditions in which a complex network paradoxically experiences both 
stability and instability – where variations in the reproduction of existing 
 63 
patterns may amplify to generate real novelty. I talk about how such self-
organizing emergence is intrinsically uncontrollable in the usual sense and 
unpredictable in the longer term. I said that I was interested in working 
with the self organizing processes far from certainty and agreement where 
people really did not and could not know precisely what they were doing 
as they acted into an evolving situation  
(Shaw, 2002, p. 93) 
 
Working with a team that was partly selected by me and partly selected itself, it 
was possible to exchange ideas and start feeling comfortable in not knowing. We 
were very clear about the fact that we needed to build up informal relations with 
the union leaders. Godfried, a member of the team who came from the General 
Services Division as a labour relations expert, had built up strong relations over 
the past few years, and this contributed to the kind of starting position we wanted 
to be in. It would surely help to prevent polarised conflict from emerging and 
facilitate dealing with the more normal exploratory conflict situations that arise in 
every discussion (Mead, 1934). During the final stages of the negotiations, 
Godfried and I had many opportunities to make use of these good relations in 
discussing subjects on an individual basis outside the conference room, which is 
often the case during complicated negotiations (Mastenbroek, 1994). During 
almost every negotiation team meeting we talked about major developments in 
government policies on subjects connected to our negotiations. Step by step our 
knowledge base increased and we felt more comfortable about widening the circle 
of people we would like to involve in the discussions.  
 
The first union leader I met on an individual basis was Karl, from one of the 
largest unions. He warned me about the attitude of one of the other unions, which 
was intent on destabilisation. I thanked him for his concern, but as always with 
warnings, most of the time I had no idea what to do with them. Boris, another 
union leader, had a clear view of what he wanted to talk about and was well 
prepared. In fact he came up with many of the subjects we had identified 
ourselves. Boris was also partly responsible for the agreements with the 
government department providing the logistic infrastructure and was worried 
about the way their negotiation process was developing. The government is still 
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responsible for much of the logistic infrastructure. In the early days it has been 
one entity but it had to split up because of European regulations. Several 
competitors make use of this same logistic infrastructure, which serves a common 
purpose. Although the government department had their own negotiation process, 
we still shared many rules and regulations. However, both organisations have their 
own wage structure and the government level is not at the same as ours. This 
creates tension, on a day-to-day basis, between the people working in the 
government and people in our company who sometimes work closely together. 
Two other union leaders, Stef and Egon, had done their homework well, 
presenting an analysis of the present and an extensive description of the future 
they wanted. During the process they tried to hang on to their ideas and come 
back to their plan, but no one actually accepted their invitation. Their 
disadvantage was that the group they represented was one of the smallest.  
 
 
The issue of job security and job flexibility 
 
On 13 April 2004, we had an EXB strategy meeting. The subjects I presented did 
not arouse much discussion. However, it was clear that some of the members 
strongly opposed JSF. Although JSF had been agreed for the more than 7000 staff 
members of the GST division in the last labour agreement, my impression was 
that some of the EXB had agreed to this against their will or had been overruled. 
This time, they wanted to make sure that this would not happen again. However, I 
was convinced of the importance of extending JSF to other parts of the company 
because of the new distribution system we would be installing in the coming 
years.  
 
We did not stand alone in this line of thinking. Wilthagen (1998) introduced the 
term ‘flexicurity’ as a new paradigm for labour market policy reform. He 
describes this concept as a trade-off between labour market flexibility and 
increased national social security models. He states that flexicurity could be 
considered as an implementation strategy for transitional labour markets under 
government supervision. The main purpose at that stage was to create social 
systems more open for transitory states between gainful employment and 
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productive non-market activities to alleviate structural unemployment. Later, 
Wilthagen (2002) extended this thinking not only to transitions between work and 
social security situations but to the emerging of the flexibility–security nexus in 
and between companies. In our company this line of thinking was transferred into 
the JSF proposition.  
  
The first ideas of exchanging JSF and mobility came up in 2003. The GST 
division, which had been through the major trauma of 2001, had to reach a new 
labour agreement and there was a real necessity to discuss changes in working 
patterns. Every discussion about this subject ended in a stalemate, because 
whenever organisational change and reduction of staff were discussed people 
were afraid of losing their jobs. By analysing pension schemes and dates of 
retirement, the management of this division – in those days responsible for their 
own agreement – had figured out that natural reduction of staff numbers matched 
the business plan forecast of the next eight years, and they decided to offer this 
security. Combined with a reasonable wage increase, stability on the worker front 
was restored and management could start working on the next phase of plans. 
 
The purpose of the negotiation I was leading was to combine all labour 
agreements in order to create a new ‘one group’ feeling. Differences in legal 
position, with some people having JSF and others not, would hinder us in the 
discussions about job integration, more output with less personnel, and new 
working schemes. Every time the subject arose in board meetings, feelings of 
animosity rose to the surface. Such a hostile atmosphere compromised the 
willingness of others to talk about the matter.  
 
In our negotiation team we had made calculations of what would happen if we 
honoured the request of the unions to extend the JSF offer to the staff of other 
specialised divisions, which would enable us to start talks about the integration of 
jobs between the GST and other specialised divisions. It turned out that it would 
easily fit the business plan forecast, so we decided to support the idea and to 
present it in the next EXB meeting. During this EXB meeting, the discussion 
about JSF followed two directions. Firstly, for some, there was a feeling that 
extension of the working sphere of JSF could bring the necessary flexibility (with 
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a stronger agreement and better contract), given that organisational change was 
inevitable. Secondly, other members reported that the experiences with flexibility 
so far had been disappointing. There was another complication. If JSF was 
extended to all the company’s national divisions, the international division would 
also press for it. I was requested to present an inventory of all types of JSF 
agreements for one of the next EXB meetings. There was also misunderstanding 
on the current agreement, and insufficient understanding of staff reduction due to 
normal retirement. We promised to provide the necessary information for 
regional, national and international operations. 
 
Although we later provided detailed information, the members of the EXB still 
did not give us the impression that they agreed with us on JSF. We, the 
negotiation team, tried again to give improved and clearer information. I tried to 
explain that many of the other subjects were directed by new government rules 
and regulations and that our main goal was to create as much room as possible for 
future change in the organisation and possible lower costs. Eventually, the EXB 
agreed on JSF for those groups of employees working in the same field. JSF, 
previously agreed upon for the operational staff of the GST division, was to be 
extended to service groups of other specialised divisions. The negotiation team 
would prepare a memorandum on how staff of the GST division were distributed 
across the regions of the country, and what it would mean to add the other service 
people. Decision-making processes moved slowly forward, but there was still a 
feeling of ‘yes, but…?’. The atmosphere during the discussion of this issue 
continued to be tense, reflecting the pattern of power relations.  
 
Because of the concerns that Boris had expressed, I organised a meeting with one 
of the directors of the government logistic department to discuss JSF. They too 
would be greatly affected by the outcome of our agreement, so we needed to 
explore where serving our interests might become counterproductive for them. In 
the meantime, the negotiation team had developed a strong coherence; we even 
had some harsh discussions and real conflicts, but came out stronger. 
Conversation played an important role in all phases of the process. 
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As the patterning within and between the different groupings evolved, it became 
clearer and clearer that the JSF issue was leading to a more and more polarised 
conflict situation between several of the participants. The atmosphere at meetings 
was grim and the discussion itself was leading nowhere. During one of the EXB 
meetings, I asked if there were other reasons for the opposition that had not yet 
been disclosed. This question led to a hostile atmosphere and did not take us any 
further. We were stuck. However, my team and I were convinced that an 
understanding on JSF would help the company to move forward in the coming 
years and also help us finalise the negotiations. In October 2004 one of the unions 
sent us a letter demanding job security for all staff. This was the first time the 
unions brought the subject up for discussion.  
 
So, what I want to draw attention to here, as we slowly approach negotiations with 
the unions, is the tension, with its potential for polarised conflict, within the EXB 
and also with closely related companies and government departments which we 
depended on and which depended on us. 
 
 
Conflict: individuals and groups 
 
Reflecting now on these events, I can see how we in the negotiating team 
identified the three most important groups involved in these negotiations as our 
own team, the EXB and the union leaders. There were many other groups also 
involved, but they did not have the same level of influence. Individuals 
participated in a number of different groups. Many of the discussions in these 
groupings took the form of explorative conflict as we worked through our 
differences, and although the potential for polarised conflict was never far away in 
any of these groupings, the only serious potential for polarised conflict emerged in 
the EXB where the discussion stagnated and explorative conflict was avoided. So 
what do other authors in the sociology and organisational literatures have to say 
about the role of groups in emerging conflict or its prevention? 
  
Coser (1956) explains the effects of conflict on groups in two ways. Firstly, 
conflict sets boundaries between groups within a social system, creating 
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awareness of separateness and thus creating the identity of groups within the 
system. Secondly, conflict reinforces group cohesion. He argues that conflict 
establishes the distinction between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-groups’, so giving 
rise to the development of individual identities. Coser makes a distinction between 
realistic and unrealistic conflicts. Realistic conflicts provide the means toward a 
specific result, whereas non-realistic conflicts, although still evolving in 
interaction, are not caused by the antagonists but by the need for tension release of 
at least one of them. Non-realistic elements in realistic conflict situations increase 
the intensity of the conflict.  
 
Rapoport (1974) starts with an extensive analysis of conflict in nature in general, 
as the struggle for existence, evolution and survival. When dealing with conflict, 
he says, first we must identify the conflicting parties. In doing so it seems most 
natural to identify individuals as the basic conflicting parties, because if all 
members of a group had the same aspirations there would be no problem. When 
some members of the group want to achieve goals and purposes for their own 
benefit, problems will inevitably arise.  
 
Rapoport focuses on systemic theories of conflict, where it is not the individual 
psyche that is at the centre of attention but group processes not subject to control 
by single individuals. When looking at the role of individuals, Rapoport draws, 
among others, on Hobbes’ (1957, p. 139) picture of human life as the war of 
everyone against everyone. In Hobbes’ model, individuals are not differentiated 
from each other, in which case the focus of attention is not on individual 
psychology but on systemic effect. For example, Rapoport considers the 
’psychologies’ of actors larger than individuals, in particular highly organised 
social ‘organisms’ such as states. The soldier sent out to a war obeys the 
command even if he does not want to. Coser focuses more on the individual 
human being, whereas Rapoport chooses a systemic and group approach, pointing 
to Hegel’s idea that contradiction is unavoidable in the process of logical 
progression toward the truth and that this contradiction is in its essence also a 
concept for conflict.  
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Mastenbroek (1994) describes his methods for intervention in terms of four 
stereotypical patterns of relationship connected to certain behaviour, problems and 
frictions. Based on this assumption, Mastenbroek (1987, pp. 206–208) 
distinguishes four types of conflict-solving behaviour, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Types of conflict solving behaviour 
 
Types of conflict 
 
Effective behaviour 
Instrumental conflicts, which are 
business- or target-oriented 
 
Problem analysis, efficient meeting 
and decision-making processes 
 
Social emotional conflicts, which 
focus on identity 
 
Empathy and open communication 
 
Negotiation conflicts, concerned with 
the distribution of scarce goods 
 
Negotiate 
 
Power and dependency conflicts, 
focused on securing position or 
improving positions in relation to 
others   
 
Structuring mutual dependency 
 
 
Glasl (1999) generally sees two opposite positions in dealing with conflict: 
conflict avoidance and battle. The first attitude suppresses all forms of conflict 
and will result in a negative influence on working atmosphere. In the second, 
attitude conflicts will go on until social coherence in the group is completely lost. 
Glasl focuses more on the individual in the group and less on conflict between 
groups. His most important question is whether the person has a conflict or 
whether the conflict has the person. In other words, does the person still have 
control over themselves? When the conflict has control over the person, this 
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person will be guided as if by an invisible hand and will transform the image of 
the other. In a conflict situation there is self-infection.  
 
Glasl (1999, p. 123) provides many intervention techniques based on nine 
different levels of escalation to handle these kinds of situations with the strong 
belief that awareness about conflict can prevent it from emerging or can solve it.  
 
1) Hardening: Concentrate on issues, suitable communication methods relieve 
the strain, loosening to allow to return to the positive qualities of people 
involved.  
 
2) Debate and polemics: Disabling the polarised powers, from fighting for 
dominance to debate, from compulsive ping-pong to self-directed action. 
 
3) Actions, not words: Strengthening empathy, loosening the crystallised roles, 
clarifying discrepancies between verbal and non-verbal messages.  
 
4) Images and coalitions: Correcting distorted perceptions, which disable 
perceptive mechanisms, dissolving fateful role attributions. 
 
After this point professional help is advised: 
 
5) Loss of face: Process consultation or process counselling.  
 
6) Strategies of threat: loosen or break interlocking of the conflicting parties. 
 
7) Limited destructive blows: Mediation in the classic sense is required.  
 
8) Fragmentation of the enemy: Voluntary arbitration. 
 
9) Together into the abyss: Mobilisation of superior power. 
 
Glasl works out the interventions in great detail, which can be helpful in 
recognising the occurring situation, but it is important to bear in mind that every 
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situation will be slightly different from any other and requires a different 
approach, a basic assumption when working in terms of complex responsive 
processes.  
 
Elias (1970) describes interaction between human groupings in terms of patterns 
of power relations in which people are included and excluded from particular 
groupings. It is this process of power relating that creates the identity of the 
individual (‘I’ identity) and of the group (‘we’ identity). One’s sense of personal 
identity is closely connected with the ‘we’ and ‘they’ relationship within and 
between groups. In this way the identity creation of the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ are 
closely connected. Griffin (2002, p. 195) describes the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ as 
emerging identity in the tension of the direct experience of relationships between 
human beings in the unity of the social act, and relates this to complex responsive 
processes. He shows that conflict is a natural process in the recognising of one’s 
own identity in the other and the other in oneself, and that recreating one’s 
identity cannot be realised without the struggle of entering into conflict. Griffin 
focuses strongly on the relation of conflict and identity. The transformation of 
identity through conflict is an intense process because conflict holds a high level 
of emotion and tension. Griffin develops his line of thinking from the leadership 
perspective. I think there is no leadership without emotion, and emotion – like 
conflict – transforms identity. Coping with this phenomenon is one of the major 
aspects of leadership. Taking the views of Griffin into account opens up new 
possibilities in processes of negotiations. I will now review some of the 
experimental processes that helped us to develop negotiations in an explorative 
way.  
 
  
Preparations for the negotiations continue 
 
I had my first meeting with Charles, the leader of one of the unions, in December 
2004. This meeting had been postponed six times during the previous ten months. 
To my great surprise, and probably also to his, we got along very well, which 
immediately led to a few other meetings. In previous labour agreement 
negotiations this union had been the hardest to deal with. After my meetings with 
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Charles, we organised an informal dinner meeting with all the union leaders to get 
to know each other better and to exchange general knowledge. It was a successful 
first step that involved the exchange of much personal information. We took our 
time to build up a relationship and to create something of a common feeling. At 
the end of the dinner, we planned the first official meeting to exchange company 
information.  
 
There were also other ways in which we engaged the unions. For example, we 
organised theme groups and later we organised a conference. 
 
 
Theme groups 
 
Early in 2004, after our second explorative dinner meeting with the union leaders, 
our negotiation team reviewed the interaction between the unions, noticing the 
competition and sometimes the tense atmosphere when they started negotiating 
between themselves. Those are the moments when one feels that polarised conflict 
lies just around the corner. In light of this, we proposed setting up small combined 
theme groups involving the different unions and ourselves, to investigate in detail 
four main topics:  
 
1. Job security combined with job reduction and job flexibility; 
2. Pensions; 
3. One labour agreement; 
4. Conditions related to sickness and the disabled. 
 
All unions agreed to participate in these groups and to investigate the boundaries 
between the major subject areas. The outcome of this meeting guaranteed us the 
desired delay of the beginning of real negotiations. We had the impression that 
time would help us in building up not only personal relations but also working 
relations with union members and leaders. 
 
Our intention in setting up the smaller theme groups was to provide forums where 
we could discuss the major issues together with union representatives and explore 
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the situations in which we all found ourselves. The last thing I wanted to happen 
was for us to be forced into real negotiations. The government was so unclear 
about future regulations on our main negotiation points that, given a huge 
demonstration of hundreds of thousands of union members against government 
policy, especially on pension regulations, starting negotiations too soon could 
easily bring us into a polarised conflict situation. Avoiding the formulation of a 
strategy right at the start is not a common procedure during negotiations. In 
normal negotiation processes, people tend to take up starting positions on what 
they would like to realise as a best outcome, and the party that can hold on to this 
starting position the longest makes the most out of the negotiation (Karrass, 
1974). In not taking this position, the process went in a different direction where 
parties were investigating together what new government regulations would mean 
for everybody and what an objective point of view might be. Because of the 
universal uncertainty, the risk of going into polarised conflict about unclear 
negotiation points was so high that we intuitively chose another approach.  
 
Another example of how we slowly prepared for the negotiations is the 
conference we organised. 
 
 
The conference  
 
During a short conference on complex responsive processes of the Complexity 
and Management Centre of the University of Hertfordshire near London, one of 
the participants suggested that I contact a consultant on union participation in 
organisational change. At the same time, Boris proposed having a conference to 
develop a recovery plan for the complete sector. The members of the negotiating 
team favoured the idea of creating joint experiments with the unions.  
 
As a result I made an appointment with the consultant, together with two people 
of the negotiating team, and we met him in London. He talked to us about the 
privatisation process of the British energy and electricity industry, where he was 
involved in the change programme of one of the sectors. These public-sector 
organisations had to be transformed into a commercial company. From the start of 
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the process, management tried to involve the unions in playing an active part. This 
was not easy, to say the least, because unions were afraid of losing control, 
influence and power and were organised in a bureaucratic way. They organised 
brainstorm sessions with employees of this ‘future’ company about many subjects 
and invited union leaders to take part in these meetings. During the meetings all 
hierarchical levels were mixed. Special attention was paid to involve so-called 
opinion leaders or ‘trouble-makers’, often also active members of the unions. As a 
result of these meetings, ten conferences in the country were organised inviting all 
other employees, to increase the general level of participation. As people were 
able to convince each other that there were no hidden agendas and that the 
decision of the government was not an issue for discussion, so it was best to be 
involved, the results of these conferences contributed strongly to a smoother 
change process than expected. Looking at our case, the expert suggested inviting 
the unions into the strategic thinking process of the company based on his positive 
experiences during a massive change program. Besides, a conference with union 
leaders and opinion leaders about the future of the company, which was similar to 
Boris’ earlier idea for a joint conference, could support the process. 
 
The members of the EXB were enthusiastic about a conference to discuss the 
future of the group with union leaders and opinion formers. The negotiation team 
suggested that the CEO should take the lead at the conference to signal a 
separation between the conference and the actual negotiations. It was clear that the 
negotiations and the conference would influence each other and that the 
conference would give us an additional opportunity to work with the union 
representatives. Soon after, we had a meeting with the union leaders to prepare for 
the conference. Although there was always some tension at these meetings, the 
union leaders were very enthusiastic about the idea of a conference. Ellis, a 
colleague of Godfried, then joined the organising team. She had been employed 
by one of the unions and had a good sense of what was going on there. One of our 
ideas was to create preparation teams consisting of union leaders, union members 
and ourselves. I suggested that it would be wise to involve the HRM managers of 
the divisions because they still felt excluded. This suggestion was accepted. We 
formulated a communication strategy and I undertook to inform EXB members 
about the conference plan.  
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When we organised this conference for the beginning of February 2005, the 
unions agreed to postpone the negotiations, even though the old agreement had 
expired by then. This was exactly what we wanted, and indeed it served a mutual 
purpose for both the unions and ourselves. We hoped that the conference would 
improve our working relations with the unions. Boris suggested a conference 
preparation meeting with the participants in the form of sharing dreams about the 
company’s future.  
 
The conference itself was organised as an open-space gathering (Owen, 1997), a 
meeting instrument we often use, and was attended by more than 150 participants, 
including management, union leaders and union members. We gathered all 
information around dreams of participants in advance, created a marketplace 
where people could express their interest in discussing certain topics, and in the 
end had a public forum where people could express their ideas or concerns based 
on the discussions. In between we held a ‘press conference’ with interviews with 
union leaders and our CEO. During the conference it was possible for anyone, 
working anywhere in the country, to communicate through an internet connection. 
This went even on for extra days after the conference. In the end we informed all 
employees through our journal and a special bulletin about the results. A second 
conference was to be organised before the end of the year. 
 
This turned out to be a useful exercise because it led to an open exchange of 
information, although some people did have doubts about the value of sharing 
dreams to initiate discussions, because of the risk of speculating about an idealised 
future shorn of any obstacles to achieving it. However, the discussions we had did 
reduce fears of threats and manipulation, because everybody could take part. After 
sharing many dreams, the discussion moved quickly to the day-to-day working 
situation of drivers, mechanics, conductors and customer service people, which 
formed a common context for all of us. Without the dream sessions, this might not 
have happened so easily.  
 
There was an unexpected interruption in the development of relationships with the 
unions after the conference. Boris, one of the union leaders, provided members of 
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parliament with incomplete information about a calculation model from the 
conference. This led to a severe confrontation between Boris and the company, 
after which we had a serious discussion with him. Godfried explained to the 
negotiation team that passing on information by the unions to outsiders was 
always a risk and had often happened in previous years. The team formed the 
view that this action would have to be responded to, and so proposed a very 
interesting early retirement scheme, making it clear that this was not a shared 
success of both the unions and the company. Boris understood the message from 
the negotiation team and promised that information leaks would not happen again. 
We knew that we were moving at the edge of possible polarised conflict and had 
to inform the other unions of what happened. Parliament can be a disturbing factor 
when misinformed and when it starts acting on this misinformation.  
 
 
Negotiations, agreement and some surprises 
 
Although I was the leader of the negotiating team, it turned out during the first 
round of the negotiations that Godfried took the initiative of chairing the meeting. 
This was not prearranged but, rather, happened in a very natural way; he 
continued to take this role at all other meetings, after members of the negotiation 
team decided that they all felt comfortable with it. Due to his expert knowledge on 
many subjects he was already doing much of the talking, which he did with much 
talent. This development gave me the chance to play a bigger role in discussing 
ideas and content. Godfried and I had our final meeting with the CEO about our 
mandate on 23 March 2005. JSF was still the most important issue. We wrote a 
final memorandum highlighting all the items we were to discuss with the unions 
and suggested another discussion with the EXB because the JSF subject was still 
so sensitive. However, everybody felt that the information was clear and that we 
had talked about it enough.  
 
During the third round of negotiations on 24 March 2005, we were slowly moving 
forward on all subjects. We exchanged much technical information and in the end 
the questions on JSF and the required organisational change regarding EDS 
brought some life to the meeting. The discussion offered us the possibility of 
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clarifying our ideas and reducing the union fear that people would feel threatened 
by the reductions in staff and changes in work patterns required by EDS. We 
explained that we could reduce our workforce by 1700 operational members in a 
completely natural way between 2005 and 1 January 2011. That is why we could 
offer job security to operational staff of other divisions. However, we made it 
clear that the same amount of work had to be done with 1700 fewer employees 
due to the investment we would be making in the new distribution systems. All 
understood that this had to be our main mission for the coming years.  
 
One of the unions wanted to extend job security to the operational team of the 
international division. The managing director of this division had given job 
security under certain conditions to his staff and agreed that we could bring the 
subject into our negotiations. I explained the situation in a telephone call to our 
CEO to get his approval for this arrangement. Afterwards I discovered that he had 
misunderstood how many board members were directly involved in this 
discussion, which led to a conflict after finalising the agreement.   
 
On 20 April, the last round of the negotiations started at 10 am. A problem arose 
due to a mistake or misunderstanding by us at 1.30 am in the morning of the next 
day, and there was an intense and lasting silence; at least, it felt that way. The 
leader of one of the unions gave in immediately and solved the problem in the 
blink of an eye. This was one of the most remarkable moments during the whole 
negotiation period and demonstrated the atmosphere we had been able to create. 
At 2.30 am that day we had an agreement, and by 4 am Godfried and I could sign 
the papers together with the union leaders. After having a beer together we 
prepared news releases for the newspapers, radio and television. No conflict, no 
extra tension.  
 
All news stations talked about a revolutionary agreement supported by unions and 
the company. Remarkable was the quiet, almost silent way the whole process had 
moved forward. Compared to many times in the past, when we hit the newspapers 
with controversial news and conflict, this was a big surprise for many people. 
Some did not even know we had already started the negotiations, although unions 
presented results on their Internet sites on a day-to-day basis. All union members 
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supported the outcome, and on 3 June 2005 we presented the follow-up of the 
negotiations to the EXB. 
 
However, there was also an unexpected development. Some members of the EXB 
still had doubts about the outcome, mainly because extension of job security was 
part of the agreement. (The decision was made 23 March and communicated by 
internal memo to all EXB members, but it remained controversial). It was strange 
to experience a certain distance that surfaced during some of the regular meetings. 
My feeling of success was diminished, and I wondered if and how I should 
communicate this to my team. In fact I had a bad weekend, especially because all 
newspapers in the country were complimenting us on the results. I was able to 
express my astonishment at the attitude of some in an EXB meeting a few days 
later. We discussed in more detail the EXB processes accompanying the 
negotiations and why some of the EXB members felt ignored. When it came to the 
issue of JSF, it was clear that whatever the outcome, some members would be 
against it. The CEO had interpreted the extended mandate for the operational staff 
of the international division during our telephone conversation in another way, but 
their managing director did not leave any doubt that he agreed with our approach. 
The outcome of the meeting was that the JSF subject was so sensitive that another 
EXB meeting after 23 March would have been wiser.  
 
Some time later, there was another surprise. The negotiations of the logistic 
government department were not our direct responsibility. Their management, 
however, was not able to reach an agreement on terms and wages, and on 17 June 
this department went on strike. There was no means of services during that day 
throughout the country. Although we were not directly involved in this part of the 
negotiation process, we could have been more aware of the pending risks and 
perhaps we could have tried to have more influence on their process directly or 
via our negotiation partners. Luckily they soon reached an agreement. 
 
 
Local interaction and global patterns 
 
This paper has described organisational negotiation processes comprising more  
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than one hundred meetings and discussions. I have left out many, many details, 
but I hope I have included enough to show that such processes are messy and full 
of unexpected sidesteps. How it all evolves depends on the specific contexts the 
parties find themselves in, as well as on many coincidences. A key question for 
me is this: what made it possible to work at the edge of polarised conflict without 
such conflict actually arising during the negotiations? I think the answer has to do 
with building up good relations, which took much time and energy. In the end it 
was this that helped us to avoid polarised conflict and achieve a result that 
benefited both the company and its employees.  
 
Instead of following standard negotiation procedures, we created opportunities for 
discussion that amounted to opening the door to explorative conflict; it is this 
engagement in explorative conflict, rather than suppressing or avoiding conflict, 
that creates the greater possibilities of avoiding polarisation. There is risk-taking 
involved, because explorative conflict approaches the edges of polarised conflict, 
but by doing so we reduced the risk of an outbreak. Although this is a specific 
example concerning union negotiations, I suggest that it has general implications 
for many other management processes where complicated negotiations inevitably 
raise the prospect of conflict. I would say that during the period of the 
negotiations, my colleagues and I operated quite intuitively and in the process 
created a different approach to negotiating. As the leader, I think I tried to 
stimulate working at the edge of polarised conflict where creativity evolved in 
local interaction (self-organisation) from which there emerged the global, 
population-wide patterns (strategy) of better understanding with the unions and a 
successful agreement, as well as global patterns of a divided EXB and a strike at 
the logistic government department. Let me explain.  
 
As I have said before, several groups played important roles in the overall 
processes of the negotiation. The EXB was responsible for the group as a whole, 
that is, the head office and all the divisions. The negotiating team had to relate to 
the EXB, and it also had working relations with divisions and HRM departments. 
The union leaders acted as one group, but also as separate entities for the people 
they represented, and we in the negotiation team had to develop relationships with 
them individually and collectively. Many other groups played a role during these 
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negotiations, and then there were policy-makers and politicians in the central 
government who were making decisions of direct relevance to our negotiations. 
Again we had some interaction with all of these groupings. In terms of activity, all 
of these groupings consisted of relatively small numbers of people, sometimes 
with the same people in more than one grouping, who accomplished whatever it 
was that they accomplished in ongoing conversations, in relationships, with each 
other. All of this can be described as local interactions (Stacey, 2005a), or more 
technically, as self-organisation. The narrative in this paper has pointed to some of 
these local interactions. 
 
Those working in the natural complexity sciences have been particularly 
concerned with the relationship between self-organising, that is, local, interactions 
(micro activities) and global or widespread patterns (the macro). For example, 
Prigogine (1996, p. 60) became convinced that macroscopic irreversibility of time 
was the manifestation of the randomness of probabilistic processes on a 
microscopic scale. Also, in an interview with van Maris (2005) on computer 
simulations of the self-organising development of vowel systems, Bart de Boer 
argued that global structures emerge only through interactions on the local level, 
without any outside influence and without a prearranged hierarchical structure.  
Elias (1970), writing long before the complexity sciences appeared, took a similar 
view of human interaction. He explains that (1) development of technology, (2) 
social organisation, the twin processes of increasing differentiation and increasing 
integration and (3) the civilising process cannot be understood in terms of parallel 
increase in what he calls three types of control leading to a predictable future. 
Especially in the civilising process, changes in self-control take place that can be 
non-linear. Elias says that looking at the past makes it possible to see how present 
forms of society have emerged from earlier forms, but that this has no pre-existing 
aim or significance. Trends do not take a straight course, and very often develop 
via severe conflicts. It is beyond human power or foresight to carry out changes in 
social structures. Elias refers in a way to types of local interaction leading to an 
unpredictable form of tomorrow’s (global) society.  
 
I argue that it makes sense of my experience of the negotiations to think in this 
way about the many local interactions, the many meetings and events, through 
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which widespread, global patterns emerged. In other words, strategies, as global 
patterns, emerged in the continuous thinking and discussion involving all of us in 
many local situations during the negotiation process through which we were 
reconstructing every step we took. However, in all our local interactions, we were 
also keeping in mind ‘the big picture’. We were very aware of a number of global 
patterns: our group’s contracts with central and regional governments; the 
financial resources and results; our clients and their representative organisations; 
our own organisational structure; and so on. So in our many local interactions we 
were co-constructing the emergent global patterns, but at the same time we were 
taking into our local interactions our generalised interpretations of these global 
patterns. These generalisations then were constraining us. These generalised 
global patterns, both internal to our company and external to it, were most of the 
time beyond our control (Stacey, 2005a).  
  
When we take a complex responsive process view, we focus on communication 
between humans. This immediately leads to diversity and unpredictability (Stacey, 
2005a). This makes us look at organisations as ongoing temporal processes of 
human communicative interaction.  
 
 Social forces, social structures, routines and habits can all be understood as 
 generalizations that are particularized over and over again in each specific 
 situation we are in… Furthermore these generalizations are often idealized 
 and come to form the cult values we repeatedly have to functionalize in our 
 interactions. This way of understanding routines and habits focuses attention 
 on the inevitably conflictual nature of particularizing the general and the 
 idealized. 
(Stacey, 2005a, p. 44). 
 
It is the idealisation of our imaginatively created unity that makes us experience 
value; the voluntary compulsions that serve as criteria for good and bad actions 
(Dewey, 1934). Mead (1934) talked about the functionalisation of idealised cult 
values to give the values we make use of in our day-to-day life; and this always 
gives rise to conflict, which will show itself in interaction. This is true for the kind 
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of negotiation processes I have been describing, as well as for the implications on 
strategic developments of the company as a whole.  
 
At the EXB meetings, some of the members tried to hold on to the cult value, 
‘companies do not give away job security’. However, the reality was that more 
than 7000 employees had already been given job security. It was the proposed 
functionalisation of this cult value involving the addition of a further 1500 
employees to the scheme that brought up the different opinions. Some tried to 
limit diversity by holding on to the cult value in an absolute sense, while others 
were trying to functionalise it. These differences of opinion led to attempts by 
some to engage in explorative conflict as part of a normal discussion, while others 
were moving toward polarised conflict. Power plays an important role in 
determining who will take up which position. The approach of Griffin (2002) and 
Mead (1934) is one in which people engage in explorative conflict that often 
comes close to working at the edge of polarised conflict. When in a discussion 
people try to hold on to cult values in any circumstances, the explorative conflict 
phase will not take place and people will immediately enter polarised conflict and 
get stuck. As soon as we start taking account of the specific time and situation we 
are in, we are particularising or functionalising the general and the ideal. This 
requires continuing conversation in which we engage in explorative conflict. We 
still have our different positions, but now we are negating the simple negation, the 
polarisation, and exploring how we can obtain something of what we want that 
makes sense for both of us in the specific situation we find ourselves in. The 
opposition, the conflict, is then potentially transformed into a novel arrangement 
we can all live with. Although the story is one of a successful negotiation, from a 
leadership perspective it is important to stress my inability to control all the 
factors involved and point out the inevitable surprises that occurred along the 
away. 
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Project Three 
 
 
About Project Three 
 
In Project Two it became clearer to me how the population-wide patterns of 
interaction between people, which is what we can understand organisational 
strategy to be, emerges in the many, many local interactions between people and 
groupings of people. The situation described in Project Three asked more or less 
for a comparable approach, only it did not happen at the beginning. The story 
begins as the very general strategy of a straightforward cost-cutting operation in 
which one of the options is a merger between the national and international sales 
departments of two divisions. In Project One I stated that strategy means an 
elaborate and systematic plan of action. In the story in this project, over two years 
passed before the merger was accomplished, and I started to question the 
assumptions about what strategy actually is. When I compare my experience of 
strategy in these events over the two-year period, I experienced a mismatch 
between this and the usual view of strategy as a systematic plan of action 
formulated by top executives and then implemented by others. Instead my 
experience was one of ongoing conversations involving not only top executives 
but many other members of the organisation, all of whom had and interests in, and 
views on, what was happening and what should happen. Working in the DMan 
programme made me aware that we probably had to start involving other 
groupings to solve the problems that arose. When we invited other people who 
were directly related to the process to participate in conversations and organise 
their own meetings, new strategic issues were emerging, leading to actions not at 
all related to managements’ original intentions. After finalising the process it 
became clear that strategy emerges in the social interweaving of (different) 
intentions and actions by all groupings involved. But it was not until being 
confronted with the strategic issues described in Project Four that what started as 
coincidentally enabling local patterns of interaction became a deliberate strategy.  
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Strategic development of a merger: formulating and 
implementing at the same time 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This reflective narrative describes a two-and-a-half-year merger process between 
the sales and distribution offices of the international and national divisions of a 
large services company. Approximately 1500 people and 40 regional sales offices 
were directly involved in this merger. I focus attention on micro-strategising 
activities and leadership, exploring how thinking in terms of complex responsive 
processes (Stacey, 2003a) affected how I worked in this situation. I point to how 
groupings of different departments play a part in the merger process through their 
changing positions and shifting power relations, reflected in the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion and the effect this has on their identities (Elias, 1939; 
Elias 1970; Elias and Scotson, 1965; Iterson et al., 2002; Soeters and van Iterson, 
2002). If, from a complex responsive perspective, I see organisations as patterns 
of interaction between people who have to live and work with the outcome of 
strategic developments, it becomes important to work with strategic questions in 
this community. I invite people to co-develop strategic answers in diverse settings 
and groupings as part of their day-to-day work, leading most of the time to new 
unexpected outcomes. Asking strategic questions can also surface insider and 
outsider relations (Elias and Scotson, 1965), in which diverse groupings develop 
or damage their co-operation, making this an important point in strategic 
development. The following narrative describes the trial-and-error process of 
formulation and implementation of strategy at the same time and my own shifting 
of thinking about strategy as the interplay of intentions in conversational 
processes. 
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Organisational background: established–outsider relations  
 
The national and international divisions both operated through the same sales and 
distribution department unit until five years ago, when the international division 
decided to develop its own sales and distribution department. The national offices 
were then separated from the international offices, and staff had to choose where 
they wanted to work. Although they continued to be located next to each other, 
and often shared back-office facilities, a psychological divide arose between the 
people involved in which they came to regard each other and themselves as the 
‘international elite’ and the ‘staff’. The people working at the international desks 
were paid on higher grades, and this led to some envy.  
  
This situation did not attract my immediate attention when I became responsible 
for the division in which the national sales and distribution activities were located; 
but it was later to become very important. Looking back and reflecting on the way 
these group formations played an important role in what subsequently happened, I 
find it helpful to turn to Elias and Scotson (1965). They describe ‘established and 
outsider relations’ in a small community in England, which led to people thinking 
about themselves as being superior or inferior to each other, so establishing power 
differences between two interdependent groups. The only real difference in this 
community was that people in one area had been there longer than the others. This 
small difference was used to establish major differences between groups through 
labelling in streams of blame-and-praise gossip (Soeters and van Iterson, 2002). 
For Elias, power was not something possessed by one group or person and not by 
another but, rather, was a structural characteristic of all human relationships in 
every situation (Elias, 1970). Elias held that people are not autonomous but 
always live in figurations of power relations taking the form of ‘we’ and ‘them’ 
(Elias, 1970). The differences between the international and national groups were 
pay grade and the feeling that international sales were more complicated. In 
gossip terms, they were called the ‘ladies with the pearl necklaces’. The real 
differences, however, were relatively small. Personal identity is connected to these 
‘we’ and ‘them’ relationships. Such group dynamics do not feature much as 
important factors to take into account in most approaches to strategy but, as I will 
explore later, they can be very influential. 
 86 
Round one: cost reduction through co-operation as strategic choice 
 
With all of this in the background, the EXB, of which I am a member, had budget 
meetings, to investigate ways of improving the company’s financial results. The 
management of the international division was not present at this meeting. So even 
though that division had budget problems because of low-cost operators entering 
their markets, attention was nationally focused on seeking to identify areas where 
we could perform more effectively and efficiently. My colleague Gerald, 
managing director of the commercial department, and I proposed developing co-
operation between the national and international desks with a view to increasing 
efficiency and lowering costs, or increasing service levels for our clients. This was 
not a fully formulated plan, but emerged as a possible intention worth following 
up. So after we had discussed the idea with the others present, we decided that the 
two of us should meet the management of the international desk and share our 
ideas with them. Knowing that they had financial problems and were looking for 
more efficiency too, we expected that the idea would find a warm welcome. We 
also knew that part of the management group at international was going to move 
to other positions soon and that a new managing director was preparing to take 
over. 
  
The national sales and distribution department was part of my division, but the 
commercial division was responsible for sales and marketing strategy. They 
financed the offices in which we worked, playing an important role in decisions 
about the layout and image of the offices as well as the presentation of our staff. 
Two weeks later, Gerald and I informed the management of International about 
the meeting we had and the idea we wanted to discuss with them. They did not 
explode with enthusiasm, which of course is natural enough when colleagues start 
introducing ideas concerning your business; but they did listen carefully. In the 
end they followed our argument and we decided to ask the responsible directors 
and personnel managers of both divisions to investigate whether this approach 
could lead to an acceptable form of co-operation between our sales offices and 
reduce costs enough to make it worthwhile putting the energy into this approach. 
Four of the directors and managers had their first two meetings in December, two 
months after the board meeting, and agreed to meet again the following January.  
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In the meantime I confidentially informed our Staff Council about the plans we 
were starting to develop. I did not want to surprise them, and was curious about 
their initial reaction. They liked the idea, and I promised them I would involve 
them the minute it became serious business. Some European countries have a two-
tier board structure, consisting of a Supervisory Board and a Management 
(Executive) Board, and in addition they have introduced a Staff Council structure 
by law. This law ensures that the rights and interests of employees are respected 
by management in relation to matters of labour conditions and company strategy. 
The Staff Council has to approve a request for any change in labour conditions, 
and they have a right to give advice on company strategy. Both parties have the 
right to appeal to a labour court if one feels that the other one did not follow the 
proper rules. In most companies, the Staff Council has a right to appoint one or 
more Supervisory Board members. This structure reduces the direct influence of 
unions in the company, as happens in the UK and the USA, because it is the Staff 
Councils that have a direct interest in the success or failure of a company. Based 
on the size of the company, the number of elected members in a Staff Council 
ranges from 3 to 21, and elections take place every two or three years. In large 
companies with several structural levels, such as divisions, each division will have 
its own Staff Council with representatives of these Councils forming a central 
Staff Council at the top level to meet with the president of the company. During 
the election process, unions play a role in proposing and supporting union 
member candidates.  
  
 
The plan stops: strategic decision-making in isolation 
 
In the second week of January, my colleague Genevieve, one of the directors of 
sales and services in my division, called me. Anxiously she said, ‘The new 
managing director of International, Robert, is going to call you in a few minutes to 
tell you that they have changed their strategy and will present a recovery plan for 
their division which involves shifting most of their sales activities to the Internet 
while maintaining telesales and reducing the workforce by 250 people, including 
almost all the 150 staff members of the international sales offices’. She had also 
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heard that they had consulted union leaders and their Staff Council and planned to 
release a press statement soon. However, the former manager had suddenly fallen 
ill so that Robert, who had not even started his new job yet, had to take over and 
was about to inform all employees of the changes. It was Genevieve who had 
urged him to call the managing directors of the other divisions and tell us what his 
plans were. I was speechless when I heard the news, especially since colleagues 
from his and my division were investigating a possible merger of the sales offices. 
However, the only concern Genevieve and I had at that point was the effect this 
message would have on our 1000-plus sales and information people who were 
working in close proximity to international sales staff and had originally been one 
team who all knew each other well. We decided to inform our site managers on 
location about what was going to happen and assure them that this would have no 
effect on our operation.  
  
That afternoon there were no international sales – all the international offices were 
closed because staff members were engaged in emotional meetings. After a while, 
I explained to our Staff Council what had happened. 
 
 
Back to business as usual 
 
We then had to look for other opportunities to improve our performance and lower 
our costs. We also had to visit all our offices to regain the confidence of our own 
teams and reduce the fear of ‘today it’s them, tomorrow it’s us’. Despite the 
assurances, however, the doubts remained and it took us some time to get 
everybody back to normal. Even more surprising was the fact that after a few days 
the international sales staff went back to work and took up their daily activities as 
if nothing had happened. However, we heard that they had little confidence in 
what was going to happen and no idea how rapidly the shift from personal selling 
to Internet sales would be. At the time of the decision, 6% of the international 
sales went through the Internet, and the plan was that this would be increased to 
more than 60% over two years. The Staff Council of the international division 
withdrew in protest, leaving management without any means of formally 
communicating the change in strategy. 
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It was also surprising that none of this was discussed at the EXB. During this 
period, International was not in the mood to seek co-operation and my EXB 
colleagues and I just let it go, since we thought it was not crucial to the short-term 
developments of the whole group. Furthermore, it was in accordance with the 
overall strategy of increasing Internet sales and electronic ticketing. After Robert 
took his new place at the EXB, we started to work together and I developed a 
better understanding of how he was trying to restore results in his division. 
However, he did not ask anybody for help, so he was very much on his own. Also, 
at that time I started to prepare for negotiations with the unions about a new 
labour agreement for the group, and so had many other things to do.  
 
 
Renewal of personal acquaintance and restart of co-operation  
 
In October, 12 months later, I was interviewing my colleagues on their ideas about 
the coming labour agreement negotiation. Robert and I decided to have lunch 
together to exchange our views. We both had the feeling that it would be a wise 
idea to get to know each other better, since we were sitting together around the 
same table at every board meeting. My attitude was still one of keeping a certain 
distance. After exchanging formalities, I tried to explain why I had kept my 
distance. I asked why they had not only stopped the talks at the end of the 
previous year but had also chosen not to inform us in advance. Robert gave two 
reasons: first, the former management had told him that we could not be trusted 
and acted only to serve our own interests; and, second, they wanted to be sure that 
none of their ideas would leak before they were ready to present them.  
  
After continuing our conversation, he understood that I felt offended and did not 
want to have anything to do with the developments of the international division. 
He also admitted that if he had the chance to do it again he would make different 
choices, including continuing our talks about integrating the sales offices. The 
development of Internet sales was not likely to meet the original expectations of 
an increase to 60% in two years because after one year it had only moved up to 
8%, which meant that the international sales offices would have to remain open. 
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From a personal point of view, I liked Robert, and so after a while I accepted his 
suggestion to restart the integration talks. I knew that our division had some extra 
financial resources that would enable us to absorb part of his staff and that the rest 
could come from his reorganisation funds. Together we would be able to raise 
sufficient funds to integrate, and so cut costs while developing the future of 
electronic ticketing. A complete restructuring of tasks and responsibilities would 
take place for all our operational staff, which would enable us to save a great deal 
of money without incurring any job losses and so, we hoped, no unacceptable 
social conflict. We decided to reopen talks with the same people who were present 
ten months earlier. 
 
 
Reflections on strategy2 
 
The events I have described so far affected the whole of the international division, 
as well as large parts of the national division, and they had potential long-term 
consequences for the whole group. They are, therefore, what most people would 
call strategic. How can I make sense of the strategising activities in this story? Or, 
better still, how can I understand strategy and strategic management in the light of 
the above events and my long working experience? What is the role and influence 
of all the people working in this strategy process, apart from continually being 
surprised? To develop a better understanding of what was happening, I first want 
to focus on the broad notion of strategy. 
  
A few years ago I would have defined ‘strategy’ as an ‘elaborate and systematic 
plan of action’. When I now look back at the events of the last two years and 
compare my experiences with this statement, I am struck by a number of points. It 
could be said that the story so far displays elaborate patterns of action, but they 
hardly constitute a systematic plan. A systematic plan would normally take the 
form of a clear decision reached after analysis of the facts, followed by a clear 
sequence of implementation steps that are adhered to by all those concerned. This 
clearly did not happen – it was all much more exploratory and political, 
                                               
2 Appendix 1 
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characterised by personal relationships, people falling ill or retiring, personal 
rivalries, and possibly Robert’s own anxiety when he suddenly discovered that he 
was on his own, leading him to forget to involve his managing-director 
colleagues. Instead, when I reflect on the above events, it becomes clear to me that 
through the social interweaving of (different) intentions and actions by all 
groupings involved (Elias, 1939, p. 436), new strategic issues were emerging, 
leading to other actions not at all related to the original intention of the 
management of the international division. On the first day of the announcement, 
all international sales offices were closed and staff members were engaged in 
emotional meetings. Pretty soon after the emotional reaction of staff, the question 
that predominated was whether management had made the right decision to move 
into the direction of totally automated sales and whether our clients had the ability 
to use these new technologies. People were worried whether this new system 
would lead to the loss of a great number of customers. The reactions of staff and 
customers caused doubt in the minds of International’s management, making this 
a story of stopping and starting, where demarcations between formulating and 
implementing strategy are far from clear. 
   
I now see that my earlier, assumptive, clear statement about strategy does not 
describe what actually happened. Robert and I, seeing the outcome of the 
processes so far, could say that our strategy processes had failed. Were we 
incompetent? On the other hand, it could be that simple definitions of strategy are 
unrealistic in practice. Perhaps strategy needs to be looked at in different ways. 
But what different ways are there?  
  
The definition of strategy in standard textbooks runs along the following lines: 
‘top management’s plan to attain outcomes consistent with the organisation’s 
missions and goals’ (Wright, Pringle and Kroll, 1992, p. 3). However, many 
authors do not consider the definition of strategy to be a simple matter and 
provide a broad spectrum of views. For example, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and 
Lampel, (1998) present a complete guide to nine ‘strategic schools of thought’. 
They focus on two major lines of thinking. The prescriptive schools are built 
around planning and design, reflecting the above standard definition of strategy, 
and are more concerned with how strategies should be formulated rather than with 
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how they are actually formed. The descriptive schools are developed around the 
learning aspects of strategy and more concerned with ideal strategic behaviour 
rather than prescribing how strategies should be formulated. Volberda and Elfring 
(2001) link to the work of Mintzberg and take a ‘synthetic approach’ that 
incorporates all of the nine schools. A synthesising school of thought in strategic 
management consists of more than one base discipline and one set of problem-
solving techniques to deal with a specific range of strategic problems. They have 
analysed three emerging schools of thought with synthesising characteristics: the 
configuration school, the dynamic school, and the boundary school. Volberda and 
Elfring see these classifications as an improvement on some previous attempts, 
which simply distinguish between ‘content’ versus ‘process’ and ‘strategy 
formulation’ versus ‘implementation’, leading to more fragmentation in the field 
of strategy instead of contributing to strategy synthesis and bringing schools of 
thought together.  
  
The confusing conclusion so far is that strategy is a complicated matter and that 
all approaches seem useful in one way or another, providing choices that, taken on 
their own, do not really help practitioners such as me to go further. We can 
conclude that our knowledge of strategy and management is fragmented, 
unstructured and inconsistent, even self-contradictory (de Wit and Meyer, 2005). 
Whittington (2001) does not give any answers, but encourages managers to start 
thinking differently about strategy. Members of the academic community 
increasingly argue that the concepts and tools of analysis that have formed the 
backbone of the strategy literature during its major growth period need a basic re-
evaluation in order to pave the way for new ideas (Volberda and Elfring, 2001). I 
could continue with a longer list of statements by other authors, all telling us 
practitioners that there is no general recipe for strategy and all encouraging us to 
use our own brains and senses in developing our strategic awareness.  
  
As we created a second chance for ourselves in the merger of the two sales and 
distribution departments, we needed to ask ourselves whether other approaches 
might be useful in helping us to develop new ways of strategising, which included 
our own awareness of our day-to-day practice. The complex responsive processes 
view of organisations and their strategies is that they are continually iterated 
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processes of relating and communicating between people. The central argument of 
the complex responsive processes perspective is that strategy is the evolving 
pattern of collective and individual identities and intentions, emerging in the 
ordinary, everyday local interactions between people (Stacey, 2001). These local 
interactions lead to population-wide processes that give form to emerging 
strategies in organisations. It is not the exclusive domain of a few top managers to 
create their strategy and pass it on to the rest of the organisation. Frequently, 
strategising activities lead to confusion and opposition that require the ongoing 
involvement of people in top hierarchical positions in organisations like mine.  
  
Looking at the narrative so far and taking the events of the merger between the 
sales and distribution offices of International and National into account, it 
becomes clear that, without emphasising the detailed approach and introduction of 
another level of participation, we would not have been able to finalise the merger 
with a positive outcome. The strategic world changes: strategic innovation 
increasingly involves managers at the periphery, rather than just at the centre. 
Strategy-making then becomes a continuing feature of organisational life and 
there is an increasing pressure for a more micro perspective and to involve people 
in the daily strategising process. In our case, the total separation between 
management formulating the new strategy and staff blocking the implementation 
is a good example of the necessity to rethink how to involve people performing 
the daily working process in strategic developments. With this in mind, the 
missing link in the developments of International so far is the bridge between the 
formulation of strategy and the way a company can actually make its strategies 
work.  
  
At this stage it became clear that my view on how to develop strategy had 
changed from the traditional top-down approach to a broader perspective in which 
many people play many roles, sometimes without even realising it. Small events 
influence the way in which the outcome is formed. Many patterns were emerging 
showing examples of the interplay of intentions and coincidences, leading to 
mostly small, but some big, steps in the strategic process when it moved forward. 
What looks like a systematic approach is in reality largely influenced by 
unexpected events. Traditional literature focuses on prescriptive schools, like the 
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planning and design schools, advocating this systemic approach. More recent 
literature describes other strategic approaches in which less absolute choices are 
made and developed through thesis and antithesis, ending in a synthesis for that 
specific strategic question. The real strategic world is much more messy and 
unpredictable and is influenced by small incidents that have important effects. 
Who is present at or absent from a meeting affects what happens afterwards. 
Many groupings like the Staff Councils are part of the strategising activities in 
which personal relationships, personal agendas and shifting coalitions are 
important to reach goals. During our process the effect of people not informing 
each other or trying to manipulate each other had great influence on progress at 
certain stages. Conversations, as well as gossip, at formal and informal meetings 
(Soeters and van Iterson, 2002) are vital to what happens in terms of the strategic 
outcome. 
  
Different groupings develop different intentions and they clash in their interplay, 
which leads to strategic patterns emerging across the organisational population. 
The interdependence of these groupings makes it very clear that one cannot live 
without the other. During one period the EXB was left out, which later turned out 
not to be very sensible when you need the co-operation of other colleagues. 
People in operations of the international division did not play any role of 
importance in the top-down strategic thinking process. Their real influence, 
however, was significant as they were able to make the process stop or go when 
they wanted, so that developments were not smooth or linear. Formulating and 
implementing in this example can be seen as one activity and top management has 
to remain involved.  
  
Let us now move on to the next episode in this story of a merger.    
 
 
Round two: interplay of intentions in strategic development 
 
At the first meeting of the second round of talks with our four managers, in 
November, after 13 months, Robert and I shared our feeling that we had not 
explored all the possibilities for integrating jobs and operational responsibilities in 
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such a way that the 150 people earmarked to leave the company could keep a job 
related to their experience and even maintain their same wage level. We 
discovered that we needed to invest more time and energy to bring our colleagues 
to the same level of co-operation that Robert and I were slowly approaching. 
Change was happening through the conversational nature of the interaction (Shaw, 
2002; Shotter, 1993), formulating and implementing was happening at the same 
time (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Stacey, 2001; Whittington, 2001) and politics 
was involved to convince each other and balance individual positions. At the end 
of the meeting, everybody was ready to proceed again and appointments were 
made.  
  
During the next regular Staff Council meeting, I announced that we were starting 
discussions again, which could mean that a greater part of the sales staff of the 
international division would have jobs. They again reacted positively. Shortly 
after this announcement it became clear that during the period of unrest in the 
international division, people had started to move to other jobs without waiting to 
see how future developments would look. At three locations this was leading to a 
staff shortage, and the management of International proposed a quick merger at 
these locations. My Staff Council accepted this on condition that the people 
coming back from International to our division would be placed at the bottom of 
the seniority list in each location, which meant that they would have the last 
choice when jobs had to be transferred to other locations. The interplay of 
different intentions became very obvious at this point as did the shift to the new 
relative positions of the established (national sales) and the outsiders 
(international sales). 
  
Although one might have thought that the most important matter for the 
international staff would be to move from the category of ‘being redundant’ to 
‘having a job’, the condition to do with seniority generated much emotion and led 
both the national and international groups to label the latter as ‘second-class 
citizens’ and ‘rubbish’. I suddenly realised that some of the old envy felt by 
national staff was still there. I could understand the way of thinking of the national 
staff who felt that helping others was fine provided it did not lead to higher risks 
of relocation, but I did not expect to encounter such strong emotions. Power 
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relations were shifting as the international staff felt their increasing dependence on 
the national staff (Elias and Scotson, 1965, p. xlv).  
  
For me, the story is one of ongoing local interactions taking the form of formal 
and informal conversations between small numbers of people in which they were 
relating to each other in ways that reflected their histories of being together, as 
well as their own individual histories. These local interactions are conversational 
and political in nature. Various intentions emerge in these conversations and those 
intentions interact with each other, so interweaving human activities (Elias, 1939, 
p. 441). The management of International decided to close their sales offices to 
reduce increasing losses. People in operations opposed this decision, not only 
because their own jobs were at stake, but also because they thought such a drastic 
decision dangerous for client continuity and in the long run for the continuity of 
the company. They also seemed to have enough power to make these 
developments effectively come to a standstill. However, on their own they were 
not able to reach an agreement on a new strategy without management co-
operation. Small decisions, such as the pre-merger of three offices, were blocked 
by other groupings from National; they just would not let them in. All these 
events led to other outcomes, which in turn influenced new (global) outcomes, 
determining the future of the company. Patterns of local interactions of (small) 
groups led to the emergence of global (that is, population-wide) patterns. 
Discussions in all sectors of the divisions concerned, and even outside of them, 
led to a global outcome that could not be influenced by one single grouping in the 
field of operation and management. These processes, however, still develop under 
generalised restrictions set by company management, such as ‘We have to find a 
solution, otherwise financially we will not be able to continue to serve our clients 
in the same way we do today’. In other words, it is not a completely free process.  
  
Robert, the managing director of International, and I were expecting to do the 
right things. We reopened our merger discussions, involved our Staff Councils 
and made a pre-merger decision solving capacity problems at three locations. 
Again, everything came to a standstill. What was going wrong? What were we 
doing wrong this time? We could have forced our decision into the organisation, 
but we didn’t know what effect that would have on our plans for the near future. I 
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consider myself a participative manager, but when I think it is necessary I do not 
hesitate to use power. People in operations have their own power position, 
influencing co-operation and the outcome of their ideas. The same power relations 
make people feel included or excluded in the development of strategy and the 
links with identity and recognition (Elias, 1970, p. 93; Elias and Scotson, 1965; 
Griffin, 2002, pp. 197–200). During the process up till now several things became 
very clear: people were taking positions, airing their ideas, wanting to be heard, 
using their power in closing the offices. Different groupings were more or less 
forcing their way into the discussion. From a complex responsive process 
perspective, I started to understand this form of strategy as the iteration and 
emergent change of the identities of various groupings and the interplay of 
intentions. These considerations convinced us and opened up our minds to 
investigate other options. Closing all the sales offices ceased to be the main target 
of the management of International.  
 
 
Round three: exchanging new ideas with the Staff Councils 
 
At the beginning of a new year, after 15 months, Robert and I sat down again to 
think about what to do next. What had at first looked like a very rational process 
was turning out to be far from that as the emotional conflicts between the national 
and international sales groups became more evident. One option to deal with this 
situation would be to stop the discussions and go back to the original plan of 
keeping the sales offices separate. However, at this stage it would mean great 
social instability again and, given the labour agreement negotiations at that time, 
could do more harm than good. So we decided against this option. Instead, we had 
to carry on with a full merger between the two sales and distribution departments. 
As stated before, we also started to understand strategy as the iteration and 
emergent change of the identities of various groupings and the interplay of 
intentions, and therefore organised another meeting with our directors and 
personnel managers to exchange ideas about how to take the next step. 
International had made their director Holger responsible for sales and marketing, 
and he joined us for the first time. The new Staff Council of the international 
division was almost reinstalled, so we agreed to prepare an official letter to them 
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to present our ideas for the full merger and ask their advice. At the same time, 
directors would inform staff groups of National and International at various 
locations and present the ideas. Robert and I would join the presentations at the 
biggest locations to give moral support and show that we were really serious this 
time.  
  
We invited both Staff Councils for a joint presentation to exchange our ideas and 
present our plans. We invited them to join us during presentations to staff of both 
divisions on location in the country and see what kind of questions were coming 
up. The meeting itself was not a great success because the Staff Council of 
International was new and showed distrust regarding our intentions. I intervened 
at one point when they doubted my trustworthiness, reacting very personally to 
one of their members. It was clear that they were not used to a personal reaction 
like that. Luckily, the effect was that the atmosphere went back to normal, making 
the result of the meeting more or less acceptable. Everybody, however, seemed to 
have forgotten that the current plan was still to fire a great number of people. Due 
to all kinds of personal initiatives the number had been reduced to 150, but this 
was still substantial. Part of the discussion was about what kind of international 
products were going to be sold and where, despite the original intention of the 
management of International to stop physical sales activities. People tend to hold 
to their original ideas about their working situation as long as possible, so 
blocking any awareness of any threads, such as, in this case, the real threat of job 
loss. In practice this means that people do not start being creative in their search 
for new solutions in view of the changing circumstances, but cling to their 
idealised perception of the old structure, which in practice was not so ideal at all 
and had the same working problems as everywhere else. 
  
It was our obligation to make it clear to the Staff Council of International that if 
no solution was found it would mean that the international sales offices would 
cease to exist. In the end, we agreed to do our presentations personally on location 
and then move forward to the official part of the merger in co-operation with Staff 
Councils.  
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Presentation(s) in the country: shifting established–outsider positions 
 
In March, some 17 months after the start of this story, Genevieve and Holger 
visited one of the smaller locations in the countryside. There were separate 
presentations to national and international workers, about 20 people in all. The 
presentations did not go very well, but nor did they go badly – people reluctantly 
waited for things to happen. The members of the Staff Council were the ones 
trying to light the fire, but also with little success. The same thing happened at 
another smaller location with the same result. Then the first big group, about 80 
people, was on the list. Robert and I would join our colleagues to show our 
commitment.  
  
We started our presentation in the kitchen of the international team. This idea of 
using the kitchen was quite good, because it created a homely atmosphere that 
helped the flow of the discussion. People still had many questions about their 
personal situations, wages, hours and future positions, but, to my surprise, they 
spent a long time discussing sales, disappointed clients and many other sales-
related strategic subjects, which were not actually part of the discussion. During 
this meeting, in which we expected to talk about personal expectations of people 
moving to another division, it was a surprise to enter into discussions about the 
strategy of the international division and the effects this had on customers. Even 
when management has made a decision, this does not mean that people dealing 
with this decision on a day-to-day basis will accept this as a given situation. 
  
The presentation for the national team was in a meeting room, which was really 
full. The atmosphere was hostile. The possible impact of the seniority listing was 
blown up to gigantic proportions, and our colleagues at International were thrown 
completely off-balance by so much aggression from the national sales staff. I must 
say that I was somewhat shaken by this too, not really knowing what to do next. 
We collected all the arguments and told them we would come back to them as 
soon as we could.  
 
The next day I asked Brent, one of Genevieve’s colleagues who was responsible 
for this group, what had happened. His answer astonished me. He had stayed a 
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little longer and talked to the group and some individuals. They told him that they 
had had a marvellous time, that it was good to see the managing director and that 
they were very relieved. My experience, however, was that of going nowhere. A 
member of the learning group in my DMan programme suggested looking for an 
explanation for what happened in The Established and The Outsiders by Norbert 
Elias and John L. Scotson. Reflecting today on what happened, it becomes clear 
that there had been a shift in the established–outsider relation between 
International and National. The identity of the last group had changed, and they 
saw what happened as an attack on their new power superiority (Elias and 
Scotson, 1965, pp. xlv-xlvi).  
 
 
Round four: involving people on operational levels in strategy development  
 
What became clear during these meetings was that people working in operations 
do have views on how strategy should be developed in our divisions and how co-
operation between our divisions could help us perform better. What does it mean 
to involve people in strategy-making, and how should it be done? Mintzberg 
(1987) compares strategic planning by one or more senior managers sitting in an 
office formulating courses of action that everyone else will implement on 
schedule, with someone crafting strategy. Crafting is not so much about thinking 
and reasoning as about involvement with the materials at hand, with feelings of 
intimacy and harmony developed through long experience and commitment. 
Formulating and implementation merge into a fluid process of learning through 
which creative strategies evolve.  
  
When they talk about strategy, many managers have in mind what Mintzberg 
(1987) calls deliberate strategy based on intention, formal plans and 
pronouncements. But can we trust these plans? Do we not often fool ourselves by 
denying unconscious motives? Mintzberg places emergent strategies at the other 
end of the spectrum from deliberate strategies. He describes emergent strategies as 
strategies without clear intentions, actions simply converging into patterns 
(Mintzberg, 1987, p. 69). He argues that strategists have to take into account the 
many actors in an organisation and the ‘interplay’ of their actions, which he 
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understands in terms of chance. Elias (1970) also talks about emergence, but as 
the emergence of pattern in the interplay of intentions rather than chance. He links 
the interplay of intentions with the development of identity and power relations.  
  
Having had good earlier experiences in asking managers and colleagues to get 
involved in finding solutions for future next steps in our organisational 
development, I suggested to my colleagues that we ask the two responsible 
managers, National and International, at the ten different locations to organise a 
series of meetings with all their people. They would take to these meetings our 
basic problem: how to develop a full merger of our sales and distribution offices, 
taking into account the new commercial parameters of the international division. 
We would help them in facilitating the meetings when required and would ask 
them to come back with their ideas in three months. We hoped that this would 
allow new patterns of interaction and intention to emerge. I did not see many other 
options, so I phoned Robert about this idea. It did not really surprise him that I 
suggested another approach: he had been at the previous emotional meetings too. 
He answered that he would discuss it with his team and come back to me in 24 
hours.  
  
The next day, he said he embraced the idea. We also agreed to invite a member of 
both Staff Councils to the meetings on location to keep everybody at the same 
pace. Our teams started organising the joint meetings and the facilitation. The 
reception in the country was positive and everybody was ready to go to work. 
Then there was a surprise: the Staff Council of International was against the plan. 
They thought it was their job to give advice on this subject, and that their position 
was undermined when the whole country started to influence the discussion. After 
a short deliberation, Robert and I decided that we could make a management 
decision on the approach, because this was not among the legal rights of the Staff 
Council. We still offered them the opportunity to team up on location, which in 
the end they did. The personal involvement of top management, playing an active 
part in these meetings, enables implementation and formulation of strategy to take 
place at the same time, and in the end this became one of the key success factors. 
Without separating the processes of formulation and implementation, it is not 
possible to play a distant role as a leader, as this will immediately split this 
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process in two different actions, one following the other. Influenced by the power 
of decision-making capacities, the managing director can speed up the 
development of ideas. Initiatives of middle management to involve their 
groupings in a strategy discussion followed by a meeting where results of these 
middle-manager groups can be exchanged with top management creates an 
acceptable mixture of middle-management and top-management involvement, 
making strategy formulation and implementation possible at the same time. Top 
management also has the power and the responsibility to alleviate identity 
conflicts within the different groupings participating in the process of the 
information exchange. Again the importance of conversation is emphasised, as it 
is through conversation that identities are formed.  
  
If strategising is not a top-down one-way street, and we accept the alternative that 
strategy is developed in local interaction leading to novel global patterns, it is 
important to create an atmosphere that enables participants, as serious players, 
interactively to contribute to these processes (Stacey, 2005a). The constraint for 
leadership is to create this atmosphere, realising that power is at play in all 
relations, but certainly also knowing that hierarchy is always present when 
opening up these non-hierarchical discussions. The need for co-operation with the 
Staff Councils, during the merger, shifted power relations substantially in their 
direction. Power relations form figurations, or groupings, in which some are 
included and others excluded and where power balance is tilted in favour of some 
groupings and against others (Elias, 1939). However, it is these groupings that 
will play an important role in the final outcome of the process we have initiated. 
Belonging to a group establishes powerful feelings, constituting each individual’s 
‘we’ identity. These ‘we’ identities, derived from the groups we belong to, cannot 
be separated from the each of our ‘I’ identities (Stacey, 2005b). Mead (1934) 
explains that processes of human relating form and are formed by the individual 
and collective identities. These processes reflect complex processes of power 
relating as part of the processes of interaction. When the ideas to organise the 
meetings were emerging, there was a large difference in identity between the 
international and national groups. I developed the idea that bringing people of 
both groups together and stimulating conversation about a common problem 
would bring the groups closer together. During the next phase of the process, this 
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did indeed turn out to be the case. Initiating the strategy meetings between the 
groups of International and National brought people closer to each other through 
conversation. These meetings led, especially after the exchange of ideas in the big 
meeting, described below, to new strategic ideas and plans applicable to the whole 
(population-wide) organisation working on the merger. 
 
 
The big meeting: formulation and implementation of strategy at the same 
time 
 
The communication manager of my division took responsibility for organising the 
big presentation event that was to be held in October. She hired a top facilitator to 
lead the day and the large-group discussions, and prepared the feedback sessions 
for the people from the ten different locations. When the day started, there was a 
noticeable difference compared to the last sessions. National and international 
colleagues from different parts of the country had prepared their presentations 
together and walked in together, chatting loudly.  
  
In retrospect, the invitation accepted by participants to develop intentions on a 
local level through conversation, good facilitation and the assurance that 
management would take their contributions seriously helped in bringing down 
boundaries between groups. In addition to bringing people together and 
stimulating conversation about what had to be done, a trust in leadership helped 
the process move forward. My personal feeling is that a lack of trust will increase 
the positional bias of the participants because they will focus discussions on their 
own responsibilities and the local environment in which they work, instead of 
joining the invitation to participate in a wider-scale discussion.  
  
After coffee, our facilitator introduced the two representatives of our Staff 
Councils, as well as Robert and myself, to the more than 100 people present and 
briefly gave us the opportunity to express our hopes for a fruitful day. Today’s 
goal was to be able to write the legal request for advice to the Staff Councils 
based on the requirements and practical input of the groups from the country 
offices who would have to do the real work. 
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During the first half of the morning, five groups presented the combined ideas of 
each of their locations to the other five, who were free to move around at ten-
minute intervals. During the second half of the morning the roles were reversed, 
giving everybody the chance to absorb the information of at least six groups; but, 
with some intelligent shifting of presentation responsibilities, this could even be 
more. It was good to see that national and international people from all locations 
had joint ideas on how they saw their co-operation. Some had worked this out in 
great detail, as it was not necessary that every location had to follow the same 
standards, since their markets were quite different. Everybody had the chance to 
ask questions, show doubt or confirmation. The remarks were added to the 
flipcharts to be used in later presentations. Afterwards the facilitator discussed the 
questions of the morning with management and some of the Staff Councils’ 
members. We extracted six to eight major subjects to be discussed in the 
afternoon by mixed groups of both divisions. We hoped that this would lead to 
suggestions on how to handle the request for advice and the next steps. One 
remark came back from all groups: please let us get going and finalise these 
discussions as soon as we can. This was, in fact, good news.  
  
After lunch we presented the general questions. This led to a small interruption, 
when one of the participants accused us of bringing in subjects that had not been 
discussed that morning. Although they were related, he had a point. The Staff 
Councils also had a suggestion on one of the subjects not presented that morning, 
so we had a common problem. Genevieve saved the situation by mentioning that 
everybody could sign up to and participate in any of the discussions. If nobody 
was interested then the slots would remain empty, which actually did not happen.  
The big group split into all kinds of smaller groups like an open-space session 
(Owen, 1997), discussing the most important questions that should lead to the 
next steps on how to organise the follow-up. The level of participation was high. 
Everybody had this feeling of responsibility; as if people were crafting and 
designing their own future (Mintzberg, 1987; Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 
2003). At the end of the day all groups presented the outcome of their discussions 
and Robert and I assured them that all their suggestions would find their place in 
our plan and the legal request for advice to the Staff Councils. 
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People were really influencing each other that day. When people meet, start 
working together and exchange information, a form of generalisation takes place, 
influencing the process into a global outcome. Two weeks later Robert and I 
presented the combined legal request, prepared by our colleagues, to our Staff 
Councils, with an answer expected within six weeks of the meeting.  
 
 
Micro strategy in retrospect 
 
Looking back at what had happened, it became clear that the moment we asked 
our staff members to participate in the project it suddenly gained speed. It 
involved the methodology of asking middle management (Nonaka, 1988) to take 
up responsibility for local interaction, based on the open questions we formulated: 
‘What do we have to do to make this merger work?’ and ‘What are the 
consequences for all people involved?’. We looked for a meeting design that 
offered the possibility of a high exchange rate of information with a high degree 
of participation in the shortest possible time, and followed the suggestions of our 
facilitator. 
  
The information-exchange session helped bring all ideas and views together in a 
way that allowed us to formulate a strategy beneficial for the company with the 
input and support of all employees. In implementing the next phases of the 
merger, we could relate our findings to the outcome of the Ketovi and Castener 
(2004) research on joint reduction of managerial position bias. When people were 
asked to participate in the strategy process in the various sessions of the meetings 
described above, they found that their interactions with each other tended to 
reduce their highly personal focus on their own local situations and enable them to 
see the connection to company-wide developments. It was clearly visible in our 
approach during the first rounds. Only very slowly management was convincing 
each other and themselves to ask staff of the different departments to participate in 
solving the problems that had arisen and to play a substantial role in strategic 
future developments. Every failure during the process directed my own thinking 
toward a more participative process. In doing this, the process started to move, 
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resulting in better cooperation, encouraging us to go forward, slowly discovering 
that the patterns of random conversation between people increased better 
understanding. 
 
The way our managers in the offices in the country developed their strategic input, 
based on our questions, can also be compared with the results presented by 
Regnér (2003), who describes strategy-making in the periphery, our offices, as 
inductive, including externally oriented and exploratory strategy activities like 
trial-and-error, informal noticing, experiments and the use of heuristics. Strategy-
making in the centre is more deductive, involving an industry and exploitation 
focus and activities like planning, analysis, formal intelligence and the use of 
standard routines. We actually introduced our micro strategy (Johnson, Melin and 
Whittington, 2003) and periphery approach (Regnér, 2003) the moment we got 
stuck in the original deductive approach (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 
1998). During the process, we chose our different approaches as a trial-and-error 
run. Views I developed during the DMan programme resulted in the move away 
from the centre of power, looking for other forms of participation and enabling 
other forms of communication and patterning. It is only now, through reflection, 
that I am able to explain what happened and change future ways of thinking.  
  
Balogun et al. (2003) focus in particular on the importance of working with 
organisational members as research partners, rather than seeing them as passive 
informants. When working with larger groups to gather data, facilitation skills and 
the knowledge of group settings need special attention. We were supported by 
skilled facilitators who helped us to make this process a success. In a way, 
studying strategy and performing strategy is comparable in its action with 
studying ‘the know-how’ and ‘the know-what’, bringing strategy back to its day-
to-day function in organisations which, in a business environment, has to be 
measured and followed. Lowe and Jones (2004) describe the design of a strategic 
control system. Emergent strategies and control systems do not get along very 
well, but constructing the system as a participative inquiry with people in 
operations, identifying critical success factors and Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) and, more broadly, the formulation of a strategic performance 
measurement system, opens up new possibilities. This is especially the case when 
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critical colleagues have to be convinced to give a bottom-up approach a chance, 
and KPIs give them some security that this is not an uncontrollable method of 
management. Practitioners expect concrete advice and insight related to changing 
circumstances and hard-headed connections to performance outcomes with no 
reason for unnecessary softness (Pettigrew 2000; Pettigrew, Thomas and 
Whittington, 2002a: 485). These expectations need not be in conflict with a more 
process-oriented approach, especially when the target is a process of continuous 
improvement (de Wit and Meyer, 2005, p. 91). From a complex responsive 
process point of view, however, working with KPIs is not sufficient: improvement 
has to be organised through patterns of relating in the organisation, leading to 
better results and performance figures. This approach of stepping back and letting 
the members of the organisation work together to build better performance often 
results in anxiety for many leaders, who need to step back from the feeling of 
ultimate control, which in reality is itself illusory since managers are in control 
and not in control at the same time (Stacey, 2003a). 
 
Being aware of the established–outsider circumstances and the shift between 
positions (Elias and Scotson, 1965, p. xlv), we introduced different platforms of 
conversation between International and National, leading to new (global) patterns. 
Original intentions, even negative ones, disappeared and were replaced by new 
intentions of groups formed by other people who had not worked together before 
(Elias, 1939). The people of International felt superior in the beginning, retaining 
this perspective even during the period when their jobs were under threat. It took 
some time before they realised what was at stake and, even then, more than once 
they shifted discussions back, leading to denial of what was really happening 
(Elias and Scotson, 1965). Very slowly, the people of National discovered their 
power position, being at the receiving end of the merger, and power positions 
changed, leading to highly repetitive patterns of thinking. Only after management 
started to enable different patterns of conversation during the local meetings and 
the big meeting were new plans formed that led to new strategic outcomes, again 
emphasising the importance of direct top-management involvement during the 
whole process.  
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Looking back now, I relate this to a complex responsive process view of 
organisations as a continually iterated process of relating and communicating 
through conversation between people. An evolving pattern of collective and 
individual identities and intentions, emerging in the ordinary, everyday local 
interactions between people (Stacey, 2003b, p. 358), leading to population-wide 
patterns giving form to emerging strategies in organisations. I wonder why it took 
so long to make the necessary process-attitude adjustments, and whether it will be 
possible, knowing what I know now (again), to integrate complex responsive 
approaches in our organisational life, not as something special but as an integral 
part of our day-to-day work. Working in ways influenced by complex responsive 
processes thinking can produce effective change if management as leaders of the 
company are willing to take the risk of unpredictability, without losing their own 
responsibilities. A strategic problem is only really solved once concrete actions 
are undertaken that achieve results (de Wit and Meyer, 2005). So far, the 
described merger process is successfully completed. One of the conclusions of 
this paper is not to be surprised by the next surprise, which will inevitably occur. 
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Project Four 
 
 
About Project Four 
 
A sudden career move, which meant that I became member of the new BOD of 
the transport division, shifted my responsibilities from the onshore division to 
train and general services. My knowledge about this division came from my 
involvement in the latest labour agreement negotiations. The main reason a new 
management team was formed was that customers required further improvement 
of our performances and a next step had to be made. Train conductors, the most 
visible group, play an important role in the way customers evaluate our work. 
Many conductors work most of the time individually in a technologically driven 
environment and are seen by management as part of a technological and logistical 
system. All improvement questions are approached through this technological 
system and we discovered that this does not work. To get a better idea of the 
consequences of this approach, I highlight the role of technical systems in a 
human–technology environment. At the same time, several other groups of 
professionals in the service-and-security domain are working in teams, developing 
more successful ways of working similar to many of the examples of 
communities-of-practice. These teams, especially empowered teams and teams 
working on the basis of continuous improvement, perform better in contact with 
customers.  
 
When I started this project, I was convinced that technological constraints in our 
environment made it impossible to develop improvement areas based on customer 
requirements, other than from a systems point of view. In particular, the individual 
work sphere of conductors is a hurdle we have been unable to overcome over the 
last few years. My research, based on my knowledge of complex responsive 
processes, has taken me in another direction. Based on the experiences in Project 
Three, I started to make deliberate connections between local patterns of 
interaction, the development of ‘social objects’ and leadership responsibility. This 
means that technology does not lead in the interaction between the technical 
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system and the people involved – technological determinism or ‘technological 
myopia’ – but instead the interaction focuses on the relation between people, 
strongly influenced by technological developments and constraints. People, not 
the system, are responsible for the transportation of travellers; so how can we 
bring the technical system into the discussion about human interaction and 
performance, leading to improvement in customer evaluation? This approach has 
led to other forms of discussion in our Board and new ways of managing our 
company with regard to performance improvement and the development of 
organisational structures.  
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Resisting ‘technological myopia’: focusing on performance 
improvement at the interface of humans and technology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past year I have been involved in the merging of several large 
departments, involving more than 10,000 people, in the public transport company 
in which I work. One of the reasons for this reorganisation is continuing customer 
demands for performance improvement in services such as punctuality and, 
especially when services are disrupted, travel information. Our performance over 
the last few years has been adequate enough to keep the system running but even 
though our company has very sophisticated systems for planning, performance 
measurement, reviewing, monitoring and quality control, we have not been able to 
improve customer services much.  
 
We are not alone in experiencing difficulties such as these. According to Boonstra 
(2000), planned objectives were not realised in more than 70% of change 
processes in Dutch organisations. He argues that planned change programmes are 
not adequate in dynamic and ambiguous environments. He believes that a research 
methodology with its roots in the action itself and reflection on these actions is 
required where organising, renewal and learning meet. These experiences seem to 
be consistent with other international inquiries where 75% of all cases do not 
achieve the required outcome (Pettigrew, 1997). Mulder, Robroek and Stil (2006) 
go one step further and state that 90% of all reorganisations fail. Their opinion is 
that there are relatively too many managers, the fastest-growing professional 
group, and they emphasise that without the involvement of people responsible for 
the execution of strategies in production areas of organisations, no reorganisation 
will succeed. They also emphasise the necessity for employees to resist corporate 
bureaucracy. This counterpower is necessary to re-establish mutual respect 
between managers and employees, so that improved performance becomes a co-
production. According to van der Ven (2006), many managers isolate themselves 
from their employees through using reason as their dominant management 
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philosophy. In public governance, normative justice is changing into justice based 
on pragmatic and economic models (Pessers, 2006). It is likely that few managers 
today welcome messages such as these, because they conflict with many of the 
control developments in the organisations and society of today. 
 
However, for me, the experience of my company and that of many other 
organisations means that instead of just continuing as before, looking for the 
answer in better technical systems and increasing pressure on local parts of the 
organisation, we need to step back and consider why our past actions have not 
produced what they were supposed to. Organisational change is stimulated not by 
a common vision of the solution, but by acceptance of the problem (Swieringa and 
Jansen, 2005, p. 45). It becomes important to ask what is going on in our 
organisation; particularly what the relationship is between the technical systems 
and the people working in this organisation. Reflecting on these questions is the 
purpose of this project, and I propose to do this by focusing on the issue of 
improved punctuality, service attitude and travel information. In particular, I will 
focus on the role of conductors in delivering performance improvement, because 
they are the ones in direct contact with customers. 
 
The dominant way of thinking in our organisation is that it is built around many 
technical and logistic systems, such as time schedules, working rosters for 
personnel and computer-guided traffic-control and information systems. We seem 
to have a kind of ‘technological myopia’ according to which we think of people as 
being organised around these technological systems, seeing them as parts of the 
systems. This reflects our systems way of thinking in which we conceptualise our 
organisation as a cybernetic system where actions are directed in such a way that 
the discrepancy between the desired outcome and the actual outcome is fed back 
as information that guides the next action, so that the discrepancy is reduced until 
it disappears. In this way the organisation should perform according to a given 
pattern. This can be seen as the application of the engineer’s idea of control to 
human activity (Stacey, 2003a, p. 33), where cognitivist psychology assumes that 
even the human mind is a cybernetic system (ibid., p. 82). Perhaps it is this way of 
thinking that results in idea after idea, initiated at head office, tumbling over each 
 113 
other as we try to balance performance and planning while hardly anything new 
happens in our day-to-day operations.  
 
There are other ways to think about humans and technology. For example, we can 
think of people as a social system interacting with the technical systems. This 
immediately draws attention to the fact that staff on trains work according to 
individual rosters and continually change teams during the day. So it seems that 
there may not be much interaction between the social and technical systems 
because there is little social activity within working relations (ibid., p. 131). My 
observation is that the social system exists far more outside working relations 
leading to strongly developed streams of blame-and-praise gossip (Soeters and 
van Iterson, 2002) in canteens and clubs, influenced by unions and works 
councils. How are we to understand the impact of all this on our attempts to 
improve performance? 
 
Actor–network theory partly overcomes the problems of socio-technical systems, 
but here technology is still at least as important as people, possibly more so. 
Relation between humans and technology, in a common environment, can be seen 
as a ‘quasi object’ (Serres, 1982), but technology is still shaping the organisation.  
 
Yet another way of thinking about the social and the technical is in terms of the 
theory of complex responsive processes, according to which organisations are 
patterns of interaction (communicative, power, evaluative choice) between people, 
in which they use, form and are formed by technical systems understood as both 
physical and ‘social objects’ at the same time (Johannessen and Stacey, 2005). A 
‘social object’ is a historically evolved tendency to act in similar ways in similar 
situations by groups of people in a common (working) environment. This way of 
thinking opens up other insights into the possibility of performance improvement. 
I will argue, however, that although physical objects have a function in the 
emergence of the ‘social object’, they are only subject of the interaction between 
people, and that as physical objects they constrain and enable what people can do. 
Technical systems are created by people, and people work with the technical 
system as part of their day-to-day responsibilities. There is a standard procedure 
handbook for people working on trains, which is partly followed, so the question 
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becomes relevant whether influencing patterns of interaction between conductors 
can lead to other working relations and working standards towards each other and 
the customer/traveller. Surprisingly, customer evaluation figures in responsibility 
areas where people work in groups or teams, such as security and general services 
at railway stations, showed a dramatic increase during the last few years. Has this 
any meaning when asking ourselves how to improve service quality on trains?  
 
We need to be asking a number of questions: Does the technical system simply 
support organisational activity, or is it more than this? Is it continually shaped by 
people while it shapes them? Technical and logistic systems are important for 
people working on trains, but how does this influence their performance and the 
way people on the trains socially interact? Staff appear to have little social 
interaction in their working situations, especially when people are seen as parts of 
the technical system in which they are working, so can finding out more about the 
social (working) relations of conductors and drivers lead to understanding the 
impact of these relations on performance? More particularly, what is the impact 
when social interactions take place outside of work, having little to do with work 
and so little chance to develop a ‘social object’ and much to do with rumour and 
gossip? If we discover that this is where change is necessary, how do we think 
about the role of technology and the impact it has on people when they are 
perceived by others – and probably themselves – as simply parts of the technical 
system in a technological organisation working according to schedules, working 
rosters and computerised traffic control? Where does the client or traveller 
become part of the answers to these questions? How much does the technology 
constrain people like conductors in what they can do, and what can managers do 
about shaping and constraining the impact of the technological system? By 
introducing (virtual) teamwork and the workings of (virtual) communities-of-
practice and so trying to overcome the problems of individuality, I intend to 
pursue questions such as these in relation to the work of conductors on our trains. 
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Problems with the performance of train conductors  
 
The work of drivers and conductors is organised around national agreements on 
train schedules, which are developed in relation to customer demands and travel 
requirements. These schedules are translated into working rosters in which 
regional requirements are taken into account, especially concerning first and last 
trains of the day. Many of our interactions and working relations are based on 
these agreements, leading to many constraints and much mistrust. A consequence 
of the planning rules is that, due to required variation and cross-regional duties, 
drivers and conductors work alone or in new combinations when they start a new 
trip. Conductors hardly ever work in the same team configuration for more than 
half a day. Because we have no individual or even group quality-check models, 
this individualistic behaviour leads to great anonymity without any individual 
feedback from colleagues or managers. My impression is that there is hardly any 
(social) interaction on performance requirements and performance standards. The 
only aspects which beyond any doubt are handled in a very responsible way are 
safety regulations. I think this has to do with personal values of conductors and in 
this case also drivers, more than management influence. 
 
Important issues related to client satisfaction are punctuality of arriving and 
departing trains, the intervals travellers have contact with a conductor and 
information in trains and on railway stations when the train system is interrupted. 
To experience the workload of conductors, I worked several shifts together with 
them. I did the same with the mobile security teams, who really focus on control, 
and I already had my experience in my former position working with the station 
service teams. Conductors in general do have a high safety standard with regard to 
the technical handling of trains. Apart from this, talking about the majority, I am 
not impressed by their general level of service performance, their negligence 
regarding the dress codes and general procedures, their passive attitude during 
train journeys and their inadequate knowledge of train schedules. Regarding the 
last point, we need to ask whether we provide them with sufficient access to the 
required information and whether they find this adequate. On the other hand, I 
was present in some cases when serious incidents or accidents occurred and then 
conductors took brave and highly effective action, helping victims, providing first 
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aid and excellent collegial support. A number of questions arise in relation to 
improved customer service. Is it ‘them’, the conductors, who are at fault? Or is it 
‘us’, the management? Is it the way we co-operate, or fail to co-operate? Or is it 
the technological environment in which we operate? Consider first the possibility 
that we blame the people when the problem is the technical systems that are at 
fault, as Norman suggests: 
 
 Humans, I discovered, do not always behave clumsily. Humans do not always 
 err. But they do when the things they use are badly conceived and designed. 
 Nonetheless, we still see human error blamed for all that befalls society.  
 (Norman, 1988, p. vii) 
 
 
Improving performance through technical systems 
 
When there is a disruption to our train system somewhere in the country, the 
technical system prevents conductors from collecting what information they can 
locally because they are only allowed to contact a central call centre for 
information. This call centre then contacts regional traffic controllers, but only 
after a 15- to 20-minute delay, during which they analyse and solve the logistical 
problems. There is a clear preference for securing the optimal availability of train 
equipment because planners firmly believe that optimal client satisfaction is 
achieved through bringing the right train to the right spot. However, it is during 
this short period of time required to do optimal planning at a central location that 
travellers are most in need of adequate information. The consequence of the 
centralised information procedure is that conductors feel insecure and are unable 
to give the required information, leading to angry customers. The conductor 
silently leaves the scene and customers stay behind, alone. The present solution is 
to give the conductor a better handheld computer, but not to change the procedure. 
Again, the focus is on the technical system and there is no change in the outcome. 
Recently I had a discussion with some Board colleagues about the need to 
optimise the way staff work with technical systems by asking conductors and 
drivers whether they can work with the planned equipment or whether we needed 
to make some form of adaptation to the volume of travellers.  
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Take another example. When a train is a few minutes late to make a cross-
platform connection with another train, it can happen that the first train leaves at 
the same time as the second train stops. This means that travellers see their train 
departing and miss their connection, most of the time without information. It 
could be said that the system is to blame for this, because the instruction is for 
trains to leave on time. Yes, this is true; but not always. Conductors can make 
professional judgements on the situation, but for this to happen we have to make 
them partners in the discussion about this subject so that, at least, they can inform 
travellers about the occurring situation. The blind pressure on train staff to drive 
on time has other consequences. Due to a change in a safety rule in our departure 
procedures, all our trains require 15 to 20 seconds more than what is allowed in 
the schedule to complete door-closing operations. This has led to a substantial 
reduction in punctuality of arrival at the next station, escalating over the whole 
journey. The system change was not discussed with the conductors, who simply 
accepted it without pointing out the implications of a change in departure 
procedure to meet the aim of punctuality. No account was taken of what the 
conductors actually have to do to meet the change in procedure. 
 
Managers in our organisation have been trying to improve the performance 
standards of conductors for years but many are now giving up, simply hoping that 
the standard will remain sufficient so as not to endanger train operation. However, 
the above examples suggest that we usually approach an issue primarily from the 
technical-systems perspective, tending to pay rather little attention to what is 
actually involved in the way people have to work with those technical systems. 
We have a tendency to assume that they are rather like parts of the system who 
will fit into it and do whatever is required to make it work efficiently. Unintended 
consequences frequently result from the system not working as required, and this 
may be why managers are losing heart. So perhaps we need another way of 
thinking. 
 
It is becoming apparent that improvement has to do with people: the social, not 
just technical, systems. Conductors normally work alone or in small teams of two 
to five in a continually changing composition, meaning that they will very seldom 
 118 
work within the same team, taking into account the large number of people. 
Security teams, by contrast, often work in the same configuration for a couple of 
years. Their average performance standard is much higher. My experience of 
working with the station service teams, who work in groups too, is that they also 
achieve a higher standard. Another observation I made is that when conductors 
work in teams most of the time, the poorest standard of one of the team members 
becomes the standard of all. When one of the conductors does not feel 
comfortable moving through the train, most of the time there will be a no-show 
for travellers. In that case, conductors safely close doors after a stop as part of the 
safety procedure and sit down in first class or in the rear driver’s cabin for the rest 
of the trip, as part of their service attitude. Management has been irritated by this 
problem for many years, but they admit that they have not found the solution to 
change this behaviour. We have a long history of improvement planning with 
little success, and have not consequently introduced continuous improvement as a 
quality development method. So what makes train staff act in the way they do, 
and how do we evaluate their role in the improvement of service levels? Recently 
a colleague and I were examined by several conductors and an instructor on safety 
departure procedures. This meant working a full day shift as an apprentice 
conductor, and although the emphasis was on safety procedures, we performed all 
the other responsibilities of a conductor. The enthusiasm with which conductors 
were talking about their profession, with us and their colleagues, during the exam 
was remarkable.  
 
So is there something missing in our daily social contact to enhance this feeling? 
What is the role of management in this? What has literature to offer on this 
subject? If we focus on patterns of relationships while also accepting the 
importance of technical systems in our work, the question to be investigated is the 
psychological and sociological relation with the technical and social environment 
in which people work.  
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From technology and humans to humans and technology 
 
According to MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985), three layers of meaning of the 
word ‘technology’ can be distinguished. First, the level of physical objects or 
artefacts, such as lamps and bicycles but also trains, engines and tracks. Second, 
‘technology’ may refer to activities or processes, such as steel-making, or driving 
trains. Third, it can refer to what people know as well as what they do: an example 
is the know-how that goes into designing a bicycle or operating the information 
system on railway stations. 
 
Bijker et al. (1987, p. 4) also identify three approaches to understanding the 
relationship between humans and technology:  
 
1. The social constructionist approach, in which individuals and groups 
participate in the construction of their perceived reality. Socially 
constructed reality is seen as an ongoing, dynamic process, in which 
everyday reality is derived from and maintained by social interactions. 
Key concepts within this approach are ‘interpretive flexibility’, ‘closure’ 
and ‘relevant social groups’. One of the central tenets of this approach is 
the claim that technological artefacts are open to sociological analysis.  
2. Technology treated in terms of a ‘systems’ metaphor, which stresses the 
importance of paying attention to the different but interlocking elements of 
physical artefacts, institutions and their environment and thereby offers an 
integration of technical, social-economic and political aspects and enables 
links between micro and macro levels of analysis. 
3. Breaking down the distinction between human actors and natural 
phenomena, both treated as elements in ‘actor networks’. This approach 
reverses the usual relationship between participant and analyst and casts 
engineers as sociologists.  
 
In their study, they also question the identity of ‘technology’:  
  
 The distinctions between human and machine, knowledge and action, 
 engineering and the study of engineering practices, are all ‘blown up’. We 
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 find that sociologists of technology are actually contributing to the 
 development of technology. 
(Bijker et al., 1987, p. 6) 
 
Norman (1988) looks for social implications of technological artefacts. He 
introduces POET, The Psychology of Everyday Things, or the psychology of how 
people interact with things. One of his major arguments for POET is that much of 
everyday knowledge resides in the world and not in our heads. Norman focuses on 
the role of the designer bearing great responsibility for the interaction between 
technical object and its user or operator. From examples of small items like 
VCRs, cameras and household appliances to be used in our day-to-day lives, he 
also goes on to investigate operations and disasters in nuclear plants, airplane 
cockpits and trains. He especially focuses on the role of errors in designing an 
artefact or technical system:  
 
If an error is possible, someone will make it. The designer must assume that all 
 possible errors will occur and design so as to minimize the chance of the error 
in the first place, or its effects once it gets made. Errors should be easy to 
detect, they should have minimal consequences, and, if possible their effects 
should be reversible.   
(Norman, 1988, p. 36) 
 
According to Schlick et al. (2006), a characteristic of human–machine interaction 
is that the complexity is self-generated, or emergent. Self-generated complexity 
arises from the ability of human cognition to make spontaneous abstractions of 
phenomena in the task domain. The human is able to dynamically distinguish 
between important and unimportant features of the task. The task acquires its 
meaning, often unconsciously, during the interaction. However, designers of 
automated systems try to automate all the tasks in order to deal with human 
(un)reliability. This design approach assumes that an a priori task allocation can 
be made so that each task in the human–machine systems performance is optimal. 
However, even in highly automated airplane cockpits, in the end, humans are 
controlling the flight management computer and have to step in when the 
computer fails. The paradox of this design approach is that the component of 
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presumed low reliability, the human, is then given the task of supervising the job 
that has been automated, because humans have greater adaptive abilities than 
machines. They can be expected to help the machine, instead of the other way 
around (Hoc and Lemoine, 1998).  
 
Looking at these approaches, it must be noted that many technical systems in our 
railway industry are organised in a way that allows people, especially train 
drivers, to make errors that are then considered to be a public offence. 
Furthermore, conductors are always looking for more variation in their daily 
work. This is understandable, but not consistent with Norman’s approach that 
complex tasks of everyday responsibilities should become routine and do not 
require much planning and thinking, simply because we do not have enough time 
to make a conscious decision during the execution of the many normal (complex) 
tasks involved in working on trains. This desire for more flexibility in operations 
and the burden of the technological system is worth investigating further. 
 
 
Improving performance through interaction between social and technical 
systems 
 
An important perspective on the relationship between people and technical 
systems is provided by socio-technical systems thinking. Examples of human–
technology cooperation based on system dynamics comes from the aviation 
industry. Degani and Wiener (1997) describe the use of airplane procedures 
specified by operational management. These procedures must lead to a 
standardised means of carrying out the job. Inconsistent or illogical procedures 
lead to non-compliance by the operators. The paper addresses the development of 
procedures for automated cockpits, a highly controversial issue in commercial 
aviation. Over-procedurisation fails to exploit one of the most valuable assets in 
the system, namely, the intelligent operator who is ‘on the scene’. So, introducing 
procedure interaction between pilots and the technical system becomes important. 
Procedures are also dependent on the operational environment, the type of people 
who operate them, the culture of the company and the nature of the company’s 
operations. Even in highly procedurised systems, there is room for individualism; 
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and that individualism can and should be tolerated in these human–machine 
systems.  
 
In our industry, conductors and drivers are informed about technical and 
procedural changes by means of a handheld palm-top computer. The messages are 
created by management, but even more by staff departments. Sometimes 
representatives of the target group will participate in the development of ideas. 
This is no guarantee that people reading the messages will comply with the new 
regulations. They will probably use what they think useful and ignore other 
messages partly or completely. 
 
Sharma (2006) proposes the use of non-linear dynamic system theory as a 
possible technique to account for the dynamic, non-linear and possibly chaotic 
human–machine characteristics. Pilots require more automated aid when their 
manual performance is inadequate from a flight safety perspective. Depending on 
the necessity, the human–machine system dynamics may be transformed from a 
chaotic to a nonchaotic regime or vice versa by small control perturbation. Lewis, 
Sycara and Payne (2001) studied the role of (technical) agents in human teams 
and discovered that, depending on the role an agent plays, the way agents 
communicate with their human team-mates influenced (social) team behaviour. In 
the world of air traffic control, ‘humans using automated tools’ is changing into 
‘humans and automated systems “collaborating” with each other’ (Hoc and 
Lemoine, 1998; Lee, 2006). Olsson and Jansson (2006) studied the work 
conditions of officers on bridges of high-speed ferries to examine the information 
provided and the understanding of interactions and interfaces between humans 
and the technical support systems. Their conclusion was that the way information 
is integrated and presented to the officers is inappropriate. The automated systems 
are introduced one by one, replacing traditional instruments, so integration and 
layout is inadequate.  
 
Although I cannot prove it, I have the feeling that a similar investigation of our 
train drivers’ environment might come up with comparable results. A Swedish 
project investigating traffic safety related to the train-driver work situation 
showed comparable outcomes (Kecklund et al., 2001). Although not directly 
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connected with my research project, it is concerned with human–machine 
interaction and might be worth investigating at a future stage. Spurgin (2004) tries 
to connect the fields of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) with Human–
System Interfaces (HSI) in order to estimate the effects of changes in HSI upon 
risk reduction. This question is reiterated in the work of Hoc and Lemoine (1998), 
Lee (2006) and Degani and Wiener (1997), and is an important issue in the 
approach of Norman (1988) when he talks about human error in a technical 
environment or working with technological systems. Much emphasis is given to 
the relations and interaction of human and technical systems, the design and the 
role they play in operating these systems, and little emphasis is given to the social 
circumstances in which processes take place. When conductors need information 
to inform customers during disturbed situations, the process is regulated on the 
presumption that our technical equipment is functioning well enough to maintain 
radio silence and work on digital information. In practice, this very often turns out 
not to be the case, leading to frustrated conductors and angry travellers. 
Conductors have nothing to fall back on except a central call centre that is far 
removed from operations. To illustrate more clearly what I mean, we should step 
back to the beginning of the 1950s.  
  
The view on the relation between technical systems and humans was strongly 
influenced by the research of Trist and Bamforth (1951). They studied a change in 
technology in the coal-mining industry of the UK as part of a larger project of the 
Tavistock institute of Human Relations on new social techniques developed in 
industry. A new coal-cutting device was introduced that required miners to work 
in different ways. This caused considerable hostility, and the miners sabotaged the 
changes. Trist and Bamforth tried to understand why this was happening in order 
to advise managers what to do about it. They argued that the new technology and 
its new mode of working broke up the teams miners had been working in, teams 
that reflected their social relationships in the mining villages in which they lived. 
Trist and Bamforth argued that treating technology as if it was simply a technical 
system would increase the risk of managerial actions failing, because they would 
be ignoring the social dimension of operators’ lives: not just the social aspects of 
their work lives, but the social aspects of their whole lives, since these were 
inevitably intertwined. They suggested that we think in terms of a social system 
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that is interacting with a technical system. This question will become more 
important to my company when we introduce electronic tickets and controlled 
access gates on railway stations, changing certain tasks and responsibilities of our 
conductors. How will this affect their social interaction, and will this improve 
service levels?  
  
From this perspective, the operators are now thought of as parts of a social system 
(covering work and life more generally); drawing on open systems theory, one 
could think of this social system as exporting work roles that are imported by the 
technical system. To change or improve anything, one must analyse the social 
system as well as the technical system, and design changes in the social system to 
reflect whatever changes are desired in the technical system. The social system 
here includes not only the direct activity with others while doing the work, but 
also interactions back at the canteen with others, in our case conductors, drivers, 
etc. The rumours become important aspects of this social system that could all 
affect how the technical system functions. At present, we are introducing a new 
schedule for travellers and new rosters for our employees. More than ever before, 
we try to increase employee participation in these planning models. On the other 
hand, there is a rumour going around that we do not have enough equipment and 
staff to start up the new schedules. Although this is not the truth, the rumour can 
ruin the introduction of the new schedules, so we need to take this threat very 
seriously and it is of great concern for management despite the higher 
participation level of employees. Trist and Bamforth concluded that technology, 
no matter how sophisticated, will fail when it is not part of a social system 
designed to operate it.  
 
The requirement was for joint optimisation of the interrelated technical and social 
systems. Based on this assumption, consequent resistance to working in new ways 
will make new technology fail its potential. If changes are to succeed, they have to 
be based on a realistic understanding of the interconnection between the social 
and the technical subsystems. The Trist and Bamforth article still shows 
remarkable parallels with the actual development of the situation our company is 
in today. According to Boonstra (2004, p. 12), organisational systems theory has 
developed further into a dynamic system theory based on the ideas of Emery and 
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Trist (1965), in which dynamic systems theory assumes that organisation takes 
place in complex dynamic systems in which the actors constantly interact with 
one another and give meaning to the events around them, and in so doing they 
create a social construction of reality. Connecting the stories of Trist and 
Bamforth and Emery and Trist, the question becomes relevant whether these 
connections and interaction also apply to the relation between humans and 
technological systems. What effect do socio-technical systems have on 
improvement?  
 
An important step made by the socio-technical systems approach is to move away 
from the idea that humans have to adapt to the organisational and technical 
framework of production, to stress the interrelationship between humans and 
machines and foster the aim of shaping both the technical and the social 
conditions of work in such a way that efficiency and humanity no longer 
contradict each other (Ropohl, 1999). The quintessence of this approach is 
captured in the words ‘foster’ and ‘design’. Moreover, socio-technical systems 
can be seen as the application of the engineer’s idea of control to human activity 
(Stacey, 2003a, p. 33); although, paying closer attention to the social 
consequences of their decisions about technological developments (rationalist 
causality), there are still systems unfolding the enfolded design (formative 
causality). It is still about (top) management designing the way systems interact 
(Johannessen and Stacey, 2005, p. 146). Callon (1987, p. 100) offers two reasons 
why socio-technical systems in the end will not contribute to a balanced relation 
between technology and humans. First, engineers involved in the design and 
development of a technological system, particularly when radical innovations are 
involved, must permanently combine scientific and technical analysis with 
sociological analysis. Second, systems concepts presuppose that a distinction can 
be made between the system itself and its environment. In particular, certain 
changes can and sometimes must be imputed to outside factors. How do we define 
the limits of a system and determine the precise influence of the environment? 
Callon points out that the actor–network concept has the advantage of avoiding 
this type of problem and the many difficult questions of methodology it raises, so 
let us join him in investigating this next step.      
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Taking an actor–network perspective  
 
Another way of thinking about the relationship between people and technical 
systems is provided by actor–network theory, allowing us to measure the distance 
between the heterogeneous and impure sociology of the engineers and the pure 
and homogeneous sociology of the sociologist (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Callon 
and Latour, 1981; Callon, 1987). According to this perspective, the railway is a 
network and the agents are conductors, drivers, controllers, timetables, trains, 
work rosters, signalling equipment, etc. So here the work roster and the timetable 
are as important, probably even more important, than the conductors. Although 
actor–network theory partly overcomes the problems of socio-technical systems 
and seems more balanced, it introduces another reified concept (‘the network’) 
that also can be manipulated in a managerial way and diverts attention away from 
interaction between people. This approach places very high importance on the 
technology in terms of what is produced. In other words, the technology is 
shaping what happens; perhaps even more than the people do. Latour (1997) sees 
the transformation of the social from a surface, or a territory, to a circulating 
entity, as the most useful contribution of actor–network theory. The social has 
become a certain type of circulation in which actor–network theory becomes a 
theory of space, bypassing the question of social construction and the 
‘realist/relativist’ debate, leaving only the organisation of the ‘glocal’ as a single 
plane of endlessly entangled translations, calling networks. 
 
According to Harris (2005), institutions, organisations, are, from a Latourian 
perspective, loci of methods of ordering, whose essential operation resides in the 
recurrent patterns by which the relations between humans (subjects) and non-
humans (objects) are generated and maintained. Latour sees technical objects as 
intermediaries, or translations, that enable human ‘actants’ to achieve definite 
goals. There is no polarity of a subject and object in which the former, via the 
methodology of the natural science, attains knowledge of the latter, but rather a 
network of ‘circulating’ references or translations. Latour emphasises that in 
organisations non-human actants come to develop new properties; in other words, 
organisations become the kind of hybrids that characterise contemporary culture. 
Latour uses the terms ‘purification’, the world of humans and non-humans, and 
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‘translation’, fabricating novel entities, as hybrids in the intermixture of nature 
and culture, society and matter. These contrary tendencies (purification and 
translation) exist in mutual presupposition, mixing society and nature in complex 
networks. Instead of this dichotomous constitution, Latour introduces the category 
of the ‘quasi object’, a term developed by Michel Serres (1982), in which the 
relations between object and subject are moments in an originary aporia:  
 
 This quasi-object that is a marker of the subject is an astonishing constructor of 
 intersubjectivity. We know, through it, how and when we are subjects and 
 when and how we are no longer subjects.  
(Serres, 1982, p. 227) 
  
 From the perspective of the quasi object “it is impossible to define the human 
 by essence”, the human is rather the focus of a historical succession of 
 contingent networks, the product of particular ways of “passing” the quasi 
 object. The human is the nexus of relations, the site where properties are 
 exchanged. In keeping with a commitment to symmetry, this perspective also 
 alters the status of matter or objects which can no longer be regarded as outside 
 or prior to history or society… In this manner the quasi object casts new light 
 on organisational structures – which are perhaps too often reduced to abstract 
 systems of interpersonal relations. 
(Harris, 2005, p. 173) 
 
The human, being the nexus of relations, shows similarity to Mead’s (1934) 
approach of the ‘social object’, to which I shall return later. Latour envisages a 
society that is technically determined by a technology that is socially determined 
(Harris, 2005, pp. 171–172).  
  
Goguen (2000) argues against this technological determinism, where technology 
is seen as an autonomous force that changes society, because it ignores the 
complex social network that supports the technology. Latour’s approach places 
humans and technology on a scale of even balance regarding the development of 
society, or one might say puts technology in an even more important position. 
This positioning, as mentioned earlier, did not lead to the required performance 
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improvement in our company. At this point, actor–network theory shows the same 
limitations as the socio-technical systems, shifting the focus away from the 
interaction between people. Actor–network theory pays little attention to the detail 
of interaction between individuals as the process in which transformation 
emerges. They do not explain the transformation process, what it is that 
transforms social practices in their replication, transformative causality 
(Johannessen and Stacey, 2005). As my research into improvement is focusing 
heavily on patterns of social interaction between humans supported by technical 
systems, in the next step I turn to a complex responsive processes way of thinking 
about technology in my search for this explanation.  
 
 
Technology and complex responsive processes 
 
Mead’s thinking plays a significant role in constructing the theory of complex 
responsive processes and offers us a chance to engage in another way of thinking 
about people and technology that differs from the systems perspectives I have 
reviewed earlier. Complex responsive process theory focuses on human behaviour 
and interaction, meaning that the only agents in a process are people and they are 
not thought of as constituting a system. Instead, they form and are at the same 
time formed by patterns of interaction between them (Stacey, 2003a). In this 
communicative interaction, which is also influenced by power relating and 
evaluative choosing (Elias, 1939), they employ tools and technologies. These 
tools and technologies can usefully be thought of as technical systems. Thus the 
primary relation between people and technical systems, in this theory, is that 
technical systems are tools developed and later employed by human agents in 
their activities of interaction with each other, through which they shape both the 
social and the physical worlds they live in. However, to stop at this point does not 
take account of the powerful impact that technical systems have on what human 
agents are able to achieve and on how they experience themselves. Secondly, 
therefore, according to Mead (1925, p. 263; 1934, p. 154) and Johannessen and 
Stacey (2005, p. 153), the relationship between people and technical systems takes 
the form of a ‘social object’. According to Johannessen and Stacey (2005), as 
people design and use technical systems they develop tendencies to act in similar 
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ways with regard to these technical systems. Technical systems have meaning for 
us as reflected in a sense that meaning can arise only when taken up in 
interactions with other people, and it is through these interactions that technical 
systems become ‘social objects’. I have to acknowledge that there are similarities 
between this approach of the ‘social object’ and the ‘quasi object’ developed by 
Serres (1982). The difference I see is that the ‘quasi object’ starts with a focus on 
the object, matter, in symmetry with the social. The focus of complex responsive 
thinking is directed not only to the physical technological object, but more to the 
interaction and relating between people where the generalised ‘social object’ 
called technology is particularised. This differs from elevating technical systems 
to the status of agent, as in actor–network theory, or seeing human agents as parts 
of a social system, as in socio-technical system theory.  
 
From this point of view, according to Johannessen and Stacey (2005), one could 
understand the relation of conductors with the technical logistic system of 
timetables, rosters and procedures as ‘social objects’, as generalised ways of 
acting on the part of conductors with regard to those timetables and rosters. 
However, another question arises when we try to relate the performance of 
conductors to their technological environment, and this also counts for many other 
technological developments in the company. Many technical improvements and 
changes do not lead to a more satisfying product or service for customers. Let me 
come back to the example of departure procedures mentioned before. For safety 
reasons we changed our departure procedure, meaning that the train will not start 
moving before all doors are closed. This change in procedure was not 
accompanied by allowing extra time for the extra steps a conductor has to take 
before the train actually departs. After a major drop in punctuality was noticed, 
system analysts started to investigate what the reason for this drop could be. The 
conclusion was that trains that depart a little later than planned are more likely to 
lose extra time on the way to their final destination. After talking to many 
conductors it turned out that the new procedure takes 30 to 35 seconds, compared 
with the original ten. However, we still start our procedures ten seconds before 
actual departure time, with the result that all trains depart late and the punctuality 
figure drops. This has been going on for almost two years now! Why has this 
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happened, and did anyone stand up to suggest an alternative approach to the 
change in procedure?  
 
A departure procedure and safely closing the doors, a technical procedure, can be 
seen in the light of Johannessen and Stacey (2005) as a ‘social object’, a tendency 
to act. Based on several observations, I argue that a technological object or any 
physical object can play a role in the emergence of a ‘social object’ only as 
subject in the interaction between two or more human agents. Using the ideas of 
Searle, in which he states that physical objects cannot be named by the object 
itself, Fearn (2005) explains that something becomes a computer when it is used 
as a computer and it becomes named as a computer when at least two people have 
agreed on the use of this term. There is no doubt that after this agreement, the 
computer, when used, autonomously takes part in the development of human 
knowledge and skills, and this is how humans develop a ‘quasi object’ working 
with technology. The big step, however, can only be made when this ‘quasi 
object’ becomes part of the ‘social object’. In the introduction, I mentioned that 
there is little interaction between conductors about their actual performance. This 
lack of interaction, along with insufficient stimulus on the part of management to 
talk about day-to-day performance, might have led to this and other failures to act 
according to customers’ wishes. Change in improved technology or safety 
procedures does not automatically lead to positive change in customer services 
and performance. In fact, Johannessen and Stacey (2005, p. 158) also state that a 
physical object can be meaningful only insofar as it is somehow taken up in our 
interactions with each other.  
 
Going back to Bijker et al. (1987), Norman (1988), Hoc and Lemoine (1998), 
Sharma (2006), Trist and Bamforth (1951), Emery and Trist (1965) and Boonstra 
(2004), they all emphasise, from different perspectives, the need for human 
interaction to develop the performance between humans and technology. Schlick 
et al. (2006) state that the complexity of human–machine interaction is self-
generated; Lewis, Sycara and Payne (2001) claim that the way technical agents 
communicate can influence social team behaviour. According to Mead (1934, p. 
154) and Johannessen and Stacey (2005, p. 153), the relationship between people 
and technical systems takes the form of a ‘social object’. I argue, however, that 
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technical systems have meaning for us as reflected in a sense that meaning can 
only arise when taken up in interactions with other people forming a ‘social 
object’. This approach is consistent with Mead’s earlier writings:  
 
 I wish, however, to restrict the social act to the class of acts which involve the 
 cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the 
 act, in the sense of Bergson is a social object. 
(Mead, 1925, p. 263) 
 
Based on Mead’s presumption and my own argument, I make the following 
statement: 
 
Individual use by humans of physical objects or making use of a new 
technological procedure does not automatically mean that there is some form of 
generalisation, because the social process is taking place only in the mind of the 
individual. It is by talking to others about the use of physical objects or the effects 
of a procedure that these will be taken up in the conversation and so become part 
of the generalisation process between humans, having influence on the ‘social 
object’. 
 
This can become a very important point because it can make visible what is 
missing from our process of introducing new technological solutions or 
improvements and shows the difference of management behaviour between 
technical-socio systems thinking and complex responsive process thinking. In the 
first situation, management will devise a solution for this evolving problem. In the 
second situation, they will encourage broad communication and interaction 
between the people involved in working with the problem. In the presented case, 
that means that conductors, managers and logistic people have to sit down and 
start talking about the problem before entering the discussion about the solution 
(Swieringa and Jansen, 2005). After that, we will have to think about a way to 
widen the circle to all people involved in improving the punctuality of departing 
trains. This is one of the main differences compared to socio-technical systems 
thinking. There is not one prescription for solving this problem, even when we 
take the technical and sociological aspects into balanced consideration. An 
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important question, however, is how to stimulate the interaction and 
communication processes between the thousands of people involved in this and 
other problems, and how to improve in general. It is not a ride free for all and it 
will not go by itself. Management must follow and measure improvement steps 
and participate in the development of the ‘social object’ itself (Tobin, 2003).    
 
 
Complex responsive processes of performance improvement 
 
Stacey (2005c, p. 57) questions the mainstream systems perspective on quality 
improvement, taking a complex responsive process approach that changes the 
focus to an ongoing, iterated pattern of relationships between people. Where could 
this lead in working relations in our own organisation?    
 
Almost one year ago the company changed its penalty system for travellers 
without a ticket. We had to bring it more in line with the rest of the national public 
transport sector, and we had to reduce the number of quarrels between travellers 
without a ticket and conductors. For that reason the choice was made that on every 
occasion the traveller should be penalised for being unable to show a ticket. 
Central Customer Service was the only department with the power to revoke this 
penalty. Many conductors embraced the new rules, but there was also a lot of 
opposition. After a year it became clear that the conductors had made their own 
rules, depending on the situation. When one of our vending machines broke down 
and passengers were unable to buy a ticket, they were obliged to give the penalty, 
but in many cases they were looking for other solutions: allow people to get off at 
the next station, allow them to stay on when it was a short trip, and many more 
examples. Brown and Duguid (1991) already discovered, through studying 
workplace practices, that the ways people actually work usually differ 
fundamentally from the ways organisations describe that work in manuals, 
training programmes and job descriptions. Even in highly sophisticated 
technological areas like airplane cockpits, these debates take place (Degani and 
Wiener, 1997; Sharma, 2006). Recently, after several discussions with different 
groups, we adopted their way of handling the situations. Again, Brown and 
Duguid suggest that practice is central to understanding work. The penalty regime 
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did not change, and this is what we told travellers; but the conductor is 
responsible for a proper execution, including providing customer services when 
this is needed.  
 
In fact, the conductors had functionalised our cult value of giving a penalty to 
every traveller without a ticket. So the suggestion is that we accept that policy 
statements are generalisations and idealisations, or cult values that have to be 
made functional in the complex responsive processes of interaction between those 
who actually do the work, in our case, the conductors. This practical solution is 
related to my experiences in the DMan programme, where a final stage emerges 
from many interactions between the participants and is consistent with the ideas of 
Mead (1923) when he talks about values. Can instructions from management be 
seen as values? If so:  
 
There are no absolute values. There are only values which, on account 
of incomplete social organisation, we cannot as yet estimate, and in face 
of these the first enterprise should be to complete the organisation if 
only in thought so that some rough sort of estimate in terms of the other 
values involved becomes conceivable… The task of intelligence is to 
use this growing consciousness of interdependence to formulate the 
problems of all, in terms of the problem of every one. In so far as this 
can be accomplished cult values will pass over into functional values.  
 
(Mead, 1923, pp. 243–245) 
 
However, people find it difficult to keep such a perspective in mind; and this does 
not only apply to managers. To my surprise, in a meeting about the subject, the 
union representatives started to call for new regulations to describe what can and 
cannot be done in this new form of freedom. At the end of this discussion I 
bluntly said that I would not do that because it would bring us back to the same 
dilemma, only from another angle; which they accepted. Although we agreed not 
to make this new approach public, the next morning it was in all the newspapers, 
creating a lot of extra work for our press department.  
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Generalised other and ‘social object’ 
 
The other day I was sitting as a passenger on a train that was delayed entering one 
of the bigger stations. A female conductor, who had already checked our tickets, 
started to give information about changes of platforms for other departing trains 
and new times of departure, and she apologised for the delay of our train. She did 
all this in a highly professional manner. Not only was her information accurate, 
but she showed so much confidence that this in itself influenced the way 
passengers experienced the train system. Because I could not find her after the 
trip, I had to look up who she was so that I could phone her half an hour later to 
compliment her on her performance. She told me that she had been member of a 
team working on improvement of information for travellers, and that she and her 
team members developed better ways to provide this information. I could not 
agree more. She also told me they had conferences together with other teams. 
Although I also introduced conferences as a way of quickly exchanging 
information, this was not new for the company: other managers had done this 
before me. The information improvement teams one day ceased to exist and she 
could not tell me why, but thought it was a pity and offered her help if we thought 
of starting again. I include this story to emphasise that there are very good 
examples of high quality performance; people have been working on this 
improvement in a form of communities-of-practice, but the improved ways of 
working somehow did not cross the boundary of the community and none of the 
developments held any kind of general continuance. So, next to the question of 
how conductors improve their performance; the other question is: when they do 
improve, why is this confined to small teams working on new knowledge, 
procedures and customer satisfaction? Why does this not cross over to other 
colleagues?   
 
We are talking about the interaction between people who are already participating 
in a group. Development takes place through interaction between individuals, 
selves, of the two groups, creating new ways of working together on a local basis, 
even when they are part of large national departments. These local interactions 
can lead to new global processes in due time (Project Three). According to Mead 
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(1934, p. 158), the self is constituted by an organisation of new particular attitudes 
of other individuals toward oneself and toward one another in the specific social 
acts in which the person participates. Full development of the individual’s self 
takes place by an organisation of the social attitudes of ‘the generalised other’ or 
the social group as a whole to which one belongs. One thus becomes an individual 
reflection of the general systematic pattern of the wider social or group behaviour. 
The organised community that lends each individual their unity of self may be 
called ‘the generalised other’. The attitude of ‘the generalised other’ is the attitude 
of the whole community (Mead, 1934, p. 154). So, in the case of a security team, 
the team is ‘the generalised other’ insofar as it is part, as an organised process of 
social activity (work), of the experience of the individual members of this team. 
Bringing other people into this organised process of social activity changes ‘the 
generalised other’, and it is in this form of ‘the generalised other’ that the social 
process influences the behaviour of the individuals involved in it and carrying it 
on (Mead, 1934, p. 155). This imaginatively perceived unity is then a generalised 
tendency to act in similar positions in similar ways. This emerging imaginative 
generalisation is one phase of the so-called ‘social object’. The other phase, which 
is inseparable from the generalisation, is the particularising of the general in the 
specific contingent situations in which we find ourselves (Stacey, 2005a: 36) 
 
…objects are constituted in terms of meanings within the social process of 
experience and behaviour through the mutual adjustment to one another of the 
responses or actions of the various individual organisms involved in that 
process, an adjustment made possible by means of a communication which 
takes the form of a conversation of gestures in the earlier evolutionary stages of 
that process, and of language in its later stage. 
 
(Mead, 1934, p. 77) 
 
A ‘social object’ means belonging to a specific group of people in a specific 
situation, a historically evolved tendency to act on the part of large numbers of 
people, to act in similar ways in similar situations. They form and are formed by 
‘social objects’ in a process of interaction. Mead uses the word ‘object’ as a 
tendency to act rather than the concept of a ‘thing’ (Johannessen and Stacey, 
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2005, p. 156). People can belong to different social groups with different ‘social 
objects’: a familiar example of this can be the family father and well-respected 
employee transforming into a football hooligan on Sunday. In both cases, he feels 
that he belongs to the group he is part of. The results of the merger meetings 
between the security people and the service people show all aspects of this 
generalisation process, and do suggest remarkable new ideas and insights on how 
a future part of the organisation could be established. 
 
By introducing technology in the discourse, another question becomes important: 
whether there is an influence of other objects or artefacts on the ‘social object’, 
people feel that they belong to and act accordingly (Mead, 1934, p. 154). In our 
case, conductors are constrained by schedule and roster planning in a 
technological environment. The question is important because of the possible 
impact on the relation between humans and their technological environment. It is 
good to mention that Serres’ (1982) approach of ‘quasi objects’ shows some 
similarities with this approach of Mead, when he talks about generalisation with 
inanimate objects. The difference can be found that the ‘quasi object’ starts with a 
focus on the object, matter, in symmetry with the social as the leading property of 
interaction. 
 
One year ago we introduced the possibility to use a WIFI network on stations for 
staff to call on for duty with their handheld computer. The advantage is that 
people do not have to walk to a central office on the railway stations – which, on 
the larger stations, can be a walk of 15 minutes – but can go direct to the train they 
have to service. The very modern system was designed as a physical object to 
increase efficiency and reduce unnecessary loss of time, but it also led to a further 
reduction of social interaction. The end result was that people were not trained 
well enough, or it was more complicated than expected to use the system; and for 
that reason, it was thought that the system was not working properly. What should 
have led to more efficiency was heavily criticised and turned out to lead only to 
more inefficiency. Even now, after one year of reparative measures and 
considerable extra training, the system will never be accepted as the very helpful 
solution it has the potential to be, and has cost the company a great deal on 
increased payments resulting from the use of extra time. Instead of community 
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members helping each other in the use of the technical system, people convinced 
each other that this was yet another management whim designed only to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs.  
  
 
What can we do to improve customer satisfaction in train services? 
 
We realised by now that our operations are guided by technical systems and that 
this way of working is not leading to the required improvements in operational 
performance. I have tried to explain how complex responsive process thinking 
invites us to start working in another way on this performance improvement, 
taking into account the relation between people and between people and the 
technological systems and procedures. One way can be to initiate forms of 
interaction about our day-to-day experiences and try to include people from 
operational levels in this discussion. I have been invited by several regional 
management teams to share my opinions about service developments. In these 
teams, managers and employees of train and security departments are present. 
Until now, I have been able to exchange information about service developments 
with up to 80 managers and several hundreds of other employees. Instead of 
talking about service development with managers, I will start with the question: 
‘What do you think about your work today, and are you satisfied with your 
present performance?’ When they answer that they are not satisfied enough, I start 
an inventory of opinions and ask: ‘What, then, is blocking your normal daily 
performance? Why do you think that solutions have to be found in a new plan in 
the future? Do you know why you and your people in operations do not perform 
at the required levels, and have you ever discussed this with them?’ (Swieringa 
and Jansen, 2005). This question disconnects people from the technological 
environment for a moment, making the person, rather than technological systems, 
central to the discussion.  
 
Brown and Duguid (1991) argue that practice is central to understanding work. 
They describe the research of Orr (1990), where a maintenance department for 
copying machines could not find the necessary repair instructions to solve a 
maintenance problem. The social pressure in the company is to solve problems 
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without changing machines. The work of maintenance representatives is not only 
simply about maintaining machines, it is also about maintaining social relations. 
The team was not able to solve the problem directly, which ended up in a long 
story-telling procedure, essentially being a process of diagnosis. This story-telling 
begins as it ends, in a communal understanding of the machine and shared 
experience; information that cannot be found in the manuals. The story-telling 
lasted for several hours, progressing from incoherent to coherent information, in 
the end generating enough insight to lead to diagnosis and repair. I think that by 
telling these stories the representatives were moving their thoughts from 
unconscious to conscious, looking for new images of the machine in the 
asymmetry of its parts (Norman, 1988; Dalal, 2002). After three months, an 
assimilated version of the diagnosis was heard in the companies’ lunchroom, 
recounted among other service representatives. An important skill for service 
representatives is not only knowing how to repair machines but also being able to 
create, trade, and understand highly elliptical, highly referential, highly 
informative ‘war stories’ (Brown and Duguid, 1991, p. 45). The irony, according 
to Orr (1990), is that for the purpose of diagnosis the representatives do not have 
smart machines, just inadequate information and ‘their own very traditional 
skills’.  
 
This is exactly the question we are facing. How can we restore the relation 
between the company’s requirements and procedures and conductors’ skills, 
discussing the difference between conscious and unconscious operation? The 
story-telling and informal conversations are often framed in a community-of-
practice. A community-of-practice evolves around the sharing of experience 
related to work practice (Orr, 1990; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Orr, 1996; Wenger, 
1998). This sharing relates to professional responsibilities, activities and 
vocabulary. Since the actual work practice often differs from the canonical 
practice described in manuals and directive documents, the community-of-practice 
plays an important role (Olsson, Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2000). When we have 
our meetings, I work together with several of my colleagues from the HRM 
department who are also interested in this conversation approach based on taking 
our daily experience seriously (Shaw, 2002). We have collected all kinds of 
opinions in large group discussions, but instead of publishing our results we invite 
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managers to have the same conversation with their own teams, with the help of a 
facilitator when requested, to expand the community and create new ones on a 
regional or functional basis.  
 
The first results they have fed back to us are fairly encouraging. The sessions are 
held on a voluntary basis and more than 50% of operational employees come to 
attend. Managers’ reactions are that they used to bring messages from top 
management to their employees, telling how the top wants the jobs to be done, 
even when they did not fully agree on the prescribed solutions. This time, instead 
of bringing something, they can share and collect information necessary to 
prepare the next steps for discussions about service developments. This approach 
immediately changed the relation they have with their co-workers and changes 
their leadership approach. I have been able to attend several of the local meetings 
and our plan is to have a large final meeting, in four regions with 40 managers and 
160 team members; and at the end of this year, we will organise one combined 
meeting with 200 representatives from the regions to discuss what keeps us from 
doing our daily work the way customers would like us to perform, after which 
they will have to take the information back into their own communities.  
 
One of the specific outcomes is that people have countless examples where they 
describe constraints of technical systems and procedures leading to under-
performance with regard to client satisfaction. My own perception is that they 
underestimate the role they can play themselves; this role has been made 
subordinate to the technical system, leading to forms of cynicism and lethargy. On 
the other hand, the regional meetings start having the impact of communities-of-
practice, a phenomenon we have seen earlier in the service and security group, 
with good results. The actual working situation of professionals can be (mentally) 
isolated and focused on their own local practice. They sometimes have little 
connection with the constellation of practices defined as whole and other parts of 
the company. As a result, they do not engage in systematic reflection on the nature 
of the competence to which they contribute, what is needed to ensure its future 
development, what connections to seek inside and outside the company, or what 
their own trajectories may be within this context. Because jobs fail to capture their 
imagination, working relations remain distant, passive and uninspiring (Wenger, 
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1998, p. 257). This is probably the case with conductors, despite the fact that they 
continuously operate in a customer environment, which makes this observation 
even more remarkable.  
 
Brown and Duguid (1991) argue that conceptual reorganisation is necessary to 
accommodate learning in working and innovation. This must stretch from the 
level of individual communities-of-practice and the technology and practices 
used, to the level of the overarching organisational architecture, the community of 
communities. Inter-organising the work of the three groups: service, security and 
conductors, taking into consideration the technological support and aspects of the 
working situation, can be helpful in creating new communities-of-practice where 
working, learning and innovating go hand in hand (Brown and Duguid, 1991, p. 
55). Furthermore, various communities-of-practice have to form a tight 
constellation, to take responsibility for inefficiencies and mistakes whose cause 
fall outside the narrow purview.  
 
An organisation that functions in a sufficiently coordinated fashion, without 
excessive top-down hierarchy, thrives on intensive negotiation of meaning and is 
thus likely to be more dynamic and more pervasively creative. This means we still 
have some work to do and does not imply laissez-faire or absence of leadership 
(Wenger, 1998, pp. 260–261). Brown and Duguid (1991, p. 45) describe how 
knowledge can wander into and around an organisation, not stopped by 
boundaries. I noted that in our organisation people working in teams perform 
better. So the simple solution could be to invite people to work in a team 
configuration one way or another. The advantage of teamwork is that teams most 
of the time have a common goal, even when people work individually. In practical 
terms, this is made difficult by the many individualistic tasks to be performed in 
our train services; yet when teamwork in its traditional approach is not possible, 
there are other solutions! Lipnack and Stamps (1997, pp. 6–7) introduce virtual 
teams as groups of people who interact through interdependent tasks guided by 
common purpose. Bal and Teo (2000) emphasise that virtual teams are 
geographically dispersed, driven by common purpose, enabled by communication 
technologies and involved in cross-boundary collaboration. Technology is 
therefore acknowledged as the fundamental driving force behind the existence of 
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pure virtual teams, and critical to its existence (Arnison and Miller, 2002). They 
also argue that if conventional teams use the same technology as dispersed teams 
they often work as a virtual team, although they can work in close proximity. How 
team members interact, rather than where team members are located, should 
define a work team as virtual.  
 
Virtual teams, especially when their configurations can change frequently, live on 
exchange of information. Kirkman et al. (2004) describe how highly empowered 
virtual teams and cross-boundary teams in organisations were associated with 
significantly higher levels of process improvement and customer satisfaction than 
less empowered teams. Virtual teams can be completely virtual, or co-located with 
electronic communication that may or may not be supplemented by face-to-face 
meetings (Kirkman et al., 2004, p. 178). Communities-of-practice can develop 
their own ‘social object’ in every (team) combination they work in, real or virtual, 
in which technological developments play a crucial role. Although most virtual 
teams perform highly complex based tasks, this is not always the case (Lipnack 
and Stamps, 2000). So conductors can also be part of virtual teams or (virtual) 
communities-of-practice and develop a ‘social object’ interacting on their day-to-
day improvement questions around the technology they work with. They are not 
working all over the world, but on the other hand they work dispersed all over the 
country all the time. The characteristics of virtual teams, combined with the well-
developed digital technologies in our company and face-to-face communication, 
can offer conventional face-to-face teams an opportunity to accomplish their goals 
and achieve their vision utilising the best features of both types of teams (Arnison 
and Miller, 2002). It is the ‘social object’ of patterns of interaction, through virtual 
communities-of-practice, that can lead to an imaginatively created global outcome 
of ‘improvement’ (Stacey, 2005d, p. 37). Recently, five virtual communities-of-
practice for train drivers from all over the country started, with unlimited access 
for other company members, to discuss improvement issues on technical and 
procedural aspects. After four months there will be face-to-face contact between 
members of these virtual communities, to evaluate intermediate results. 
 
It is the combination of conversation, enabling other forms of teams and 
communities-of-practice and leadership fulfilment, that should enable us to work 
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on performance improvement in our technological environment. The basic 
question is: What is our primary responsibility working in our company? Is it 
driving trains on the basis of meeting time schedules, or do we feel responsible for 
the more complex travel requirements of our customers with the assistance of 
several technological and logistic systems? This approach strongly resonates with 
the ‘marketing myopia’ ideas of Levitt (1960): firms should define themselves 
through their broad industry orientation rather than in narrow product or 
technology terms. Railroad companies should see themselves in the transport 
business, transporting people who wish to go from A to B. In my example this 
should be explored not only from a marketing point of view but also from a 
psychological point of view, where people in their minds and in practice make use 
of technology to provide an adequate service or product to customers and feel 
responsible for their journey. Becoming aware of ‘technological myopia’ 
introduces a broader view of the human use of technology in a generalisation 
process between employee and customer. The ‘social object’, tendency to act in 
similar ways in similar situations, of the two groups will develop through 
particularisation of the general way of interacting between employees and 
customers, leading to small changes in the general way to act. Through interaction 
between employees and management and leadership influences, as described 
above, these changes should be experienced by customers as small steps of 
improvement in the appreciation of their journeys, as a basis of complex 
responsive process thinking.            
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Communities-of-practice in the traditional way are seen as a systemic way of 
working, but I argue that this does not always have to be the case. Several authors 
describe the workings of virtual teams related to the degree of virtuality (Kirkman 
et al., 2004). The sociological aspect of technology in the interaction with people 
can be viewed from many angles; from mainstream systemic thinking, social 
systems and social constructionism, to actor–network theory, where technology is 
at the centre of thinking about humans as agents in a technological/social network. 
These theories, many of which we use today in our company, do not lead to the 
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required performance improvement. Organisational change is not stimulated by a 
common vision of the solution, but by agreement on acceptance of the problem.  
 
To improve customer performance standards, conductors, working with technical 
systems and procedures, need to develop a new customer-oriented ‘social object’, 
a new generalised tendency to act in similar positions in similar ways. I argue that 
humans develop a ‘social object’ related to technology only when they are 
enabled to interact around technological change with other humans and are not 
required merely to interact with the technical object alone. The ‘social object’ can 
be developed through working in teams or in communities-of-practice. Members 
of teams have, most of the time, a common purpose. This way of working on 
improvement, especially with empowered teams, is to be preferred, but may not 
always be possible. In communities-of-practice, members work on common 
technical or procedural (improvement) problems and develop a ‘social object’ 
around common solutions. To eliminate the restricting boundaries of systems 
thinking, virtual teams- and communities-of-practice enable knowledge 
development to move freely throughout the organisation, leading to other forms of 
generalisation and new ‘social objects’ of the different groupings involved. 
According to a complex responsive process view on teams- and communities-of-
practice during face-to-face contact, virtual contact or a mixture of the two 
approaches, managers stimulate and enable local interactions around technological 
change. They have to become part of the development of the ‘social object’ 
(Tobin, 2003, pp. 156–157), within the economic and strategic constraints of their 
responsibility. These processes should lead to global company-wide performance 
improvements relating to customer requirements. We still have much work to do. 
Considered the size of the groups involved, it will take time, courage and patience 
before we will see the impact of these improvements on the customer evaluation 
figures of train services.  
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Synopsis and Critical Appraisal  
 
 
For Project One, I was asked to identify some of the key ideas that have shaped 
my thinking about my work in organisations. This led me to explain my attraction 
to particular historical leaders whom I admired for their strategic creativity and 
their commitment to the people they led into battle. Many managers today 
similarly look for such masterful examples in the management literature in order 
to find ways of identifying and copying the success of great leaders in their own 
work (van’t Hoff and Ogilvie, 1992; Kets de Vries and Engellau, 2003). It has 
become part of mainstream systems thinking about organisations to identify 
success with the ability of senior executives to design a strategy and then ensure 
its implementation in the organisation – that is, ‘management by objectives’. For 
most of my career I have been influenced by systems thinking and management 
by objectives (Drucker, 1957, 1966; Kepner and Tregoe, 1965; Humble, 1970;  
Reif and Bassford, 1973; Lievegoed, 1975; Blokland and Fischer, 1977; Jones, 
1977; Groot, 1977). This thinking focuses on designing structures, setting 
objectives, planning, and casting all management problems in systems terms to be 
solved by systemic methods, techniques and control. In Project One, I stated: 
‘Strategy means an elaborate and systematic plan of action’, where the strategic 
choice has to be decided by senior executives and then implemented under their 
control in the organisation. However, I was also well aware that the reality was 
not quite that simple. 
 
 
Growing awareness of problems in my thinking about the senior executive 
role 
 
In Project One, I pointed to how we often lose sight of the fact that not all of the 
actions of the masterful leaders we admire ended well, indeed that some even 
ended in disaster. This leads us to create unrealistic expectations of leaders 
(Tobin, 2003, p. 140). When I look back at my own experience, as at that of my 
famous examples, the important question is always how to preserve continuity and 
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improve organisational results and how much this comes back to ordinary hard 
work rather than depending on grand designs. In our company many good 
initiatives are taken up, developed by project teams and then implemented in the 
organisation. However, when the project teams cease to exist many of their good 
ideas dissolve into thin air. So, looking back, I can see how I also took some steps 
to thinking about non-linearity and positive feedback in systems dynamics theory 
and how this related to moving away from simple top-down leadership techniques 
(Blake and Mouton, 1970; Naisbitt and Aburdene, 1985; Senge, 1990). These 
authors, and other systems thinkers, have also questioned top-down approaches 
and the ability to control. According to Pettigrew (1997), Boonstra (2000), Kaplan 
and Norton (2004) and Mulder, Robroek and Stil (2006), between 70% and 90% 
of all planned reorganisations or objectives fail due to the fact that in many 
strategic approaches choices are still made by people in small groups at the top, 
initiated by macro strategic thinking, who try to implement these changes through 
power and conviction. 
 
By the time I got to Project Three I was questioning my earlier statement about 
strategy being systematic and decided by senior executives. In that Project, I 
described a merger process between two sales functions in our organisation that 
ran into periods of stopping and starting, even coming to a standstill. This merger 
process also seemed to suffer at several points from top-down control. Largely by 
intuition, partly influenced by being on the DMan Programme, I started to suggest 
that we involve middle management in the processes we were managing, sharing 
responsibilities with them and accepting the interdependencies in which people 
influenced each others’ behaviour (Mintzberg, 1987; Nonaka, 1988). From that 
moment, the project started flowing again. I explained this in terms of the 
development of strategy formulation and implementation at the same time 
involving a combination of horizontal and vertical strategy synthesis. I pointed to 
how in strategy literature there is a movement away from leadership exercising 
top-down strategic choice approaches and towards developing approaches that 
synthesise a thesis and an antithesis (Volberda and Elfring, 2001; Pettigrew, 
Thomas and Whittington, 2002b; de Wit and Meyer, 2005), or introducing a new 
focus on micro strategy (Whittington, 2001; Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 
2003). Others also question the contribution of today’s planning, control and 
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target-setting literature (for example, Hoogervorst, 1998, p. 85; Seddon, 2003, p. 
204; Hoogervorst, 2007, p. 49). Cools (2006) introduces trust-based management 
concepts in response to modern governance and control principles. These last 
observations about control and planning make room not only for the idea of 
formulating and implementing strategy at the same time, as presented in Project 
Three, but also for other forms of transformative strategy, which I will take up 
below.  
 
The following quote from Serres (to which I have added the word systems) 
summarises the story of today’s management struggles with insecurities and the 
search for some synthesis that usually ends in a cloud of many answers in which 
we still do not know which way to go: 
 
 The devil or the Good Lord? Exclusion, inclusion? Thesis or antithesis? The 
 answer is in a spectrum, a band, a continuum. We will no longer answer with a 
 simple yes or no to such question of sides. Inside or outside? Between yes and 
 no, between zero and one, an infinite number of values appear, and thus an 
 infinite number of answers. Mathematicians call this new rigour ‘fuzzy’: fuzzy 
 subjects, fuzzy topology. They should be thanked: We have needed this 
 fuzziness for centuries. While waiting for it, we seemed to be playing the piano 
 with boxing gloves on, in our world of stiff logic [and systems] with our broad 
 concepts. 
(Serres, 1982, p. 57)  
 
It is a recognition of the ‘fuzziness’ referred to here that has helped me better to 
understand how different aspects of leadership and organising interact in such a 
way as to lead to organisational change. Managers feel the need to be rational (van 
der Ven, 2006), but many times rationality leads to stuckness and black or white 
choices.  
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Taking a complex responsive processes perspective on the senior executive 
role: developing local responsibility 
 
In developing my knowledge about a complex responsive processes view, during 
the DMan programme, I started to think differently about the social processes 
managers participate in and the part they play in these processes. From a complex 
responsive process view, organisations are seen as global or population-wide 
patterns that emerge in local interaction. According to this approach, teams of 
executives, including senior executives, are also seen as patterns of local 
interaction. People acting in terms of local interaction or self-organisation are only 
interacting with a tiny portion of the total population they are part of. This is the 
case with professionals who have contact with customers, just as it is between 
members of executive teams. Not everybody has contact with everybody; people 
are interacting according to their own local principles, or local rules, not acting in 
accordance to rules centrally established and given to them as instructions. 
Executives often try to force people to behave the way they want, but will often 
have to admit that in practice, especially in large organisations, this does not work 
out in the way they had hoped. People do not act according to the generalised or 
idealised statement of top management, but are interpreting that generalisation in 
particular circumstances at a particular time. In these circumstances patterns of 
interaction emerge and develop in the complete absence of programme, plan or 
blueprint for the whole organisation, rather than being under the control of one or 
a few members of the organisation. Self-organisation produces diverse emergent 
patterns with the dynamics of stable instability. It is this diversity that produces 
novelty (Stacey, 2005a). Global organisational outcomes emerge in local 
interactions so that the ‘cause’ of the global, organisation-wide outcomes is not a 
central grand design but the many, many local interactions, not only of senior 
executives but also of all other organisational members. In this process the global 
and the local patterns are influencing each other at the same time, that is, in a 
paradoxical way.  
 
This perspective raises important management issues, particularly concerning the 
role of senior executives. It means that managers are not able to directly determine 
global organisational outcomes, but they are still held responsible for such 
 148 
outcomes by their organisation’s stakeholders. However, they can influence global 
outcomes through their own local interactions, indeed it is in these local 
interactions that they and others create global outcomes even though they cannot 
determine or control those outcomes. It is for this reason that senior executives 
should initiate and participate actively in local interactions in the organisation, 
even forcefully when necessary. This offers them a chance to influence, through 
their local participation, the global organisational patterns, which can be 
understood as ‘social objects’. Social objects, which I explore in Projects Two and 
Four, are historically evolved tendencies to act in similar ways in similar 
situations by groups of people in a common (working) environment (Mead, 1934). 
Such ‘social objects’ are characterised not only by the sharing of intentions and 
goals but also by conflicts involved in their power configurations. This approach, 
in which the senior executive is intentionally seeking to participate in the 
emergence of desirable ‘social objects’, requires a great deal of personal 
involvement and often knowledge about detailed processes and procedures.  
 
For many managers it is difficult to recognise how outcomes actually emerge in 
local processes. It becomes even more difficult when developments do not 
proceed as fast as everyone would like and outside pressure from stakeholders, 
boards, and politicians increases. I have had the experience of giving in to these 
pressures at a certain point in my career, described in Project One, even though 
this was against my normal natural behaviour at that stage of my life. I increased 
direct control, reduced the autonomy of my collaborators and introduced multiple 
forms of direct process steering in the organisation. Today I realise that I acted on 
an illusion of control that led to a destructive outcome with regard to the 
organisation I was responsible for in those days. It is at these moments of outside 
pressure that executives need to have confidence in themselves and in taking 
another approach to leading their organisation that requires them not to stop but to 
stimulate local interactions with their potential for new emergent outcomes. An 
example of this is the development of the successful international IT group BSO 
with 10,000 ‘co’ workers (Wintzen, 2006), which was built on a structure of a 
maximum of 50 people per cell, with one manager and great autonomy on the 
business level, a structure Wintzen compared with frog jelly. He very 
meticulously describes the relation between the general board and the cells, 
 149 
emphasising how he saw division of responsibilities between himself as senior 
executive and the managers of the cells. Mintzberg once compared this cell 
organisation with a church (Wintzen, 2006, p. 199). Churches and spiritual 
organisations indeed show many similarities with a cell structure. The cell 
structure ceased to exist after the company was taken over and two worlds 
collided, one of trust and one of control (ibid., 184). This is the same trust-based 
governance controversy that is explained by Cools (2006). Another example is the 
successful transformation of the Danish company Oticon S/A, world leaders in 
hearing-aid instruments (Morsing and Eiberg, 1998). From a traditional managed 
manufacturing company it changed into what the CEO Lars Kolind calls a 
spaghetti organisation. This metaphor sums up their ambition: it moves all the 
time and is never the same, everything is tangled up and yet it is possible to 
follow an element through (Morsing and Eiberg, 1998, p. 11). Morsing and Eiberg 
explain how a lot of people and incidences were entwined during the 
transformation process, which thus affected and impacted upon the people 
involved. She refers to the process as an excellent example of change as self-
organising. It is interesting to investigate the theoretical background of Wintzen’s 
and Kolind’s choices and look for similarities with a complex responsive process 
approach.  
 
Executives should realise that in terms of self-organisation, however ‘fuzzy’ that 
may seem, they cannot directly determine the global outcome of organisational 
goals; Wintzen and Kolind both realised and practised the value of this statement. 
I claim that it is this paradoxical approach of being responsible globally – but only 
being able to achieve results by participating locally to influence, to co-create, the 
‘social objects’ – that can lead to improved results. This approach stimulates 
emergent behaviour through teamwork and communities-of-practice of people 
contributing to the required organisational improvements. As I developed the four 
projects set out in this thesis, this became clearer, as did the necessary reflective 
behaviour as a basis of thought and action at the same time. I came to understand 
that what I was principally trying to do in my many local interactions and in those 
I tried to stimulate, even if I could not directly participate, was to help co-create a 
particular ‘social object’ to do with the taking of local responsibility. I assisted in 
the development of tendencies for people to act in a locally responsible manner 
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without continual central direction. I was trying to influence these local 
interactions to develop in a particular kind of pattern through discussion with local 
managers and professionals, resulting in the transformation of global intentions 
into local responsibilities, to bring about clearly improved performance behaviour 
and better results for the organisation. At a certain point, after many meetings, we 
discovered that a train route or line is the smallest measurable entity in our 
organisation close to customer awareness. Having concluded this, we asked 
volunteers to take responsibility for these train lines. Local managers and even 
conductors stepped forward to take on this responsibility. We had three times 
more volunteers than opportunities. From the day these local responsibilities were 
adopted and people at the local level started to develop their particular ‘social 
object’ on a specific train route, performance results started to improve. I have 
described this way of working together in Project Four, and I will come back to 
this example in another section of the synopsis because of its importance. 
 
What I am referring to here is transformative strategy. In transformative strategy, 
two opposites do not lead to strategy syntheses, as proposed in some of the 
literature, but to a dialectical new form. I reflected on this last perspective as an 
additional way of describing emergent strategy development (Grogan, Donaldson 
and Simmons, 2007), global strategic patterns are not directly determined by the 
global plans, programmes or intentions of senior executives but rather emerge in 
the local interactions in which the global intentions of senior executives are 
interpreted and made particular. The merger of two sales departments described in 
Project Three, extended over a long period of time, which enabled an ongoing 
inquiry with shifting questions and occasional answers and insights. The title of 
the dissertation points to how initiating, delegating and sharing responsibilities in 
local interactions in an organisation can lead to an accumulation of local 
improvement acts, resulting in a company-wide improved global result. Senior 
executives have to realise that results will not improve by signalling idealised 
leadership. My slogan is: talking about the figures does not improve results; top 
managers have to be involved in ordinary local activities. My focus is on large 
organisations because it is the kind of organisation I am responsible for and 
particularly with regard to the many top managers, who seem to think that only 
action on a global scale has any impact. I am arguing the opposite, that it is 
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cumulative local interaction that has the impact. After several years of 
experimenting I can say that it does not stop by talking about explanations and 
new ways of thinking. Working according to these ideas has shown that top-
management involvement really can lead to better results on many levels and in 
many responsibility areas of the company.  
  
In what follows in this synopsis, I will describe how my thinking has developed as 
I worked on the different projects set out above and how experimenting with and 
particularising day-to-day experiences from a complex responsive process view 
can lead to transformation of decision-making and organising. Suddenly there can 
be clarity as to how to proceed to the next step of the process following new ways 
not previously imagined, before entering a new period of fuzziness and 
uncertainty. I will explain how, as a senior executive in a large organisation, I 
started to work differently and potentially became more effective, despite the 
fuzziness of organisational day-to-day life, even accepting fuzziness as a normal 
fact of complex organisational life.  
 
To clarify how my thinking in the projects has developed, I will now list the steps 
that I will follow in the argument, expressing the way this thinking and my 
practice have moved and from which argument the final statement and 
contribution has been derived: 
  
1) Define the role of senior executives in local interaction producing emergent 
global outcome. What is different from other more conventional approaches, 
and how does it relate to a complex responsive process view?  
2)   Examine the essential role that conflict plays in the actions of senior 
executives, and how this means making distinctions between different kinds 
of conflict.  
3) Explore how local interaction, which includes the senior executive’s actions, 
is creating organisational identity, strategy and improvement.  
4) Technology plays an important part in my daily work. I will explain how I 
have come to think about technology, especially in relation to local human 
interaction. 
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5) What is the role of anxiety? What does anxiety mean in the development of 
our company’s improvement issues? 
6) Although there is much information showing that direct contributions of 
senior executives to final and global results is limited, senior executives are 
not without means to play a significant part. So I will explain what, in my 
view, senior executives can do.  
 
After the final statement about my own contribution, I will conclude with an 
indication of the limitations of the outcome of my research and what further 
research I might suggest to build on the argument and conclusion. 
 
 
1) A complex responsive process view on leadership as a key aspect of the 
senior executive role 
 
A key aspect of the role of senior executives is that of providing leadership. From 
a complex responsive processes perspective, leadership is viewed as ongoing 
processes of social interaction in which leaders participate – they are co-creating 
the emergent outcomes in which they are being recognised as leaders while 
recognising others’ roles. Leaders are not able to control these processes or 
predetermine the social recognition that constitutes leadership. For the leader this 
involves understanding oneself, and valuing oneself, as a member of a group 
(Tobin, 2003). Our understanding of leadership moves away from a macrocentric 
orientation to a paradoxical relationship between macro and micro that places the 
leader within and among the organisation, rather than above and without, and that 
calls for leadership to be understood as an organisational phenomenon, not as an 
individual role (Taylor, 2003). Badaracco (2002) describes the decision-making 
processes leaders go through as a small step-by-step process, focusing on micro 
processes, in which leaders experience periods of doubt, questions and uncertainty 
but still have to do what they are paid for. Shiel (2003) draws on Stacey, Griffin 
and Shaw (2000) who view organisations as processes characterised by unique 
patterns of interaction that are continually reproduced, always with the potential 
for change. Shiel sees himself as part of a leadership process (albeit a very 
influential part), and in this process only contributes to knowledge and the 
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creation of knowledge rather than being the one who can choose the outcome. 
Engaging in this process of knowing also means that one’s own knowing will be 
changed simultaneously. Learning about organisations, leadership and strategy 
will be experienced as aspects of the process of continually reproduced coherence 
of interactive communication with the potential for change that is the 
organisation. Tobin, Taylor and Shiel relate here to the development of a ‘social 
object’, in which identities of participants are transformed.  
 
In Project Four I described the development of a ‘social object’ during 
conversations between management and professional workers as a means of 
contributing to a better service performance level. This ‘social object’ was about 
the way people working on trains treated customers and about their consciousness 
regarding their primary responsibilities. An example: two people start working 
together on a train, one suggests making a control round, the other declines and 
wants to sit down and wait for a while. Discussing these kinds of dilemmas in 
groups with other colleagues gives management the opportunity to share their 
opinion and discuss what is needed to follow the suggestion of the first colleague. 
When the tendency to act in these similar situations changes and the group adapts 
another approach regarding their responsibilities, this also indicates a 
transformation in identity. Who are we, how do we act and how do people see us? 
Being a participant in this process, I as the leader can also influence the 
development of the social object, but will be influenced at the same time by this 
development. A manager who states: ‘I am in control’ (Stacey, 2003a) is in fact 
creating a paradox, because there is no manager actually in control (Streatfield, 
2001). Williams’ (2005a, 2005b) approach is helpful in explaining the relation 
between the individual and the group, as located in a social process. The identity 
of the manager is emerging in social interaction, where the interplay of gesture 
and response offers a means of understanding the emotional experiences of group 
participants. Also, during my work in the many large and small group processes I 
have described, I was part of the change of social relations between individuals 
and the change of meaning at the same time, the experiencing of interdependence 
without acknowledging this in a formal or explicit way. It is, however, sometimes 
helpful to create awareness of this interdependence during conversation, 
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especially when a) delegating responsibilities, b) real dependence is at stake, or c) 
organisational developments get stuck.  
 
It is at this point that I took up Stacey’s (2005a) and Williams’ (2005b) use of the 
notion of the interweaving of intentions (Elias, 1939) in which local patterns lead 
to global outcome. Exchange of ideas or intentions, enabled by particularised 
conversation, can lead to new ideas or even novelty, to new concepts not thought 
of before. Without this emerging novelty an organisation will ultimately reach an 
impasse. Allowing or even stimulating these patterns on many local levels will 
eventually lead to new patterns on a global level. The manager, however, remains 
responsible for managing the final responsibilities in ‘the network’, stimulating a 
participative free flow of intentions at local levels leading to unexpected but 
constructive outcomes on the population-wide level, as an unbounded nexus of 
interdependent relationships (Williams, 2005a, p. 56). For myself, encouraging 
the emergence of local patterns of interaction and participating when possible is 
an important issue, a role that can be taken up positively by executives who are 
not controlling but influencing the evolving patterns of interaction. The authors I 
have referred to explain a strong feeling of dependency in terms of how others 
will influence the final outcome. The difference in my approach, which I will try 
to explain below, is how as a manager I can forcefully initiate discussion on 
different levels and, by being present, can play a stronger role in connecting 
intentions and potential goals. These intentions or goals are not random. Based on 
my global responsibilities, I do not encourage any and all local interactions. I 
always keep some higher purpose in mind, such as a merger of functions, or an 
improvement in service, or meeting the difficulties of rosters and new timetables 
for trains. This approach shows many non-linear characteristics and is highly 
unpredictable in its outcome. It also elicits many of our normal habitual human 
patterns and reactions, when we start discussions or dialogues about subjects that 
do not hold the same importance for all participants. Many times during these 
kinds of conversations other subjects surfaced that had also to be addressed; 
people had their own agendas and ideas. Sometimes we found ourselves heading 
in a different direction encouraged by the personal fears or interest of one or more 
of the participants. Although it belongs to my responsibility to make sure that in 
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the end the subject of discussion is sufficiently met, allowing other peoples’ 
contributions is extremely important. 
 
To clarify more what happened during the periods of organising the meetings and 
writing the projects, I will highlight some of the important organisational and 
psychosocial aspects I became aware of and which were essential for my 
understanding. The first aspect of senior executive engagement in local 
interactions has to do with understanding the part played by conflict, which I deal 
with in the next section. 
 
 
2) Senior executive roles and the part conflict plays 
 
In Project Two I described the negotiation of a new labour agreement. Due to the 
fact that many of the social security laws in our country changed in the course of 
the project, the negotiation team developed the idea of inviting the unions to 
participate in a combined exploration of how these new laws would influence 
labour relations in our company. We did this by creating as many opportunities as 
possible to develop relationships with the union leaders and their representatives, 
enabling us to engage in deep discussion about differences, while holding off the 
actual negotiations as long as possible. In doing this, I argue, we were engaging in 
normal processes of conflictual interaction which I have called explorative 
conflict to distinguish it from the more common understanding of conflict as 
polarised, preventive, repressive, natural or normative.  
 
These sessions of explorative conflict started as a kind of coordinated coincidence 
which we, the negotiation team, then changed into a deliberate part of the 
negotiation process, experiencing the shifting of themes and the shifting of power 
relations between the people involved in the process. In the end this overt 
engagement in explorative conflict turned out to be a powerful aspect of the final 
success. We deliberately did not enter the expected negotiation mode, but stayed 
at the edge between explorative and polarised conflict during many local 
interactions about different subjects. Although the unions were pleased with the 
modern and constructive outcome, they later said that they missed the original 
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hard-line negotiations they were used to. At a later stage I came across the 
writings of Mette Morsing (1998a) about conflict as a driving force in project 
organisations. She considers project organisations to be an organisational form 
that is characterised by conflict, although she also recognises that conflict is an 
integral part of daily life in every company. Because social systems are so often 
dominated by stability, conflict discussed openly can increase the repertoire of 
reaction patterns surviving unstable conditions (Morsing, 1998a, pp. 93–94). In 
her findings she draws attention to the fact that the conflict perspective is 
unexplored. Many of my conclusions in Project Two could be considered as a 
next step in practical and theoretical development of the general discussion about 
conflict also related to her findings.     
 
For me it was the first step in experiencing the organising power of local patterns, 
discovering that the outcome of this local interaction strongly influenced the 
global outcome of the negotiation. At a certain point all members of our 
negotiation team started to recognise how interaction between local and global 
patterns could work, accepting that the global outcome, the result of the 
negotiations, could not directly be influenced. Based on this insight, we stimulated 
talks in small subgroups between union representatives and negotiation team 
members, about many subjects. In these smaller groups ‘social objects’ developed, 
which made team members realise the importance of their individual contributions 
on these local levels. Union members and company members started to give 
similar reactions to questions like: How shall we handle disability problems? 
What is our opinion on the development of our pension fund? What do we think 
of the development of job security combined with job reduction and job 
flexibility? In the development of a ‘social object’, it is noticeable that participants 
in a subgroup, comprised of members of different unions and various groups 
throughout the company, started to give similar reactions and answers on 
questions that had arisen in the big general negotiation meeting with everybody 
present. It is this generalisation process that also became important in our 
discussion on performance improvement described in Project Four. During the 
development of ‘social objects’ in subgroups, the identities of participants 
transform, and at the same time these participants transform the identities of the 
others (Stacey, 2005b), which I will explain more thoroughly in the next section.  
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With hindsight, it might seem like a smooth linear process without disruptions, 
but it certainly was not. Not all parties wanted to participate in local talks from the 
beginning. It took some time to become better acquainted with all the participants 
coming from opposite parties, with very surprising consequences – such as  
people starting to like each other and act accordingly. There is nothing wrong with 
liking each other, but it is not often part of the normal progression during 
negotiations. Critical exploration and questioning the habitual solutions is not a 
very popular way of interacting with others, because it challenges relations 
between people and opinions. A key aspect of negotiations is that parties always 
want more than the other is willing to give. Taking positions often means that 
people try to prevent conflict, which can lead to impasse or problems in the 
aftermath; or there is no other outcome than polarised conflict, which then has to 
be resolved. Although explorative conflict might sound like a continuous situation 
of tension, extremes in patterns of relations are reduced, which gives more 
opportunity for generalisation and particularisation processes and the development 
of ‘social objects’ as described by Mead (1934).  
 
On the other hand, exploring conflictual situations always involves taking risks, 
which is one of the reasons that managers try to stay away from it. The essential 
part of exploring conflict is awareness of the role of local patterns in developing 
new insights, or novelty, on a global level. During the negotiations, inviting 
people from different parties to investigate solutions on partial subjects prevented 
a quick escalation of the total negotiation process. Bringing together the different 
partial solutions and the ‘social objects’ of the subteams helped in finalising the 
negotiations in a progressive way. It was notable how during the negotiations one 
of the union leaders came to our rescue when we made a mistake. This would 
probably not have happened during traditional negotiation processes. Conflict 
plays a central part in management processes, and is of relevance to management 
and leadership generally in all situations. Approaching conflict as a natural part of 
the exploration of opinions and meaning can contribute to better results and 
relations.  
 
In this section, I have explained my experiences of working with conflict as an 
important general part of management processes and following the development 
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of ‘social objects’ and the transformation of identities. In the next section, based 
on my first conscious experiences with the organisational force of local 
interactions, I will go one step deeper in examining the relation of patterns and 
identity in relation to organisational change and strategy. 
 
 
3) Local and global patterns of identity and image 
 
The second aspect of the senior executive role in local interactions that I want to 
describe has to do with the interdependent matters of identity and strategy. If 
emergent local patterns in organisations offer such a powerful opportunity, why is 
it that managers are not more aware that this is how organisations develop? 
During the development of ‘social objects’ in local interactions, the identities of 
participants are transformed. In certain cases, the identities of people working in 
our company need to change. There is, however, no way that management can 
directly force this change process. Senior executives can play a key role in the 
emergence of identity by linking conflictual processes with the emergence of 
identity. Griffin (2002, p. 193) focuses strongly on the relation of conflict and 
identity and states that the transformation of identity through conflict is probably a 
more intense process of transformation than other forms because conflict holds a 
higher level of emotion and tension compared with other forms of interaction. He 
also focuses on the difference between cult leadership and functional leadership. 
Cult values, like cult leadership, are the idealisation of standards of the world or 
the organisation in which we live or work. Functional leadership, experienced by 
the people belonging to the group that is led, evolves in the context of day-to-day 
interaction in which they and other participants are continuously recreating their 
identity as they construct their future in terms of enabling the constraints of the 
past (Griffin 2002, p. 196). In doing so, Griffin (2002, p. 194) relates to Mead, 
who sees conflict as being at the very core of his theory of ethics and leadership 
and states that it is through conflict that we are continuously recreating our world 
and becoming ourselves, that is, locating our identity. 
 
Elias (1970) describes interaction between human groupings in terms of patterns 
of power relations in which people are included and excluded from particular 
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groupings. It is this process of power relating that creates the identity of the 
individual (‘I’ identity) and of the group (‘we’ identity). Power is a structural 
characteristic of all relationships, and so is always present in all our (inter)actions, 
both good and bad (Elias, 1970, p. 74). Dependency on others gives rise to power, 
and when we need more from others than they need from us the power ratio is 
titled to them. Collinson (2003) questions the traditional conceptions that treat 
power as a solely negative and repressive property possessed by a ‘higher’ 
authority and exercised in a top-down fashion. All the above-mentioned aspects of 
behaviour were important when we discussed the need we felt to organise and 
facilitate as many meetings as we could, knowing we took a risk talking about 
potential critical outcomes. In this way, management could participate in the 
discussions about all the important areas of development in our company. I have 
described the many interactions that my colleagues and I had with our 
professional staff, related to my reflection on the patterns of interaction, 
interdependencies and identity transformation; but can the role executives play 
during these processes influence the final outcome?  
 
During the development process described in Project Four, we did not have much 
time because stakeholders were demanding improvements in our performance. So, 
taking up my responsibility, I used the experiences of the union negotiations and 
the merger of sales functions to initiate a quality-improvement process on a much 
larger scale but in a much shorter period of time. In this project I explained what 
happens when designed technical systems are used to influence the performance 
levels of people working with these systems, concluding that simple reliance on 
technical systems does not lead to the required improvements. As in the previous 
projects, so in this case we also organised and facilitated many meetings 
throughout the organisation. If organisational development is understood as 
meetings during which we converse (Shaw, 2002), there is a danger that people 
will dismiss this as ‘just talking’. Shaw describes complicated processes of change 
arising in conversation in a way that seems almost unrealistically simple, but our 
experiments with this on a small scale during the events in Projects Two and 
Three gave us enough confidence to really expand on these ideas in Project Four. 
Over the past year, more than 3000 people have participated in discussing whether 
we have to change our approach to customers and public, and, if we do, then how 
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we can achieve this. Many of the developments I describe started by inviting a 
group of people to discuss some given subject by just starting to talk about it. 
Once involved, the group was more or less forced by circumstances to sit down 
and talk when situations got stuck. Other authors who influenced these processes 
were Swieringa and Jansen (2005), who emphasised the importance of engaging 
the hidden, unspoken of feelings of those involved. During these enquiries we 
often encountered the unexpected, resulting in a shifting of themes or the 
necessity to change the process. This process of discussion is once again 
characterised by the ‘explorative conflict’ discussed in Project Two.  
 
Many managers would prefer to have direct control over all developments in their 
organisation. Exceptions can be found in the cell-structure development of BSO 
as a high-end IT information service company with 10,000 co-workers. This 
development stopped shortly after the company was sold to another market party 
and the founder and CEO stepped back (Wintzen, 2006), emphasising the role of 
the leader. Lars Kolind of Oticon was able to continue his approach based on 
many similar starting points. Suggesting another approach, one in which through 
self-organisation and development of local patterns performance may improve, 
needs a lot of conviction. However in special cases managers are not always 
certain that they are in control. I have looked for examples where the executive 
community accepts the unpredictability of their actions and knows that they are 
dependent on the development of many patterns of interaction, both inside and 
outside the company. Next to the unpredictable behaviour of stock value, this is 
also the case in matters of organisational identity, corporate identity and image. It 
is interesting to discover that managers accept that they do not have direct control 
over these issues. Many of the complex responsive process views are brought into 
practice when executives have to deal with the uncertainties of the market when 
communicating with outside stakeholders. Executives are aware that this 
communication affects the way the public is seeing and evaluating the 
performance of their company. Public opinions are influenced by how the 
company perceives its corporate identity and develops a corporate image. The 
image of the organisation directly influences the identity of people working in the 
organisation. This approach is supported by Morsing (1998b), who describes how, 
during a comprehensive change process in Oticon, change of organisational self-
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categorisation (identity) was mediated by a simultaneous change of external 
reference (image). How we are perceived by others buying or using our products 
and services is very much part of who I am. These personal identities lead to an 
organisational identity, who we are, which in turn develops into a ‘social object’ 
and influences peoples’ tendencies to act on performance in particular situations.  
 
To clarify some of the ideas on how executives think they can influence processes 
of identity formation of people in the organisation, I want to make a short detour. 
In a qualitative research project by van der Jagt (2005) into views held by the 
senior management of the largest Dutch companies on corporate communication 
and reputation, it was found that chairmen consider responsibility for 
communication to be an important part of their own leadership role. Their motives 
were either extremely offensive or defensive. All chairmen were persuaded of the 
power of a strong reputation. 
  
 Our external communication is therefore also aimed at employees. Indeed: 
 half of our advertising budget is in fact directed internally. 
(van der Jagt, 2005, p. 183) 
  
In general, 20% to 35% of a CEO’s time was spent on communication about 
reputation. For some, it was even their top priority. Damage to a reputation can be 
a powerful brand killer. Feelings are strongly influenced by the interplay between 
our organisational and corporate identity and the company’s corporate image, the 
image we try to sustain with the general public and the customer. I think that 
judging by this research project, there can be no doubt about the importance of 
what CEOs think about the identity development of their employees and 
organisations. 
 
During the merger process described in Project Three, the position of the groups 
from International changed from excluded outsiders into included or established, 
transforming the identities of both national and international groups. Stacey 
(2005b) sees organisations as temporal processes, the ongoing action of 
communication that is simultaneously both co-operative and competitive, the 
patterns of relations between bodies. In these ordinary experiences, our selves, our 
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identities are iterated and potentially transformed, from one present time to 
another. Organisations are not created as things or organisms separate from and 
outside ourselves as individuals, existing as some kind of supra-system above us 
that then affects us. According to Stacey, organisations cannot have an identity. 
Instead, organising is the thematic, narrative patterning of our communicative 
interaction, which actually constitutes the identities of each of us, while at the 
same time we constitute that communicative interaction. ‘Who I am’ is always 
inseparable from ‘who we are’. It is this same interaction process during the 
merger that created a feeling of belonging for the new group. Organisations are 
‘social objects’ and cult values, involving the real activities of imagination, which 
we are making particular in our ordinary everyday activities. It is in these 
activities that we are continually iterating and potentially transforming our very 
selves, our identity.  
 
This identity transformation is one of the key reflections in Project Four when 
discussing the performance-improvement aspects of conductors working with 
technology. Technical systems alone cannot improve performance levels; it is the 
conversation and particularisation of social objects in day-to-day activities 
between the participants that will transform the identities needed in these 
improvement processes. On the other hand, technical systems can be helpful and 
are sometimes necessary in supporting these developments. One of the amazing 
aspects after finalising the merger described in Project Three was that there has 
never been any serious disagreement between participants about the new situation. 
This shows that in the development of a new ‘social object’, peoples’ identities 
can transform and at the same time become established, and ‘outsider’ feelings are 
eliminated or transformed. 
 
It is through these examples that I try to explain that thinking of organisations as 
patterns of interaction or networks is nothing new; but are we aware of it? 
Reflecting on these processes from a complex responsive process view changes 
the mental position of the executive, who becomes more aware of how he or she 
can become more effective in their interactions not only with people who do not 
belong to the organisation, but also with those who certainly do. Organisational 
identity is constructed via similar processes with outsiders – for instance, 
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customers, media, rivals and regulatory institutions. Mulholland et al. (2006), in 
their book Mashup Corporations and van Grieken, Klokgieters and Tolido (2007) 
remove from their thinking the (virtual) boundaries between the organisation and 
the outside world, entering flexible forms of co-operation with partners and 
customers based on a service-oriented architecture. In this approach, customer 
relations define organisational structure. This thinking has consequences for the 
awareness of organisational image, as it removes the difference between inside 
and outside images; it can change the interaction between image and identity of 
the organisation and its environment, also affecting traditional views on 
organisational structures. 
 
What I have highlighted in this section regarding social interactions and identity 
are not the only important issues regarding performance improvement in an 
organisation in which technology plays such an important role. I have already 
made a few references to the role of technology in the improvement of services. In 
the next section, I want to come back to and explore further the role of technology 
in local social interactions 
 
 
4) Technology and local social interactions 
 
In Project Four, I have described how in our organisation technology leads almost 
every decision-making process, in which the dominant way of thinking is that the 
organisation is built around many technical and logistic systems, not taking into 
account the position of our operational staff on trains and platforms. Operational 
questions like ‘How do we improve our performance?’ are answered by looking 
for better technical solutions. The relations between humans and technology can 
be described in many ways. Technology can be seen as a mainly physical object. 
We can think of technical systems interacting with groups of people as a social 
system, in which humans do not have to adapt fully to organisational and 
technical frameworks (Ropohl, 1999). In actor–network theory, technology is as 
important as people, who are considered an equal part of the network. In our 
organisation we have tried many of these approaches, which did not lead to the 
necessary improvement of our operational processes.  
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Another approach I have described towards technology and social relations is the 
theory of complex responsive processes, in which people form and are formed by 
technical systems that are understood as both physical and ‘social objects’ at the 
same time (Johannessen and Stacey, 2005). Although this comes much closer to 
my own ideas, I was still not satisfied enough with this explanation. I argue that 
physical objects have a function in the emergence of the ‘social object’, but they 
are only subject to the interaction between people. Physical objects constrain and 
enable what people can do, but cannot be part of the ‘social object’ itself, in my 
view technical systems are created by people and people work with the technical 
system as part of their day-to-day responsibilities.  
 
 The social act is restricted to the class of acts which involve the cooperation of 
 more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act, in the sense 
 of Bergson, is a social object  
(Mead, 1925, p. 263). 
  
Is it possible to develop a ‘social object’ when people are working on a highly 
individualistic basis with technology? Orr (1996) and Wenger (1998) developed 
the idea of communities-of-practice. These are formed by people who do not work 
as a team on a daily basis – such as repair technicians in the copier industry – but 
who are asked to solve mutual organisational or technical machine problems. 
Introduction of communities-of-practice creates the opportunity of developing 
focused ‘social objects’ within groups of people responsible individually for our 
day-to-day performance. People can become key in decision-making processes in 
which technology is involved. In practice, the development of ‘social objects’ in 
communities-of-practice and in general meant provoking local interaction, either 
by myself or by one of my colleagues, and then being present as much as possible. 
I certainly believe that this had an impact on the development of the ‘social 
objects’ of many groups in the organisation. The ‘social objects’ are evolving in 
local parts of the organisation and affect image, identity, leadership and strategy. 
In fact, the manager must shake many trees to see what might come down. 
However, no matter how interesting this may sound, a ‘wait and see’ attitude will 
not be enough to realise fast improvement of our key performance areas.  
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In our team of directors, we agreed to rethink our local responsibility areas to 
understand how improvements could be made measurable and accountable. Our 
present local responsibility areas comprise groups of people whose operational 
results can be accounted for only on a global level, not for the specific group in 
which they work. We invited 250 of our middle managers to attend two sessions 
and explained our main concerns. We challenged them to start thinking about how 
the necessary performance improvement could be organised and accounted for on 
a local level. We also suggested looking back to previous experiences; there had 
been some successful projects over recent years. What we were trying to do was 
not ‘ordinary’ empowerment or team-building of our local management, although 
in Project Four I have stated that empowered people perform better. In reality, 
empowerment has more to do with a state of mind, identity, than with defining 
what this power should be. Traditional empowerment has to do with (top) 
management giving power to others, as if power is something only possessed by a 
select group of top executives. From a complex responsive process view, power is 
not something possessed by a few but a characteristic of all relationships (Elias, 
1970; Collinson, 2003). In our case, again as in Project Three, we needed middle 
management to take up responsibility for a part of our company performance on 
local level (Nonaka, 1988), not transferring power but actually together 
developing a responsibility area without a pre-planned blueprint.  
 
The result of the discussion was the introduction of train line/ route management. 
Our company operates 65 train lines, standard train connections between two 
cities, at regular intervals during the day; some are short and some can be very 
long, crossing the country. The operational results of these lines can be presented 
in terms of our measurement standards of punctuality, service attitude and travel 
information. It is the same sort of information that we present on a company-wide 
level, knowing that we cannot directly influence performance standards at that 
global level. Our regional directors and managers asked for volunteers who would 
take up the job of managing a train line, in addition to their present tasks. Our 
controlling department developed a reporting model in which actual results of 
train series could be evaluated at a local level. Numbers are extremely important 
because they can make the difference between talking about one’s work and 
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talking about one’s responsibility. This way, executive management accepts that a 
greater part of the outcome of our global responsibilities will be in the hands of 
local managers, and they will discover ways of dealing with sometimes 
complicated local situations and relations. We agreed not to change the way our 
professional staff normally execute their daily tasks, and we agreed that we would 
not make changes in the organisational structure, even after having received 
several requests to do so. Despite the fact that we did not think it was necessary, 
we also did not want a repetition of the 2001 events (the major strike) if people 
got the idea we would try once again to introduce standardisation of work 
patterns.  
 
The development of the described ‘social objects’ in Project Four entered a new 
dimension. As I have explained in Project Four, conductors and drivers are not 
connected to specific train lines but work on different lines all around the country. 
From the perspective of work variety, this is a positive point. Managers who are 
normally responsible for organising the availability of members of their own 
groups for different train lines had to volunteer to take up additional specific train-
line responsibility, in a non-formalised, virtual structure. When they are awarded a 
train line we suggest that they organise communities-of-practice with members of 
their own group or with members of other groups, who at least have regular 
working experience on the chosen train line. In these communities-of-practice 
(Wenger, 1998) they can talk about performance items at train-line level and 
discuss what should be done to improve performance. During these conversations 
a ‘social object’ can develop on how they will act on their train-line and stimulate 
others to do the same. From this point on, managers and professionals will be able 
to influence their own results. These results will add up to the global outcome, in 
which the global outcome influences the local-level discussions. It is this 
combination of working with communities-of-practice and the awareness of the 
development of ‘social objects’ in groups that presents novelty in organisational 
change on a local-responsibility level. 
 
Again as executives, although the organisation is large, we do participate 
extensively in the local processes, helping to focus on the really important issues; 
and certainly it still costs a lot of energy to get things going. Many of our middle 
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managers still do not feel confident enough to invite drivers and conductors to 
form communities-of-practice and ask them how they think professionals can 
contribute to the performance improvement of specific train lines. Some managers 
find it difficult to ask employees for their advice about what has to be done and to 
start sharing responsibilities instead of sitting down alone to develop a plan. 
Initiating these talks is one of senior executive’s most important tasks. As 
executives, we are deliberately provoking opportunities for discussion in which 
‘social objects’ can evolve when the strategy develops. We know what our global 
ambitions about the ‘social object’ are; we have our own idealised view on how 
we would like them to develop. However, we don’t feel we have to describe this 
local strategy in advance. This view differs from traditional macro strategy 
concepts, but relates to the micro strategic thinking described in Project Three. 
Another important aspect described in Project Three is the ‘established’ and 
‘outsider’ behaviour (Elias and Scotson, 1965) of the people who participated in 
the merger process of the two sales departments. In these developments, it became 
clear how strongly feelings of anxiety can develop.  
 
When people ask why all communities-of-practice do not develop at the same 
pace, anxiety is an important issue to slow developments down. People want to be 
heard; they want their contributions taken seriously, however, when suddenly the 
opportunity is offered to participate, many feel considerable anxiety that 
withholds them from doing so. Is this simply anxiety about speaking up? In a 
recent television programme, people from our company were only willing to be 
interviewed when they could not be recognised on screen. Is it anxiety about us, 
their managers, about each other, about change – what difference does anxiety 
make to the contributions people feel prepared to offer? In the next section, I will 
come back to the relation of anxiety and the development of local patterns.   
 
 
5) Another aspect of local interaction: anxiety 
 
In all the local interactions I have been describing, there is always the important 
potential for anxiety and the effect this can have on what happens. Houchin and 
MacLean (2005) suggest that anxiety makes organisations stabilise over time, as 
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stabilisation is one of the primary defences against anxiety. Nitsun (1996, pp. 
248–249) describes anxiety as the basis of deployment of ‘social defences’ in 
which people retreat from role, task, and organisational boundaries into fantasised 
solutions and self-created boundaries. Dalal (2002, p. 181) relates anxiety to 
exclusion, the fear being that the excluded will resent and attack, making this a 
fact of existence. In certain cases this can explain why (middle) managers 
sometimes will not enter the discussion when groups in our company do not 
perform or do not behave in a way we think we agreed upon. In those cases there 
is anxiety on the part of management to confront individuals or groups because of 
their possible negative reaction – or worse, looking at the 2001 strike events. 
These reactions present anxiety and aggression more as part of our day-to-day 
relational processes, rather than as internal energies. It is fundamental to trace the 
sources of fear-inducing members of a society to understand the control of 
conduct that a society imposes on its members and in which the degree of anxiety 
is different in every class and historical phase (Elias, 1939, pp. 441–442). Anxiety 
is an inevitable companion of shifts in themes that organise the experience of 
relating because such shifts create uncertainty, particularly uncertainty around 
individual and collective identities. Organisational change also affects personal 
change and the ways people make sense of and experience themselves, again 
threatening personal and collective identities. The way in which people live with 
anxiety is crucial to organisational change and innovation (Stacey, 2003a, p. 418).  
 
I have summarised the views developed on the nature of local interaction and 
some social implications of how this impacts upon global outcomes. I now come 
to the matter of just what it is that senior executives in large organisations can 
actually do to be more effective, given that they cannot directly determine those 
outcomes. 
 
 
6) What senior executives can do 
 
Senior executives are held responsible by stakeholders for global (total) 
organisational results. From the complex responsive processes perspective I have 
been taking, these results cannot be directly determined at the global level itself, 
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so senior executives need to be aware that global outcomes will depend on the 
way local responsibilities are defined and taken up by managers and professionals 
operating locally in the organisation. For senior executives, this means being 
responsible and dependent at the same time. So what are their options?  
 
I will go back to the example of organisational image. Organisational image 
influences the identity of individual members of an organisation, which directly 
leads to change of organisational identity through the interaction between the ‘I’ 
identity and the ‘we’ identity. Leaders cannot directly determine organisational 
identity because they are simultaneously part of this identity while it is part of 
their identity. They are thus participants in the processes of influencing others and 
being influenced by others at the same time. Organisational image, or more 
specifically corporate image, can certainly be influenced by senior executives; but 
the outcome remains unpredictable. Marketers have focused on the concept of 
corporate identity; the behaviourists have emphasised organisational identity. 
According to Balmer and Wilson (1998), little cross-fertilisation of ideas takes 
place, although both areas of knowledge are well developed and mutual 
recognition is increasing based on the strong link between marketing and 
organisational behaviour with regard to corporate identity scholarship. They 
advise organisational behaviourists to be sensitive to the likely effects of corporate 
identity, because corporate identity is a complex phenomenon and it is dangerous 
to think that it can easily be managed. Advertising agencies and communication 
advisors can influence this outside image. The changing image that public has of 
an organisation affects the identity of its members. Leaders are not without any 
means to readjust outside image and reputation, let alone their personal role in 
communication and PR activities, as we have seen in van de Jagt’s (2005) survey. 
Dynamic interactions through direct contact between employees of the 
organisation and the public – customers – will have effects on organisational 
image. Interaction between both groups will influence the identity of the customer 
as well as the identity of the employee. In fact, this identity change will be part of 
the ‘social object’ of train staff and people using train transport, comparable to – 
for example – the attitude people have developed on how to behave when entering 
a hospital. The executive is participating in local patterns both inside and outside 
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the organisation, influencing the development of the ‘social object’ around the 
image of the organisation as much as they can.  
 
Another option is to initiate and facilitate as many interaction and communication 
events as possible at all levels of the organisation, inviting people to conferences 
in order to challenge them and start discussions about organisational intentions 
such as performance improvement, financial results, quality items and 
organisational structures. Senior executives need to realise that they can never 
determine any global outcome (Wintzen, 2006). Lars Kolind states that there is 
never a breakthrough that has occurred by writing a memo; breakthroughs occur 
when two or more people get together, get inspired, have fun, think the 
unthinkable (Morsing and Eiberg, 1998). Only by sharing intentions and putting 
an enormous amount of energy into many meetings and discussions can a senior 
executive maximise their influence in many local-level discussions. It also means 
that in particular circumstances, executives need to develop a detailed 
understanding of processes in the organisation, as this is what communication is 
about when interacting at a local operational level. The senior executive needs to 
try to arrange for the circle of people participating in intentional local interactions 
to be as wide as possible, offering more chances to achieve more favourable 
organisation-wide outcomes. This process is non-linear and dynamic, the outcome 
unpredictable; but, as I have described in the four projects above, senior 
executives can make a difference.  
 
As mentioned before, many senior executives would like to have direct strategic 
control over global organisational performance, so producing the required results. 
This wish is quite natural given the fact that senior executives are held responsible 
by stakeholders for the total, global, results an organisation is achieving, from a 
performance and financial perspective. When results and performance do not 
match the original planning, an organisational change programme is often initiated 
to take measures to improve organisational results. Several authors have pointed 
out that between 70% and 90% of these planned reorganisations fail (Pettigrew, 
1997; Boonstra, 2000; Kaplan and Norton, 2004; Mulder, Robroek and Stil, 
2006). However, when senior executives approach organisational change from a 
complex responsive process view they accept a paradoxical position of being in 
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control and not in control at the same time (Streatfield, 2001). They then 
understand that their role is to encourage people working in the organisation to 
take control over their own work and so give the emergence of new ideas more of 
a chance, potentially leading to better results. During this enabling process people 
will develop their identity, supported by recognition of their abilities and position 
and a feeling of belonging. New responsibility areas like train-route management 
can emerge, creating new local patterns but with clear and negotiated mutual KPIs 
between managers and their executives, like those presented in Project Three 
(Lowe and Jones, 2004). New cross-reference responsibility definitions are locally 
developed and will be supported when these responsibilities contribute to global 
KPIs and can be managed locally.  
 
An example of this is the recent formation of instruction and coaching teams 
formed by managers on trains, not related to their own groups; this formation is in 
cooperation with train-route management and is an example of a chain reaction in 
the emergence of local responsibilities. Improvement results can be locally 
measured and communicated with professionals providing the services, like 
conductors. This new responsibility definition does not change organisational 
structure, but can contribute heavily to performance improvement. Numbers play 
an important part in being able to discuss the outcome of accepted responsibilities. 
Managers need the participation of professionals at a local level to achieve results, 
as I have extensively explained in earlier sections: local interaction is crucial to 
achieve result improvement globally. People’s personal identities and 
organisational identities are important performance aspects in an organisation and 
will develop in the interplay of intentions between individuals and groups in 
patterns of interaction, together forming the organisation.  
 
A complex responsive view helps executives to be aware that organisations 
develop as local patterns leading to global, organisation-wide outcomes in which 
these local patterns and global processes interact and influence each other and 
from which new shared local responsibility areas emerge. Looking back at the 
examples of historical leaders in Project One, it is said that many of them spent 
the night before a battle with their men to increase their confidence. It could well 
be possible that they used this local interaction to influence the ‘social object’: 
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how to fight together, their strategy and focus on interdependency. Executive 
teams are local patterns that cannot determine directly the outcome of the total, 
global, organisation. Local patterns develop through conversation. It is through 
talking together that participants develop local patterns in which their personal 
identity is transformed along with the identity of their group. The interplay of 
local intentions, interdependencies and global processes will lead to organisational 
identity, answering the question: ‘Who are we, and what do we stand for?’. 
Finding this answer together is important for people because the participative 
process can develop feelings of belonging, involvement and recognition and 
reduce feelings of anxiety. During such participation they are co-creating the 
further development of the ‘social object’ of their group, as they engage in power 
configurations and conflict. In the projects described above, as senior executives 
we were deliberately provoking opportunities for discussion as much as we could. 
The problem with this approach is that it requires a great deal of personal 
involvement and can be endangered by its time-consuming nature. It was 
important to share ideas and responsibilities with the team colleagues I am 
directly involved with, as this created an opportunity for sharing views and 
exerting influence on a larger scale. We know what our global ambitions about the 
‘social object’ are; we know where we need to improve, and will use all our 
influence and power to achieve better results; and we know what our own 
responsibilities are. It is difficult for managers to let developments lead their own 
way; this becomes even more difficult when developments do not proceed as fast 
as everyone would like. It is at such times that executives need to have confidence 
in another approach of leading their organisation, and not disturb but stimulate the 
emergent properties of local patterns.  
 
Although this thesis is a personal account stating that I have not been able to 
directly determine the results and performance improvement of the organisations 
we have been responsible for, I think I have been able to make a difference, but 
not alone. Most of the ideas emerged during interaction with my colleagues in the 
executive team and directors and professionals in the field. Certain developments 
would not have taken place if we had not taken the initiative. Awareness of the 
highlighted organisational aspects of patterns of interaction, interdependencies, 
the ‘social object’, generalisation, identity transformation and detailed knowledge, 
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and overall responsibilities have played an important role in the choices I have 
made and suggested during the last three years. Choices which finally should lead 
to shared responsibilities between managers and professionals, questioning 
traditional organisational structures. Other executives in my place might have 
taken other initiatives with different results. During the work on the four projects, 
and in reflecting on them, my thinking about my role as the leader has shifted 
from believing that I ought to be designing the future and motivating people to act 
accordingly, to the view that I should be facilitating and leading the local 
participation of many others, co-developing local responsibilities. This shifting of 
thought does not make any difference regarding my ultimate personal 
responsibilities, ambitions and performance levels; on the contrary, I believe that 
working according to a complex responsive process view will in the end lead to 
potentially better results.  
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Critical appraisal 
 
This thesis describes my personal experience of my own subjective choices. Other 
managers would probably have made other choices. It relates to unique situations 
in which different people would act differently, meaning that we cannot say in 
general what action a particular situation calls for, nor can we predict what the 
outcomes of particular actions will be. Some could even argue that the exercise is 
all rather pointless without prescriptive suggestions. Is this a limitation or a 
drawback of the method? In my opinion, it is certainly not. I do realise the 
difficulties that subjectivity and uniqueness pose; but these are central aspects of 
my experience, and several authors have supported this approach with their 
experiences, so what is to be done? Knowledge cannot be stored, nor can 
intellectual capital be measured or managed. I can share my own experience with 
others and tell the stories in patterned narrative-like forms in which there is no 
difference between experiencing and learning, occurring as a shift of meaning. 
Learning in this view is an activity of interdependent people and is simultaneously 
individual and social (Stacey, 2001; Stacey, 2003b, p. 331). The intention of 
sharing the experiences described in this thesis is that other managers might 
question their own habitual approaches and so come to act differently rather than 
simply repeating conventional actions which some research has shown do not 
work. Discussion of the ideas and specific situations in this thesis may well 
provoke thought in others, leading them to thinking differently; and this could 
contribute to further knowledge development by these other managers. Of course, 
what I have set out is not a textbook and provides no set of prescriptions, which is 
a limitation if one thinks from the conventional management perspective. 
However, from the perspective I have taken, this is a limitation we need to 
confront – general prescriptions for predictably successful global outcomes may 
well be impossible. But we can still say something about what not to do in general 
as we go about looking for what to do in specific situations.  
 
A complex responsive process perspective has led me to think about some entirely 
new concepts, some of which were very helpful and challenging, like the 
development of a ‘social object’, awareness of the importance of local and global 
processes, and paradox as an important aspect of management life. Some more 
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familiar concepts have introduced themselves in other parts of the research, like 
power, inclusion, exclusion, responsibility, leadership and strategy. Although 
these concepts are more common, in different ways they can potentially be much 
more helpful in my day-to-day work as a senior executive responsible for 
satisfying customers, government and stakeholders. I set out the key features of 
this shift in thinking which underlies taking a different view of prescriptions. 
 
  
Complex responsive process thinking versus systems thinking  
 
Earlier in this synopsis I referred to a quote from Serres (1982, p. 57) about a new 
awareness of ‘fuzziness’ in life and organisations, in our world of stiff logic and 
broad concepts. This fuzziness helps us to move away from a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
in very general terms to embracing the particularisation in specific situations of 
the general. I have used his quote to better understand the importance of fuzziness 
of leadership and management, moving away from the need for managers always 
to be rational (van der Ven, 2006). In the same quote of Serres, I have added ‘[and 
systems]’, intending a departure from systemic thinking. This last addendum is not 
easily accepted by many of my colleagues or the academics with whom I have 
been sharing my ideas. Systems theory literature comprises vast contributions 
from many authors and scientists about systems in different forms and 
appearances, as described in Jackson (2000), Midgley (2000) and partly 
elaborated in Project 4. According to Checkland (1981), systems thinking can be 
seen as a reaction to the failure of natural sciences when confronted with complex 
real-world problems set in social systems (Jackson, 2000, p. 2). My opinion is that 
thinking about organisations in complex responsive process terms can be seen as a 
reaction to the failure of systems thinking (Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 2000). In a 
complex responsive process approach, organisations are considered to be 
temporary patterns of interaction between participants, including leaders and 
managers, in which thinking in terms of systems is replaced by the awareness of 
local patterns of interaction and ‘social objects’  
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There is no blame 
 
We all tend to blame someone – the competitors, the press, the changing 
mood of the marketplace, the government – for our problems. Systems 
thinking shows us that there is no separate ‘other’; that you and the someone 
else are part of a single system. The cure lies in your relationship with your 
“enemy”.  
(Senge, 1990, p. 67)  
 
I can agree with Senge’s starting-point in this statement, but it will come as no 
surprise that I do not agree with the suggested solution. Thinking, according to the 
complex responsive process approach, develops around the existence of the 
separate ‘other’, as it is through the other and ourselves that we develop our 
identity and our social behaviour, not focusing on the existence of a system but on 
the development of a ‘social object’. Kozulin (1986, p. xxiv) describes how 
Vygotsky (1979) explains that socially meaningful activity can serve as a 
generator of consciousness. A first step to concretisation of this principle was the 
suggestion that individual consciousness is built from the outside through 
relations with others, and that we are aware of ourselves because we are aware of 
the other. In relation to ourselves, we are in the same position as others are to us. 
Kozulin also relates this thinking to Mead’s (1934) significant symbol 
development. Mead (1934, pp. 47–48) states that the procedure responsible for the 
genesis and existence of mind or consciousness – namely the taking of the attitude 
of the other towards one’s self, or toward one’s own behaviour – also necessarily 
involves the genesis and coexistence of significant symbols, or significant 
gestures.  
 
Senge (1990) also thinks of an organisation in holistic terms, as does de Geus 
(1997) when he portrays not only the economic aspects but also the psychological, 
sociological, and anthropological aspects of a living company using the following 
characteristics: 
   
1. The company is a living being. 
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2. The decisions for action made by this living being result from a learning 
process. 
(de Geus, 1997, p. 201) 
 
Working on my thesis from a complex responsive processes view, I question this 
holistic systemic approach as a means of improving performance in organisations. 
In all four projects I have explained how I think a complexity approach can 
support the improvement of general or specific organisational processes. In 
Project Four I have clearly shared my reservations about working according to a 
systemic approach, e.g. when introducing the concept of communities-of-practice 
(Wenger, 1998), which is originally seen as a systemic way of working with 
boundaries, parts and whole. Stacey (2003a) extensively describes the 
development of many different forms of systems theory to explain how he moved 
from systemic to complex responsive process thinking. In my view organisations 
are not wholes, but temporary patterns of interaction and conversation by human 
beings, structuring themselves together with and under the influence of leadership 
and shared intentions, as I have explained in this thesis. However, the opposing 
opinions among managers about systems and processes will continue to exist, and 
it is only realistic to emphasise that a systems approach is deeply embedded in 
today’s management thinking. 
 
 
Possible future research  
 
What I have tried to explain is another approach of relating and organising, not 
within systems but as patterns of interaction within the responsibility of the senior 
executive. The interaction between participants is not directed through system 
relations but through processes of generalisation. In this explanation I refer to the 
approaches of Vygotsky (1979) and Mead (1934). Vygotsky (1979) considers that 
the combination of thought and language interacts in the person’s mind and body 
at the same time, developing meaning and sense (Kozulin, 1986) and seems not to 
consider interaction between people as a system. He explains the social 
development of people through influences by the other. This development of the 
‘generalised’ other is what Mead (1934) calls a ‘social object’: people developing 
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similar tendencies when confronted with similar situations. This can also be seen 
as the development of consciousness (Goguen, 2000). In my view, ‘social objects’ 
have strong social implications for behaviour or changes in people’s behaviour as 
a consequence of interaction within their specific groupings. Vygotsky and Mead 
are not the only authors to refer to social developments in processes of interaction. 
Van der Ven (2006) refers to Levinas, who developed the idea of an original ‘il-y-
a’ – literally, ‘there is [being or image]’ – a collective answer to important 
problems in the form of an organisation. Serres (1982) developed the idea of the 
‘quasi object’, where people are influenced not only by their relations towards 
each other but also by ‘things’ influencing this behaviour. Furthermore, Mead 
(1934) and Johannessen and Stacey (2005) explain the development of the ‘social 
object’ under influence of e.g. technology. In Project Four I have explained that I 
hold a different opinion on this, namely that the ‘social object’ can only be 
influenced by human interaction.   
 
My thesis is based on reflexive narratives connecting theory and practice, which 
in itself does not happen very often on an executive level. This connection can 
help others to think about the other side of the bridge, whatever side of the river 
we might find ourselves. I have tried to provide management insights in the 
paradox of ‘being in control and not in control at the same time’: in my view, the 
nature of the paradox means that it will never be completely understandable. 
 
The leader is present at many events at many levels of the organisation. How 
people experience this form of leadership has not been part of this argument, but 
could warrant further research. Many of the socio-psychological aspects 
highlighted in the synopsis can be taken up as separate areas of research. We need 
more detailed behavioural studies into how elements such as anxiety, trust, fear 
and power affect leadership during the described developments of local 
interaction and global patterns. Following the ideas of Morsing (1998a) and my 
own conclusions in Project Two, this also accounts for the conflict perspective 
that could be further developed as well in theory as in practice. 
 
Another question that emerged during the events of the last year is how to find the 
most suitable organisational structure. The next phase can be investigating the 
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relation between the development of local patterns, global outcome and the 
development of organisational structures as a temporarily construct. This is an 
area of further research in which the experiences of Wintzen (2006), Kolind 
(Morsing and Eiberg, 1998) and the mash-up ideas of Mulholland et al. (2006) 
and van Grieken, Klokgieters and Tolido (2007) can be very stimulating. We had 
the first meetings, with our managers, to investigate whether a new structure could 
emerge together with the professionals working on trains; a structure based on 
customer demands and employee needs when fulfilling these demands. The idea is 
that the organisation will be structured by the demand created by dominant local 
patterns of interaction related to main areas of customer services. In our view, this 
can lead to different (virtual) structural forms in which size, hierarchies, regions 
and many other traditional aspects of structuration will be left alone and aspects of 
customer demands and needs, and the responsibilities of local professionals, will 
be leading in the formation of the structure with a temporal character. These 
processes take place within our global executive’s responsibilities but stay away 
from a globally designed structure. The outcome should provide more satisfaction, 
flexibility and customer orientation and make use of the development of local 
interaction described in this thesis.  
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Appendix 1
Related Processes View on Strategy Approach
Authors Approach-Schools-Section Content
Section - Chapter Topic Strategy Tension
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Process Cognitive activities as part of the strategic reasoning 
process, mental tasks to increase the strategic knowing. 
Activities directed to defining and solving a strategic 
problem. 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Prescriptive Schools  Whittington (2001) The classical approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies        
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Strategy's Modernist Heritage Stacey (2003) Strategic Choice    
Strategic Thinking Logic    <   >    Creativity
Strategy Formation Deliberateness   <    >   Emergence
Strategic Change Logic    <   >    Creativity
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Content The intersection between an organization and its 
environment
Volberda et al. (2001 The Boundary School Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Out of Bounds
Stacey (2003) Chaos Theory, System Dynamics 
and Complex adaptive systems
Business Level Strategy Markets   <    >   Resources
Corporate Level Strategy Responsiveness   <    >   Synergy
Network Level Strategy Competition   <    >   Cooperation
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Context Working in pace with the environment and knowing this 
well. Move beyond adapting to shaping. Modify 
structure and competitive dynamics to gain an 
advantageous position.
Whittington (2001) The Systemic Approach on : 
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies  
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Contextual Challenges to the Field 
of Strategic Management
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Context
Industry Context Compliance   <    >   Choice
Organizational Context Control   <    >   Chaos
International Context Globalization   <    >   Localization
De Wit et al. (2005) Purpose Determinating the main benificiary of the value creation 
activities of the organization
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Strategic Management: Critical 
Reflections
Organizational Purpose Profitability   <    >   Responsibility
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Prescriptive Schools  Whittington (2001) The classical approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Strategy's Modernist Heritage Stacey (2003) Strategic Choice    De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Process
 The Design School Strategy formation as a process of conception, Selznick 
(1957), Andrews (1965).
The Planning School Strategy formation seen as a formal process, Ansoff (1965)    
The Positioning School Strategy formation as an analytical process, Schendel, 
Hatten (1970's), Porter (1980's)
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Descriptive Schools Volberda et al. (2001 The Dynamic Capability School Stacey (2003) Organizational learning
The Entrepreneurial School Strategy formation as a visionary process, Schumpeter 
(1950), Cole (1959)
The Cognitive School Strategy formation seen as a  mental process, Simon 
(1947,'57), March and Simon ('58).
The Learning School Strategy formation as an emergent process, Weick (1969), 
Quin ( 1980), Prahalad and Hamel (1990's)
The Power School Strategy formation as a process of negotiation, Allison 
(1971) micro, Astley (1984) macro.
The Cultural School Strategy formation as a collective process, Rhenman and 
Norman (1960s), Sweden
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Environmental School Strategy formation as a reactive process, biological 
evolution, law of the jungle, survival of the fittest, 
maximize profits, Hannah and Freeman (1977); 
contingency theorists (e.g., Pugh et al. 1960s)
Whittington (2001) Evolutionary Approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Intergration and Cross Fertilization 
in Strategic Management
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Configuration School Strategy formation as a process of transformation, 
Chandler (1962), Mc Gill Group( Mintzberg, Miller etc. 
late 1970s, Miles and Snow 1978)
Volberda et al. (2001) The Configuration School 
Whittington (2001) The classical approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies        
Relies on rational Planning models. Similar to 
Prescriptive schools of Mintzberg
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Prescriptive Schools  Pettigrew et al. (2002) Strategy's Modernist Heritage Stacey (2003) Strategic Choice    De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Process
Whittington (2001) Evolutionary Approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies  
Strategy formation as a reactive process, biological 
evolution, law of the jungle, survival of the fittest, 
maximize profits
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Environmental School Pettigrew et al. (2002) Intergration and Cross Fertilization 
in Strategic Management
Whittington (2001) The Processualist Approach on: 
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies     
Emphasize the sticky imperfect nature of all human life, 
organizations and markets. Long Range Planning is 
futile. Strategy emerges, learning and compromise, 
rational series of grand leaps forward (Mintzberg, 1994) 
Stacey (2003) Complex responsive processes 
perspective on strategy and 
organizing
Whittington (2001) The Systemic Approach on : 
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies  
Relativistic. Ends and means of strategy linked to 
cultures and powers of local systems. Depends on the 
particular social system in which strategy making takes 
place. Class and country make difference.
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Contextual Challenges to the Field 
of Strategic Management
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Context
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Context
Volberda et al. (2001) The Configuration School Strategic management as an episodic process in which 
certain (Mintzberg, 1998) strategy configurations 
dominate 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Configuration School 
Volberda et al. (2001 The Boundary School Strategy as a boundary decision, where to draw the 
boundary and managing fuzzy between firm and its 
environment 
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Out of Bounds
Stacey (2003) Chaos Theory, System Dynamics 
and Complex adaptive systems
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Content
Volberda et al. (2001 The Dynamic Capability School Strategy as a collective learning proces, developing 
distinctive capabilities hard to imitate
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Descriptive Schools Stacey (2003) Organizational learning
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Strategy and Management: The Strength and Limitations of a Field
Characterizing the Field of 
Strategic Management
Swings of a pendulum'. From strong practice elements 
through fads and fashions in duality of theory and 
practice to cross-fertilization, integration and 
complementary.
Intergration and Cross Fertilization 
in Strategic Management
Multidisciplinary melting-pot through direction, 
purpose, strategic leadership, organization and 
competitive performance. Sociological insights.
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Environmental School Whittington (2001) Evolutionary Approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Strategic Management: Critical 
Reflections
Lack of reflexivity. Duality of theory and practice and 
expectations of stakeholders. No longer rationally 
intended purposeful thought. Power. Social practice 
research underdeveloped.
De Wit et al. (2005) Purpose
Contextual Challenges to the Field 
of Strategic Management
National cultures and National institutions can shape 
strategy and behavior. Developments in social and 
economic theory. Importance of recognizing the business 
context.
Whittington (2001) The Systemic Approach on : 
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Context
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Context
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Doing More in Strategy Research
Strategy's Modernist Heritage Separation of strategy and operations. Confidence in top-
down rationality versus robust and genaral relationship 
between strategic actions and performance outcome, 
offering reliable guidelines
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Prescriptive Schools  Whittington (2001) The classical approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Stacey (2003) Strategic Choice    De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Process
Opportunities after Modernism: 
Creativity
Related diversification does not outperform unrelated 
diversification. Accumulation of the novel and the 
complex, rather than confirmations of the old, creates 
progress. Deductive and inductive approaches are not to 
be laid down in laws
Johnson et al. (2003) Micro Strategy
Opportunities after Modernism: 
Context
National regimes can have important implications for 
entrepreneurship and leads to an inductive approach, 
highlighting the particular, not closing down some 
generalization. 
Whittington (2001) The Systemic Approach on : 
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Contextual Challenges to the Field 
of Strategic Management
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Context
Opportunities after Modernism: 
Dynamism
Modernist science deals with states rather than complex 
processes that lead to them. Creative capacity of 
practitioners to generate new strategies. Change as 
ongoing dynamic journey. 
Stacey (2003) Complex responsive processes 
perspective on strategy and 
organizing
Opportunities after Modernism: 
Out of Bounds
Reaching across disciplines for multiple methods and 
perspectives necessary to to grasp complex reality. 
Boundary problem focuses on the firm. Change from an 
economy of discrete business units to webs of alliances. 
Volberda et al. (2001 The Boundary School Stacey (2003) Chaos Theory, System Dynamics 
and Complex adaptive systems
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Content
Opportunities after Modernism: 
Practical
What is' versus 'how to'. Better science through linking 
back to practice. Extremes more likely to produce 
insights. Constructing theories of creative action which 
highlights the practical 'how'. Hard-headed connections 
to performance outcomes. 
Johnson et al. (2003) Micro Strategy
Stacey (2003) Strategic Choice    Cybernetic System, implicating the general direction of 
chosen strategy by the most powerful individual or group 
of an organization
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Prescriptive Schools  Whittington (2001) The classical approach on:   
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies        
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Strategy's Modernist Heritage De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Process
Stacey (2003) Organizational learning Points to the limits of predictability. Recognizing non-
linearity, variying effect on outcome, positive feedback 
incorporating effects of general dynamics. Working 
from a systems point of view, dynamics between the 
systems
Mintzberg et al. (1998) The Descriptive Schools Volberda et al. (2001 The Dynamic Capability School 
Stacey (2003) Chaos Theory, System Dynamics 
and Complex adaptive systems
Bounded instability, effect on long- and short-term 
behavior of systems. Chaos theory and system dynamics, 
focus on the level of the system as a whole. Entities and 
their interactions are average, agents behave according 
to some set of rules. 
Volberda et al. (2001 The Boundary School Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Out of Bounds
De Wit et al. (2005) Strategy Content
Stacey (2003) Complex responsive processes 
perspective on strategy and 
organizing
Organizations as continually iterated processes of 
relating and communication between people. Strategy is 
an evolving pattern of collective and individual entities 
emerging in the ordinary everyday local interaction. 
Local leading to global.
Whittington (2001) The Processualist Approach on: 
Strategic leadership,                   
Strategic choice                                        
Growth strategies                        
Managing Strategies     
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Dynamism
Johnson et al. (2003) Micro Strategy
Johnson et al. (2003) Micro Strategy Emphasis on detailed processes and practices constituing 
day-to-day activities of organizational life, which relates 
to strategic outcome. Uncover plausible linkage to 
perfomance and offer tangible guides to managerial 
action. No process/content split
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Creativity
Pettigrew et al. (2002) Opportunities after Modernism: 
Practical
Stacey (2003) Complex responsive processes 
perspective on strategy and 
organizing
